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ABSTRACT
Saigon has occupied an important place in the American imagination.
Captivated by its French colonial past, a diverse array of American writers 
romanticized the city’s “tree-lined streets” as the “Paris of the East” and the 
“Pearl of the Orient.” As the United States extended its influence in Vietnam over 
the course of the twentieth Century, culminating during the 1960s, Saigon 
experienced America’s growing presence. Americans composed photographs 
and writings, both personal and published, to make sense of the changing city 
and the changing public opinion of the war. The juxtaposition of American- 
occupied French colonial architecture with the visual manifestations of a city at 
war (such as overcrowding, military personal, and bombed buildings) runs 
throughout American representations of Saigon. These representations 
transformed the romantically remembered boulevards into a dystopian vision of 
the South Vietnamese capital brimming with corruption, street vendors, sex 
workers, and bars. In order to convey different ideas about Saigon, many media 
producers and government officials relied on the bodies of the people in Saigon 
to convey different meanings. This project argues that American understandings 
of Saigon often relied on a reciprocal relationship between human bodies and 
the environment around them. Bodies lent meaning to aspects of the city while 
the city helped construct meanings around people’s bodies. In some cases, the 
bodies in question were those of Western men, but more often, the bodies of 
Vietnamese women did the work of creating American meanings for the city.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ii
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. Representations of Saigon in Print Culture through
the 1950s 31
Chapter 3. The Quiet American: Graham Greene, Joseph
Mankiewicz and the Imagining 1950s Saigon 77
Chapter 4. Protest and Public Space: Saigon during the 1963
“Buddhist Crisis” 109
Chapter 5. Else Baker: Viewing Saigon through American
Domestic Spaces 157
Chapter 6. Sex, Policy, and Leisure: The American Impact on
Saigon after Escalation 206
Chapter 7. Epilogue: Binaries, Myths and American Foreign
Policy 249
Works Cited 260
Vita 276
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thank you to my committee, Leisa Meyer (co-chair), Hiroshi Kitamura (co-chair), 
Charlie McGovern, and Kristin Hoganson for their guidance and help with this 
project. The research for my dissertation would have been impossible to conduct 
without the financial support of numerous sources. At the College of William and 
Mary, the American Studies Program and Arts and Sciences Office of Graduate 
Research both awarded me grants to conduct archival research. Outside of the 
College, the Massachusetts Historical Society’s support in the form of a short 
term research grant and inclusion in their vibrant academic community in Boston 
for several weeks was crucial in research Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.’s time in 
Saigon. I am also indebted to the U.S. Department of Education and the staff 
and faculty at Southeast Asian Studies Summer Institute for the Foreign 
Language and Area Studies Fellowship that allowed me to study Vietnamese. I 
also wish to thank the staff at the Western Historical Manuscript Collection, 
University of Missouri and at the National archives for their expert guidance in 
navigating their collections.
Thank you to my friends and family both at William & Mary and elsewhere for 
their help and support over the past 9 years of graduate study. I can’t imagine 
completing this dissertation without them.
Introduction
Saigon has occupied an important place in the American imagination. 
Captivated by its French colonial past, a diverse array o f American writers 
romanticized the city’s “tree-lined streets”1 as the “Paris o f the East”2 and the “Pearl 
of the Orient.”3 As the United States extended its influence in Vietnam over the 
course o f the twentieth Century, culminating during the 1960s, Saigon experienced 
America’s growing presence. Americans composed photographs and writings, both 
personal and published, to make sense o f the changing city and the changing public 
opinion of the war. The juxtaposition o f American-occupied French colonial 
architecture with the visual manifestations o f a city at war (such as overcrowding, 
military personal, and bombed buildings) runs throughout American representations 
of Saigon. These representations transformed the romantically remembered 
boulevards into a dystopian vision o f the South Vietnamese capital brimming with 
corruption, street vendors, sex workers, and bars.4
This project deconstructs Saigon’s trajectory from the romantic town 
Americans described before the American War in Vietnam to the sprawling, vice- 
filled city they left in 1975. However, we cannot examine these two poles, clean and
1 Jack Langguth, “Saigon Tries to Live in a Hurry,” New York Times, August 8, 1965.
2 Robert Trumbull “Still ‘Paris o f  the East’; South Vietnamese Live for Today 
Tomorrow May Bring Red Attack,” New York Times, June 3, 1961.
3 Homer Bigart, “Americans Placid Amid Saigon Peril,” New York Times, January 8, 
1962.
4 R. W. Apple, Jr, “All Discomforts o f Home,” New York Times, January 8, 1966; 
Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking Press, 1983), 35.
romantic/dirty and dangerous, using the convenience o f timeline. The Saigon 
Americans encountered and represented in media did not start as safe and end as 
dangerous. Rather, this binary shifted constantly. At times, competing versions of 
the city emerged at the same time among different factions o f  Americans. Multiple 
versions o f Saigon continually emerged in the American media, changing slightly 
each time, but generally orbiting the romantic/dangerous binary.
The ability for Saigon to have multiple meanings flows from the relationship 
between the its built, lived, and imagined environments. French Colonial buildings 
carried a history of the French presence in Saigon while the Americans living in 
Saigon experienced changes in the city, such as an increase in refugees or violence. 
At the same times, American writers and readers, both in Vietnam and in the United 
States, watched, looked at, and read media that described the city— conjuring a 
version o f the city in their imaginations. From each of these sources came different 
meanings of the city that combined to be how Americans understood Saigon. Along 
the same lines, in order to understand what Saigon “was” to Americans, this project 
takes into consideration different elements o f the American presence in Saigon. It at 
once considers the ways in which the United States contributed to the physical 
environment in Saigon, the actions of American government and military officials 
who influenced the lived experiences o f the Americans living in the city, and various 
constructions o f the city through the media.
In order to convey different ideas about Saigon, many media producers and 
government officials relied on the bodies o f the people in Saigon to convey different
3
meanings. This project argues that American understandings of Saigon often relied 
on the interpretation o f human bodies in order to lend meaning to aspects o f the city. 
In some cases, the bodies in question were those o f Western men, but more often, the 
bodies o f Vietnamese women did the work o f creating American meanings for the 
city. Depending on the viewer and the body being viewed, American, British,
French, and Vietnamese bodies of different genders embodied meanings and 
judgments about their respective nations and ethnicities. While this project does not 
engage with the same primary sources, it builds on the work of Sue Sun’s work about 
the relationship between the US military population, Vietnamese prostitutes and 
venereal disease. Specifically she discusses how a “sex-education” film produced by 
the U.S. military represented Vietnam as a nation dependent on the United States, and 
this relationship got constructed in terms of gender, the female body, and 
prostitution.5
To understand the relationship between the various bodies o f Saigon residents, 
as well as the geographical separation between the French downtown and other areas 
o f the city, this projects builds on Edward Said’s idea o f Orientalism. From the 
earliest writings on Saigon, Americans engaged with an East-West binary when 
dealing with the city, often imbuing that relationship with Orientalist conceptions of 
Asian cultures. Orientalism is a term that describes the way in which the “W est” 
(Europe and America) has viewed the “East” (Asian countries), how these “W estern”
5 Sue Sun, “Where the Girls Are: The Management of Venereal Disease by United 
States Military Forces in Vietnam,” Literature and Medicine 23, 
no. 1 (2004): 66-87.
perspectives gets expressed through cultural products* and the institutions that have 
produced these views and products. In other words, “Orientalism” does not play out 
simply in the imagination, but also in the material reality o f the viewers and the 
viewed. Orientalist thought creates and utilizes categories, such as “East,” or 
“Oriental” and “West,” that condense diverse cultures into homogenous labels. These 
labels allow people to easily create hierarchical differences between different 
cultures— for instance, the “West” is different from, and superior to, the “ East.”6
This project also builds on recent scholarship about the American W ar in 
Vietnam and argues that when studying the American War in Vietnam, scholars 
cannot take into consideration only traditional diplomatic sources, such as those 
found in the Foreign Relations o f  the United States series, media or personal 
documents. Instead, we need to work to span these archives, often contained to 
academic work in a single field. Excitingly, the scholarship on the American War in 
Vietnam has begun to make this turn. For example, Scott Laderman’s Tours o f  
Vietnam considers the relationship between tour guides and Americans living in 
Vietnam and how the imagined culture present in the guides influenced the real 
experience of those Americans living in Vietnam. Laderman’s work opens new 
possibilities for understanding the relationship between military, diplomatic, and 
cultural history.
6 For a description of Orientalism in a Cold War/American context, see Christina 
Klein’s Cold War Orientalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). For a 
more specific discussion o f how Western writers constructed Vietnamese people 
using Orientalist tropes, see Mark Bradley’s Imagining Vietnam & America  (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
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To help span these different archives, this project uses the work o f Edward 
Soja. Expanding on the ideas o f Henri Lefebvre,7 Soja considers how people have 
conceived of spatiality in terms o f a “Firstspace,” “Secondspace,” and a 
“Thirdspace.” Firstspace encompasses those “ways o f thinking” that consider the 
arrangement o f things. For instance, they might consider the location o f an embassy 
in downtown area or the locations o f different groups o f people in city.8 Intellectuals 
working with “Secondspace” often focus on how people understand places through 
the knowledge created through representations o f space. Thirdspace ways o f thinking 
introduce skepticism into the ways people understand spatiality and “all traditional
7 Lefebvre argues that urban spaces need to be examined in a way that is sensitive to 
their complexity. The physical urban environment functions on three different levels. 
First, people interpret the world around them. Second, people create abstract versions 
of the city space— such as city planners who create maps that then impact how the 
urban space is physically laid out. Third, people interact with other people in that city 
space. Lefebvre uses these three concepts in order to preserve the complexity o f 
urban space. With three ideas always in circulation (what Soja calls the “trialectics o f 
being”), he avoids the tendency to construct a binary— for example, city life is either 
lived or imagined— as a third idea will always critique, influence, and help construct 
the other two. One of Lefebvre’s main contributions to using the idea of “space” is 
that space is produced. People and organizations create an environment that is a 
product o f their relationships with one another. The space is then capable o f 
reproducing these relationships over time. As a result, an urban space is constructed 
by people and their relationship with the world around them and is simultaneously 
constructing that very same world. This approach to analyzing urban spaces is also 
called the “sociospatial perspective” and is part of what some sociologists identify as 
the “new urban sociology.” The basic idea is that physical space can impact social 
relationships. This differs from an older model known as “urban ecology.” Urban 
ecology uses biological metaphors and the idea o f changing technology to describe 
changes in metropolitan areas. Specifically, the “sociaspatial perspective” allows for 
scholars to engage in “factors o f class, race, gender, lifestyle, economics, culture, and 
politics.” Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, Gottdiener, “A Marx for Our Tim e,” 
131-132; Hayden, The Power o f  Place, 18-20.
Edward Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined 
Places (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 74-75.
ways of confidently obtaining knowledge about the world.”9 Thirdspace analysis 
focuses on how space interacts with existential issues of “being and becoming” and 
how spatial issues influence theoretical constructions, “empirical analysis, critical 
inquiry, and social practice.”10 Put another way, Thirdspace combines the real and 
the imagined in order to understand how the world constructs meaning in a person’s 
life. Thirdspace provides a realm in which '‘''everything comes together. ..subjectivity 
and objectivity, the abstract and the concrete, the real and the imagined.. .mind and 
body...everyday life and unending history.” 11
One of the keys to unpacking the American understandings o f Saigon is the 
city’s downtown area. This neighborhood contained many Saigon landmarks that 
appeared throughout twentieth-century American representations o f the city. In this 
relatively small area next to the Saigon River, visitors found the Presidential Palace, a 
large catholic cathedral, a zoo, embassies, government buildings and rue Catinat/Tu 
Do Street (a street with nightlife and shopping, as well as hotels that catered to 
Western visitors). This area was the original focus o f French Colonial builders who
17built government buildings for French and Indochinese officials. Once the French 
left, the Americans moved into this area— leasing office space and villas for their own
9 Ibid., 81.
10 Ibid., 82 .
" Ibid., 5 6 -5 7 .
12 France originally captured a citadel at Saigon in 1859 and destroyed the 
surrounding villages. By 1861, French military government officials started 
planning what a French-built Saigon would look like. Planners wanted to build a 
major port on the Saigon River as well as business and government centers. At this 
time, French planners established a central district around a main street named Rue 
Catinat. Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics o f  Design in French Colonial Urbanism, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 167-169.
government officials.
France’s colonial project in Indochina started in the mid-nineteenth century and 
spread throughout Southeast Asia incrementally in hopes to compete with the British 
to trade in newly-opened Chinese ports. After several years o f military actions,
France took control o f Saigon, and later Hanoi. By 1884, all of Vietnam was part o f a 
French protectorate and France split the country into three sections called the 
“Indochinese Union.”
The French in Indochina imported their own “civilizing” mission to the colony. 
Part of this mission was to build roads and buildings that would bolster the colonial 
power structure through their imposing design. French military engineers tailored 
Saigon to aid in the surveillance o f the local population: wide streets allowed colonial 
authorities to observe public activities and the paucity o f open spaces made it difficult 
for rebels to gather.13 The French government created buildings that touted its proud 
civilization. In a small area a few blocks from the Saigon River, French engineers 
constructed such buildings as an opera house, a palace for their governor-general 
(1873), and a cathedral (1880).14
America’s presence in Asia began to grow in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Seeking access to Asian markets, U.S. expansionist policies led 
to the annexation of Hawai’i and the Philippines and the Open Door policy attempted 
to keep trade in China open for Western interests. Amid these policies, the United
13 Nicola Cooper, France in Indochina, (New York: Berg, 2001), 44.
14 Wright, The Politics o f  Design in French Colonial Urbanism , 174-175.
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States elevated its presence in Southeast Asia as well, In 1907, the United States 
State Department established a Consulate in Saigon.15 At the time, the Consulate 
served all o f French Indochina.16 It provided “economic and commercial reporting” 
and aid to American business representatives stopping in Saigon—a convenient 
stopover for steamships to make between Singapore and Hong Kong.
The 1920s saw the French colonial government in Saigon continue to develop
the city in its own image. To that end, the French colonial administration hired urban
planner Ernest Hebrard in 1921 to help develop a design aesthetic specific to France’s
presence in Southeast Asia and to help manage industrial growth in the cities.17 For
Hebrard, developing an aesthetic meant fusing French designs with local building
18conventions to help adapt structures to the weather and the environment.
Hebrard created plans for the major cities o f Indochina, including Saigon,
Hanoi and Haiphong.19 Assuming that the continued development o f the French part
of these cities would displace the Vietnamese in the city to suburbs for workers,
20Hebrard figured he could develop the downtown areas o f the cities. The plans 
Hebrard designed cited American zoning-practices that helped to maintain property
15 Quincy Roberts, Post Report, Records o f the Foreign Service Posts o f the 
Department of State, 1788-ca. 1991, National Archives, Record Group 84 Stack Area 
350 Row 70 Compartment 33 Shelf 5-2 Box 1, 1936), 4.
16 Ibid., 2-3.
17 Wright, The Politics o f  Design in French Colonial Urbanism, 201—203. The 
French were not alone in the practice of creating an aesthetic for the cities o f  in their 
empire. The United States, for instance, hired architect and Planner Daniel Burnham 
to create plans for Manila.
18 Ibid., 203.
19 Ibid., 209.
20 Ibid.
values by separating areas based on their desirability, or lack thereof.21 New 
institutions emerged in the area as well, such as banks and French corporations.22 
Thus, during this time, downtown Saigon continued to develop, at least from the 
French perspective.23
Hebrard also attempted to manage how the Europeans and Vietnamese 
interacted with one another by segregating Saigon. He didn’t think that the colonial 
experience for the Europeans living in Saigon should be devoid of contact with 
Vietnamese people, but felt that “every European district needs a native district in 
order to survive; it will provide indispensable domestic servants, small businesses, 
and labor.”24 As a result, the French colonial government established part o f Saigon 
for permanent French housing.
In the early twentieth century, relatively few Americans lived in Saigon. By 
1936, only four American organizations existed in Saigon— two private companies
21 Ibid., 209-210.
22 Ibid., 213.
23 This seems like a predecessor to what would emerge after World War II as 
“modernization theory.” This theory, backed by social science, forwarded the idea 
that the American institutions and ideas should be exported to other parts o f  the 
world. Modernization theory worked as a Cold W ar ideology as its proponents 
believed it would introduce countries to capitalism and prevent them from 
Communist influence. While this French instance predates the Cold War, by 
comparing it to Modernization Theory, we are able to think through how the United 
States presence in Vietnam may or may not have been acting in a similar way. For an 
overview o f Modernization Theory and the American War in Vietnam, see Jonathan 
Nashel, “The Road to Vietnam” in Cold War Constructions, ed. Christian G. Appy, 
(Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press, 2000).
24 Quoted in ibid., 221.
25 Ibid., 221-222.
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and two missionary groups.26 These groups, in addition to the staff at the Consulate, 
totaled about twenty Americans. Together with around 30 British residents, who 
made up the rest of the “foreign community” in Saigon,27 these Americans met 
socially at clubs and hotel terraces,28 like that of the Continental Hotel on Rue 
Catinat.29 The Consulate recommended its staff join a few French-managed clubs, 
specifically a French swimming and recreational club called the Cercle Sportif, and 
the Saigon Golf Club, a 100-or-so member club with a French, American and British 
membership. The Golf Club was the “social center for the foreign community outside 
o f the Cercle Sportif and the hotel[s].”30 These places, while frequented by the 
French residents of Saigon, did not necessarily provide much social overlap between 
“foreign” and “French” communities. Social interactions between French, American 
and British residents often happened in more formal environments— be they 
receptions at someone’s home, Government House, or formal dinners.31
Even if their social circles did not always intertwine, the lives o f  the French and 
the American communities overlapped as they resided in the same part o f town. The 
American Consulate was located at the corner o f Rue Catinat and Rue Lagrandiere. 
This location placed Americans in the middle o f the French sector o f the city— “the 
building is two blocks from the main shopping district, the principal hotel, the
y / r
Roberts, Post Report, Records o f the Foreign Service Posts of the Department 
of State, 1788-ca. 1991, National Archives, Record Group 84, Stack Area 350, Row 
70 Compartment 33 Shelf 5-2 Box 1, p. 4.
27 Ibid., 39.
28 Ibid., 36.
29 Ibid., 39.
30 Ibid., 36.
31 Ibid., 39.
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residence of the Governor o f Cochinchina, Government offices, Hospital Grail, the 
Cathedral, and the Post Office."'2 Some o f the employees lived on the consular 
premises, while others lived nearby. ’3 The overlap o f French and the limited 
American community in Saigon foreshadowed the spatial relationship between these 
communities that would continually emerge later in the twentieth century. The 
Americans followed the French in Saigon. In these early days, the Americans went to 
similar places to shop, socialize, and live their lives. Many o f these institutions, like 
the Hotel Continental, persisted throughout the American War in Vietnam. While the 
Western population o f Saigon shifted, these institutions stayed in the same place—  
downtown Saigon— and let the new Westerners, be it the French or the Americans, 
find them.
During World War II, the American presence in Saigon shrank from its already 
small size. In 1940, Japan took control o f Indochina and Saigon,34 and with it, the 
American Consulate. In 1945 Japan recognized Vietnam as an independent state and, 
later in the year, surrendered to Allied forces and left Vietnam. After Japanese forces 
left Vietnam, the Vietminh (the Vietnamese nationalist group and led by Ho Chi 
Minh) stepped up to lead the country, setting up a government in Hanoi in 1946. 
However, the French did not want to cede control o f the country and declared that the 
Republic of Cochinchina (the southern-most area o f  the country containing Saigon)
32 Ibid., 12.
33 Living Quarters Statement, Records o f the Foreign Service Posts o f  the Department 
of State, 1788-ca. 1991, National Archives, Record Group 84 Stack Area 350 Row 70 
Compartment 33 Shelf 5-2 Box 1, 1939), p. 4.
34 David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Quest fo r  Power, (Berkeley: University o f 
California Press, 1997), 36.
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was a separate state. By the end o f the year, military actions between French and 
Vietminh forces ushered in the First Indochina War.
As France fought the Vietminh for the control of Vietnam, the United States 
reestablished their small presence in Saigon. After the Consulate reopened on 
February 19, 1946,j:> the United States moved to purchase land from the French for a 
new Consulate complex. This new compound, previously home to the French 
military court, was still in the downtown French district.36 The new Consulate would 
sit next to a park, the residence o f the President o f  the Provisional Government o f the 
Republic o f Cochinchina, and a residential property owned by the Bank o f  Indochina. 
The consular staff believed such a location would be “ideal and is unlikely to be 
depreciated,”37 and “with proper development would give the United States
38representation in Saigon one o f the finest properties in the city.”
This new Boulevard Norodom property gave the United States a stake in 
downtown Saigon and the process o f renovating the property promised greater U.S. 
influence in the area. Because the allies bombed the two-block area around the 
property during World War II, the United States needed to renovate the property 
before using it.39 Even though the French completed many o f the repairs before the
35 Roberts, Post Report, 5.
36 Charles S. Reed 11, American Consul to Secretary of State, 26 April 1947,
Classified General Records Collection, 1946-1963, National Archives.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 No. 80, Saigon, Indochina, April 9, 1949, “Subject: Funds for Remodeling and 
Landscaping the Rue Massiges Residence and Blvd. Norodom Property,” Dept. O f 
State, US Embassy, South Vietnam, General Records, 1936-1963, National Archives,
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United States took possession,40 the renovation process allowed the United States 
Consulate General to start developing a relationship with those members o f  Saigon’s 
government who oversaw the visual aspects o f the city. At the time o f the United 
States’s renovations, only one modem apartment building had been built on 
Boulevard Norodom, and Saigon’s city government was planning a beautification 
project that the Consulate General expected would require all street-facing buildings 
to adhere to the same aesthetic. As a result, the Consulate General concluded that by 
default, the United States’ decisions on how to use and design the buildings on the 
property would “in a sense set the plan” for the way the Boulevard would look. All 
plans had to be approved by the Saigon government, but the Consulate General did 
not expect any problems.41
In addition to the acquisition o f the Boulevard Norodom property in the French 
downtown, the United States established an office and reading room for the United 
States Information Service (USIS) in 1947 at the comer o f  Rue Catinat and Rue des 
Freres Denis.42 By 1949, the lease on this building had run out and the Consulate
ARC 1742016, RG 84, Stack Area 350, Row 70, Compartment 33, Shelf 5-2, Box 61, 
Folder 3.
40 From George M. Abbot, American Consul General, To Secretary o f State,
“Subject: Reimbursement of the French Army for Expenses Incurred in Preliminary 
Remodeling o f Villa at 7 Rue de Massiges,” No. 37, American Consulate General, 
Saigon, Indochina, February 17, 1949, Dept. O f State, US Embassy, South Vietnam 
General Records, 1936-1963, National Archives, Box 61, Folder 3.
41 From: George M. Abbot, American Consul General, No. 161, Saigon, Indochina, 
August 23, 1949. “Subject: Boulevard Norodom Property: Transmission o f  Foreign 
Buildings Operations Form SI, Requirements for Land Surveys and Soil 
Investigations (New Projects),” Dept. O f State, US Embassy, South Vietnam General 
Records, 1936-1963, National Archives, Box 61, Folder 3.
42 Post Report 1947, 2.
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had to help find a new location for the USIS. The Consulate leased a location up the 
street from their previous Rue Catinat location on the third floor in the “Eden 
Arcade,”43 a collection o f shops that contained “fashionable stores and a high class 
motion picture theater,” across the street from the Continental Hotel.44 The Consulate 
hoped the location would provide increased traffic because it was close to the shops 
and the theater.45 While the location lacked street frontage, it was “at the very center 
of Saigon,” and closer to the Consulate’s offices.
The expansion of the American presence in Saigon came as American aid to the 
French cause increased. In 1949, France dissolved the Republic o f Cochinchina in 
favor of a unified Vietnam. However, they did not grant this state full independence. 
Nonetheless, in an effort to prevent Vietnam from being a “domino whose ‘fall’ 
would turn the Pacific into a Soviet Lake, denying vital raw materials to the United 
States and its allies,”46 the United States recognized the France’s State o f Vietnam 
and, in 1950, gave financial support to newly formed government. The Truman 
administration also created the Miliatary Assistance Advisory Group to help 
distribute financial aid to the French military. By 1950, the Consulate sought 
additional properties to purchase or rent in the downtown area because the Consulate
43 George M. Abbott, American Consul General, To Secretary of State, No. 65 “Quest 
for New Quarters for USIE Reading Room,” Saigon, Indochina, March 22, 1949,
Dept. O f State, US Embassy, South Vietnam General Records, 1936-1963, National 
Archives, Box 61.
44 Memo To Consul General From H. Francis Cunningham, Jr., “Problems o f Finding 
New Space for USIE Reading Room, Saigon, March 3, 1949,” Dept. O f State, US 
Embassy, South Vietnam General Records, 1936-1963, National Archives, Box 61.
45 Ibid.
46 Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 29.
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felt that area was more secure.47 In addition to the residence on Boulevard Norodom, 
which contained two apartments, the Consulate negotiated the purchase o f two other 
properties: a “bungalow” at 13 rue Alphonse Folloit48 and a three-bedroom, two-bath 
home for the Consulate General.49 George Abbot, the American Consul in Saigon, 
urged the State Department to purchase more property in Saigon, as the Consulate 
staff grew too large for the additional rented accommodations (two houses, two 
apartments, and a hotel room).50 The hotel rooms Americans rented to supplement 
apartments and houses also kept Americans in the downtown area. Hotel Continental, 
as noted in the Retail Price Schedule as being the best hotel in Saigon and “the only 
hotel in Saigon which is considered suitable for American personnel,” was located on 
Rue Catinat. The Majestic Hotel, next to the Saigon River and at the end o f Rue 
Catinat, boasted renovated rooms that allowed the Consulate to recommend it for use
47 Don V. Catlett, Consul, Retail Price Schedule, June 16, 1950, Saigon, Indochina, 
Dept. O f State, US Embassy, South Vietnam, General Records, 1936-1963, National 
Archives, ARC 1742016, RG 84, Stack Area 350, Row 70, Compartment 33, Shelf 5- 
2, Box 73.
48 Enclosure to Despatch No. 166 dated August 30, 1949 from American Consulate 
General on the subject: “Report o f  Status o f  Authorization - Foreign Building 
Operations -  Indochina,” Saigon, August 31, 1949, Dept. O f State, US Embassy, 
South Vietnam General Records, 1936-1963, National Archives, Box 61.
49 George Abbot, American Consul, Housing, 249, December 27, 1949, Saigon, 
Indochina, December 27, 1949, Dept. O f State, US Embassy, South Vietnam General 
Records, 1936-1963, National Archives, Box 61.
50 George Abbot, American Consul, Housing, 249, December 27, 1949, Saigon, 
Indochina, December 27, 1949, Dept. O f State, US Embassy, South Vietnam General 
Records, 1936-1963, National Archives, Box 61. ; George Abbot, American Consul, 
to Edmond A. Gullion, Esquire, Office o f Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, 
Department o f  State, Saigon, Indochina, December 16, 1949, Dept. O f State, US 
Embassy, South Vietnam General Records, 1936-1963, National Archives, Box 61.
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by Americans as well.51
As the State Department increased its staff for the Saigon Consulate and moved 
them into the city’s downtown, the everyday lives of Americans in Saigon 
increasingly focused on the downtown area. In a report submitted to the State 
Department to give an idea of the cost o f living in Saigon for Consulate employees, 
Consul Don Catlett included only retail “outlets.. .located in the downtown business 
district.” The “cost of living report” revealed that everyday American life in 
Saigon was mostly contained within Saigon’s downtown. Both expensive dry goods 
and mid-priced food could be purchased on Rue Catinat.33 A department store was 
located on Boulevard Chamer,54 and fresh meat and produce were available at Les 
Frigorifiques, a store located in the same building as the Consular offices on Rue 
Lagrandiere.55
However, the documenting o f shops that Americans frequented did not provide
51 Retail Price Schedules for Saigon, French Indochina, April 1948, for American 
Consulate General, Saigon, Dept. O f State, US Embassy, South Vietnam General 
Records, 1936-1963, National Archives, ARC 1742016, RG 84, Stack Area 350, Row 
70, Compartment 33, Shelf 5-2, Box 54, p. 22; Retail Price Schedules for Saigon, 
French Indochina, October 27 1948, for American Consulate General, Saigon, 
National Archives, ARC 1742016, RG 84, Stack Area 350, Row 70, Compartment 
33, Shelf 5-2, Box 54, p. 22; M.A. Colebrook, Consul., Travel and Tourism French 
Indochina, August 14, 1948, Dept. O f State, US Embassy, South Vietnam, General 
Records, 1936-1963, National Archives, ARC 1742016, RG 84, Stack Area 350, Row 
70, Compartment 33, Shelf 5-2, Box 54, p. 1.
c  •y
Don V. Catlett, Consul, Retail Price Schedule, June 16, 1950, Saigon, Indochina, 
National Archives, ARC 1742016, RG 84, Stack Area 350, Row 70, Compartment 
33, Shelf 5-2, Box 54, p. 18.
53 Ibid., 7a, 11.
54 Ibid., 11.
55 Ibid., 3, 6.
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a full picture o f how Americans understood the city. According to Catlett, American 
women in Saigon went to many of the shops themselves, but often opted to send their 
servants to Saigon’s Central Market, also located downtown, on Boulevard Bonard. 
Catlett explained that shopping in general was inconsistent as it was “tedious,” and 
the prices corresponded more to the shopper than the goods.56 If shoppers liked to 
haggle for prices, they could get goods for less, but this depended on the language 
skills o f both buyer and seller. Moreover, Catlett explained that prices that were 
demanded for goods went up if the buyer was a “ foreigner,” and even higher if  that 
person wasn’t French.57
By the 1950s, Americans increasingly focused their attention on the downtown 
of Saigon. Descriptions o f the city placed more importance on the area and placed 
other sections o f  the city in the periphery. The 1953 Post Report, a guide created by 
the United States Embassy to describe to Americans living in Saigon what to expect 
and places to go and shop for fulfill their basic needs, described the Saigon-Cholon 
area starting from the French downtown. The city “spreads out in a large semi circle 
on the North side o f the Saigon river.” The description focuses on the seven-block 
me Catinat, the “central avenue o f the European business section.” While connecting 
the river to the Cathedral, the Post report described the streets as lined not only by 
shops and cafes, but also by large shade trees.58
56 Ibid., 3, 7.
57 Ibid., 18.
58 Post Report fo r  Saigon... Vietnam, February 1953, Records of U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961 ... Series A: Mission to Vietnam. Reel 16, p. 2.
The late 1940s and early 1950s also saw the United States start to affect 
Saigon’s population in addition to its real estate. Since the beginning of the First 
Indochina War in 1946, in which the French colonial authorities fought the Viet 
Minh, refugees moved from rural areas to urban ones, as fighting spread through the 
countryside. After the war ended in 1954, a new factor caused people to migrate 
throughout Vietnam. As part o f the 1954 cease-fire agreement, the French and Viet 
Minh agreed to split the country along the 17lh parallel, creating a North Vietnam and 
a South Vietnam.59 The agreement stated that until all military forces repositioned 
themselves according to the new boundary, civilians who wished to live in the other 
part of Vietnam could do so.60 This moving of people from North to South 
Vietnam— what was called Operation Exodus— started in late July 1954.61 In August 
of that year, an American General for the Military Assistance Advisory Group took 
charge o f the refugees in Vietnam.62 The movement of people South lasted until the 
middle of 1955, by which time over 800,000 people had moved from North 
Vietnam.63 Around 140,000 of these people were associated with the French, worked
59 “Exodus: Report on a Voluntary Mass Flight to Freedom, Viet-nam, 1954,” 
Department o f  State Bulletin,Volume XXXII, Number 815, 222.
60 Ibid.
61 Directorate General of Information Saigon - Vietnam, “Operation Exodus: The 
Refugee Movement to Free Vietnam,” No Date, Folder 16, Box 12, Douglas Pike 
Collection: Unit 11 - Monographs, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech 
University. Accessed 29 Aug. 2011.
<http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2391216004>, 4.
62 “Exodus: Report on a Voluntary Mass Flight to Freedom, Viet-nam, 1954,” 223.
63 “Exodus: Report on a Voluntary Mass Flight to Freedom, Viet-nam, 1954,” 222; 
Directorate General o f Information Saigon - Vietnam, “Operation Exodus: The 
Refugee Movement to Free Vietnam,” 1, 20.
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for the military and government, or had other means to move south.64
The United States aided those people wishing to leave the North for the South. 
The United States Navy, for example, provided ships to transport a large number o f 
the migrants. At first, the refugees headed to 42 “reception centers.. .in and around 
Saigon,”63 but the number o f refugees quickly outgrew the facilities available. 
Refugees lived all around the city— at a horse race track, in the French-built Opera 
House, schools and other large buildings.66 The United States, in addition to French 
and South Vietnamese authorities, had to construct temporary facilities outside Cape 
St. Jacques to accommodate more refugees. After the initial move was over, the 
South Vietnamese government attempted to find permanent housing for the refugees, 
and many of the recent arrivals settled in Saigon or the provinces around it.67 Also, 
the French Commissariat General built more durable housing for some of the refugees 
along the highways leaving and entering the city and relocated others to villages in 
more rural areas.68
Refugees arriving in Saigon were met not by the relaxed city o f the French and 
American imagination but rather one affected by civil discord. In March 1955, a 
battle broke out in Saigon started by the Binh Xuyen, a private army, used by the 
French to fight the war. They attacked the Saigon police headquarters and shelled the
64 Directorate General of Information Saigon - Vietnam, “Operation Exodus: The 
Refugee Movement to Free Vietnam,” 20.
65 “Exodus: Report on a Voluntary Mass Flight to Freedom, Viet-nam, 1954,” 226.
66 Directorate General of Information Saigon - Vietnam, “Operation Exodus: The 
Refugee Movement to Free Vietnam,” 17.
67 Ibid., 22.
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Presidential Palace. ’ American reporters also took note o f the refugees’ living 
situation. One New York Times reporter described a scene he witnessed one Easter 
Sunday. He had observed the newly-arrived migrants come out of the Opera House 
where they were living, “ their clothes more tatters than clothes,” and walk down Tu 
Do Street to the Cathedral a few blocks away, while others slept on the street outside 
or begged for money.70
The battles fought in Saigon continued in April of 1955 as the Binh Xuyen 
challenged the South Vietnamese government in the city’s streets, particularly 
Boulevard Gallieni, a heavily populated main street that connected downtown Saigon 
to Cholon, where the Binh Xuyen were headquartered.71 Outbreaks o f  fire also 
burned a large swath o f the city.72
Along with the story of the fighting in Saigon and Cholon, the New York Times 
ran a map of Saigon.73 Complementing the accompanying article, this map illustrates 
the creation of an imagined Saigon, combining elements present in other texts, like 
Graham Greene’s The Quiet American. The map/article pair reveals how Saigon was 
organized. In the few blocks around the Presidential Palace, here called the Premier’s 
Palace, one could find other powerful agencies like the police. The article described
69 Tillman Durdin, “Troops In Saigon Clash With Sect ” New York Times, March 
30, 1955; “Civil War Erupts in South Viet-Nam,” Los Angeles Times, March 30,
1955.
70 Robert Alden, “Refugees’ Misery Evident In Saigon,” New York Times, April 11, 
1955.
' '  A. M. Rosenthal, “Saigon Is Swept By Civil W arfare” New York Times, April 29, 
1955.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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how one part of Saigon fought while another went about its daily life. At times, the 
fighting happened outside the downtown districts, but at other times it entered the 
small French-designed area. However, the physical distance was not the only power 
at work that might insulate parts o f Saigon from war— so did national affiliation. The 
reporter described an American unaffected by the war: “on a balcony an American 
G. I. pulled at a bottle o f beer and watched the show.”74
While Americans were for the most part observing other factions take part in 
the violence, there were some incidents involving Americans in Saigon. In July 1955, 
a group o f South Vietnamese protestors broke into two hotels in Saigon housing the 
Armistice Commission to protest what they felt was the Commission’s favoring o f  the 
North Vietnamese.75 One o f the hotels, the Majestic, had 57 Americans living in it. 
While inside this hotel at the end o f Tu Do Street, the crowd looted rooms, ripped out
7 f\elevators, and burned two cars. A few weeks after the riot at the Majestic, two 
American cars were bombed outside o f the American Embassy.77 In September 1957, 
bombs exploded the United States Information Library, a U.S. military bus, and a 
U.S. military billet in Cholon.78 As one reporter commented, the bombs were meant 
to “injure Americans and destroy United States property.”79
74 Ibid.
75 John Roderick, “Perle Mesta Holds O ff Saigon Mob Till Rescued From Hotel,”
The Washington Post, July 21,1955.
76 “Mobs Sack Hotels In Saigon, 60 Hurt ,” New York Times, July 21, 1955.
77 “Saigon Terrorists Bomb U.S. Cars , ” The Washington Post, August 1, 1955.
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The United States undertook additional construction projects in the Saigon area 
in the late 1950s. The United States Mission in Vietnam was restricted by the 1954 
agreement to refrain from building new military installations in Vietnam. However, it 
could build civilian facilities with foreign aid money, like improved runways at Tan 
Son Nhut, Saigon’s major airport, so it could handle large je ts.S() But by 1962, the 
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (the replacement for the 
Military Assistant Advisory Group created in the 1950s by the Tmman 
administration) established a headquarters in downtown Saigon, with its staff living in
8Ihotels and houses.
Saigon in the early 1960s was the site o f numerous coups as leaders shifted in 
an out o f the South Vietnamese government. At the same time, protestors took to the 
streets on many occasions, often protesting the treatment o f V ietnamese Buddhists by 
Catholic politicians. A new name for the communist enemy also emerged. The 
National Liberation Front replaced the Viet Minh as the armed branch o f the 
Communist party working in Vietnam. The soldiers, both those formally part o f the 
NLF or fighting for the same cause, were referred to as the Vietcong. After the 
United States’ varying degrees o f support o f these administrations, and its 
involvement in the coups, came the period commonly thought of as American 
“escalation” of the American War in Vietnam. In August 1964, the G ulf o f  Tonkin
Adrian G. Traas, Engineers at War, Center for Military History, United States
Army (Washington, DC: 2010), 2.
8! Adrian G. Traas, Engineers at War, Center for Military History, United States 
Army (Washington, DC: 2010), 3; Cosmas, Graham A., MACV: The Joint Command 
in the Years o f  Escalation, 1962-1967, Center for Military History (Washington, DC, 
2006), 45-46.
23
incident— where U.S. Navy vessels allegedly came under attack by North Vietnamese 
forces— led to a resolution authorizing the use o f U.S. military force in Vietnam.
U.S. involvement proceeded as an “air war” until 1965 when U.S. Marines landed in 
Vietnam to protect an airbase. President Johnson then committed 150,000 troops to 
the war.
From the perspective of Saigon, 1965 marked a change in American life in the 
city. President Johnson ordered the families of service members stationed there to 
leave the country in preparation o f an escalated war effort. As the families left, and 
more soldiers arrived, Saigon became increasingly crowded, expensive, and 
represented as a dangerous place full o f vice. While Saigon always had outbreaks of 
Violence since the Americans had been in the city, January 1968 marked a high- 
point. In January and February 1968, the Vietcong executed an attack on urban areas 
and other targets across Vietnam. Later called the Tet Offensive, this attack included 
a raid on the newly-finished American Embassy in Saigon.
The de-escalation period of the American War in Vietnam followed the Tet 
Offensive as American public opinion turned firmly against the war. President 
Johnson authorized fewer troops than the military requested and in 1969, President 
Nixon started to withdraw troops from Vietnam. Nixon announced a gradual plan to 
“Vietnamize” the war— the United States would provide aid and support to South 
Vietnamese cause, but the troops would have to come from Vietnam. In 1973, the 
United States signed an agreement to end the fighting in Vietnam. While this cease­
fire did not stop the fighting between North and South Vietnamese troops, it did allow
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the United States to remove its military forces. After 1973, the United States 
Congress reduced funding to support the South Vietnamese war effort and in 1975, 
North Vietnamese forces entered Saigon while the last few Americans evacuated the 
city. After taking over the city, Saigon was renamed to Ho Chi Minh City.
In the following chapters, I use five vignettes to explore the variations and 
through lines in American meanings and understandings o f Saigon— in other words, 
how the Americans helped to construct the “space” of Saigon. Chapter One explores 
the writing of the first American travelers arriving in Saigon. Starting in the 
nineteenth century, American writers travelled to Saigon and had to confront the 
colonial presence there. While some writers assumed a “civilizing” role, much in the 
spirit o f the colonial power structure they found in Saigon, others attempted to 
separate themselves from the colonial systems in place in Saigon. However, this split 
between “American” and “colonial” was not an easy one to maintain. Americans 
visiting in Saigon often stayed in the French downtown o f Saigon, where they 
recognized the Western urban plan and could enjoy the luxuries the French had 
imported by the late-nineteenth century, such as a cafe culture. Some American 
writers used these luxuries and Saigon’s development to critique French colonialism. 
Because the French downtown was so different from the rest of the city, some argued 
it was a physical manifestation o f how the French were unable to manage a colony.
Many American writers contemplated what was “real” in Saigon. For some, the 
French presence, and sometimes the French “character,” in Saigon was superficial. In 
the early twentieth century, Saigon left writers with a feeling of the past— it recreated
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parts of their previous experiences in France. American writers criticizing the French 
presence in Saigon saw the feelings of the past created by the city as inauthentic and, 
at best, superficial. Saigon’s success, for some, was rooted in its ability to recreate 
the feeling of France in Indochina. The impact o f the recreation o f France was 
lessened by the presence o f the indigenous population o f Saigon. As the First 
Indochina war started, Americans in Saigon wrote o f an unstable city. For many, the 
authentic city still hid behind a colonial facade. But with the start o f the war, behind 
the facade of prosperity, leisure, and French colonial architecture lurked danger.
Chapter Two examines The Quiet American, both the original 1954 novel by 
British author Graham Greene, and the American film directed by Joseph 
Mankiewicz in 1958. Engaging with many o f the same themes as American writers 
both before and after them, these texts reveal how American understandings o f 
Saigon did not exist in isolation— either in terms o f national boundaries or medium. 
Specifically, Greene’s novel and the 1958 film challenge the divide between a “real” 
and “imagined” Saigon, and use the bodies o f the people in Saigon to understand the 
city as they reveal different meanings about both local and international relations.
The visual medium of the film also allowed it to utilize the power o f the French 
colonial architecture to represent a French-controlled Saigon during a time when 
Americans lived in the French section o f the city. The film also engages with the 
real/imagined divide through its set design as well as such visual cues as makeup.
Chapter Three addresses how the foreign press corps in Saigon— the journalists 
and photographers working for the likes of the New York Times, the Associated Press
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and other American media outlets— enabled different factions in Saigon to impose 
their meanings on the city for their own political motives. More specifically, it 
examines the press coverage around the “Buddhist Crisis” o f 1963, which stemmed 
from Buddhist objections to the Catholic-led government o f South Vietnam. At a 
time when the United States could not publicly side with the Buddhists, the State 
Department, here represented by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., asserted itself 
in Saigon to send a message about its commitment to South Vietnam.
Journalistic representations o f the Buddhist Crisis revealed how Saigon’s public 
spaces downtown served as arenas where Buddhists and South Vietnamese 
Government officials addressed their political issues. These images also came to 
represent U.S. involvement in South Vietnam, as the meanings around the Buddhist 
Crisis and the city merged with the war against North Vietnam. Part o f  this overlap 
came from the connotations associated with the military equipment shown in the 
representations of Buddhist oppression. While the State Department and military did 
not condone the actions of the South Vietnamese government against the Buddhists, 
they had previously given equipment to the troops acting against the Buddhists. 
Consequently, the means for oppressing Buddhists appeared as though they were 
supported by the Americans. Even though the United States could not control the use 
of previously-issued equipment, or stop photojournalists from capturing images o f 
protests, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. did have control over his own body. Often without 
making an statement, Lodge placed him self in front of cameras—letting the 
juxtaposition of his American body against the backdrop o f Saigon and its 
Vietnamese residents lend meaning to the American presence in Saigon. Unlike the
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leaders o f the South Vietnamese government, Lodge had his picture taken on the 
streets of Saigon, making an attempt to connect with the people of Saigon and prove 
that connection in a visual and public way.
Chapter Three concludes with the representation o f the 1963 coup that removed 
President Diem from power and the aftermath of this event. Representations o f  the 
coup, particularly photographs, inverted the trends journalists established during the 
Buddhist Crisis. The lines between civilian and military disintegrated temporarily, 
the private spaces that sheltered the South Vietnamese leaders were revealed to the 
public, and the processions through the streets— previously limited to Buddhists—  
now included South Vietnamese troops. However, this mode of representing Saigon 
did not last long. Soon, stories o f the city returned to old conventions; only now they 
included the city’s new permissiveness, made possible by the removal o f the old 
regime.
Chapter Four focuses on the life o f Else Baker, an American living in Saigon 
from 1963 to 1965. Mrs. Baker and her husband, Lee, an Air Force officer, traveled 
to Saigon because Lee had to work there as a liaison between the military and the 
press. While in Saigon, Mrs. Baker published her writing about life in Saigon. Her 
writing reflects her unique perspective— she was not part o f the press corps or the 
military establishment and she interpreted the events in Saigon through domestic 
spaces and everyday life.
Else Baker’s tenure in Saigon is significant for a number of reasons. First, it 
reveals how international relations influenced, and were influenced by, domestic
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spaces. Second, Else Baker’s home life sheds light on the different factions of 
Americans living in Saigon— specifically the tension between the military 
establishment and the foreign press corps. However, by interpreting her personal 
letters, we can see how these two groups, while at odds at times, had a close 
relationship as they mingled within the Baker household. Third, Mrs. Baker’s 
published writing shows how knowledge about the city got passed from one group o f 
Americans living in Saigon to the next— creating a more cohesive understanding of 
the city in the American mind. Fourth, Else Baker’s writing documented her 
friendships with the women who worked in her home and shows how American 
domestic spaces allowed for a degree o f cultural exchange and understanding. Fifth, 
as Mrs. Baker wrote about events in Saigon, she exposed how the politics o f Saigon 
were linked to its public spaces.
Chapter Five starts as the American buildup begins in the m id-1960s. As the 
American commitment to South Vietnam escalated, different versions o f Saigon once 
again emerged among the American press and government officials. While there 
were many different descriptions o f Saigon in the second half of the 1960s, many 
writers agreed that the city struggled because o f the war. Increases in prostitution and 
traffic, popular topics with journalists, were physical manifestations o f  the American 
presence in the city. American government officials also engaged in the discussions 
focused on the conditions in Saigon. Along with some members o f the press, Senator 
William Fulbright critiqued American foreign policy by pointing at the negative 
conditions in Saigon, and did so by mobilizing gendered metaphors to describe the 
city. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara defended United
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States policy, while arguing a wholesome version o f Saigon. McNamara’s vision 
resonated with both military-produced media and some o f the American press. 
Regardless of the “spin” applied to the American presence in Saigon, the United 
States Embassy and United States military establishment attempted to minimize the 
American presence in the city by constructing American bases outside o f Saigon. 
While this move did remove many Americans from the French downtown, it changed 
the geography o f the city— moving Americans, and the bars and sex workers that 
catered to them, to a different part o f the sprawling urban area.
By looking at representations of Saigon produced by, about, or for Americans, 
this project interprets how Americans interacted with Saigon during, and leading up 
to, the American War in Vietnam. It seeks to realize the potential o f Soja’s real-and- 
imagined analysis o f spaces and considers the ways in which places, both real and 
imagined, shape everyday life. The multiple versions o f Saigon that emerge in the 
pages o f  personal letters, government documents, novels and the press, along with 
other media, reveal the process o f meaning making enabled by the circulation 
between real and imagined. The meanings of Saigon’s French “look” changed over 
time as Americans took over the spaces from the French. What was “real” and what 
was “imagined” mattered less than the aggregate o f these experiences— it is this 
aggregate this project strives to examine.
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Representations o f Saigon in Print Culture through the 1950s 
Since the nineteenth century, Americans have walked through Saigon’s public
spaces, noting the city’s development, colonial system, and disparities all the while
establishing a nascent American presence in the city. Early representations o f Saigon
in American print culture revealed the ways public space mediated and shaped ideas
Americans had about the city. Through the observation o f visible cultural elements,
such as architecture and clothing, American writers judged the effectiveness o f
French colonial policy. In many o f these accounts, authors displayed little
background research. Rather, they based their writing on their observations o f the
city and the people living there, sometimes combining their Saigon experiences with
other travel memories. Using what they saw, American writers combined people with
roads, nation and race with infrastructure as they crafted their own written versions o f
Saigon for consumption by American readers.
After the mid-nineteenth century, as the French molded Saigon's downtown 
into a semblance o f a French town, and France’s visual dominance over the city 
increased, American representations o f the city increasingly focused on the public 
areas o f the city created by the French— such as streets, sidewalks, restaurants, and 
parks. The public-facing elements of French colonialism (such as architecture and 
side-walk culture) dominated American representations o f the city, and, at first, 
seemed to impress Americans. Flowever, as more Americans visited the city, their 
writing started to reveal a complicated relationship to the French colonial process.
On one hand, authors had a deep skepticism about the colonial system in Saigon. On 
the other hand, many American travelers enjoyed the trappings of the French colonial
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system— like aesthetically pleasing public spaces and entertaining sidewalk cafes. As 
a result, American representations of Saigon’s public space also implicated 
Americans in the colonial process as they revealed American access to colonial 
privilege.
As Americans traveled to Saigon, the city they documented and the culture of 
looking in which they participated layered different meanings onto their experiences 
o f the city itself. To American travelers, Saigon was not entirely authentic, and as a 
result, many American accounts o f the city struggled to account for the “real” 
colonial layer they saw imposed upon on the city. Specifically, Saigon’s architecture, 
plan, and leisure culture seemed to be insincere in some way. Furthermore, the 
unreal/real layers o f Saigon shifted with American views of France. When writers 
criticized French colonialism, the downtown architecture and the French people 
moving through these spaces became unmoored from what the writers felt Saigon 
really was. As the First Indochina War started, the “real” aspects o f Saigon had to do 
with the war. By the mid-1950s, Americans still entertained the idea o f an insincere 
aspect o f Saigon, which they then couched in the context of the decolonization of 
other Asian cultures. At the same time, American writers began to cope with their 
new position in Saigon— the part o f Saigon they inhabited had a deep colonial imprint 
left by the French. American writers had to find a way to distance themselves from 
colonialism, while inhabiting the same spaces as the French and inheriting the racial 
tensions inscribed by decades o f colonial rule.
33
Representations o f Saigon before the First Indochina W ar
One of the earliest American representations o f Saigon appeared in the memoir o f 
Lieutenant John White, who sailed on the first American voyage to Saigon1 while on 
leave from the United States Navy.2 History o f  a Voyage to the China Sea , from 
1824, documented W hite’s 20-month commercial voyage from Salem, Massachusetts 
to the China Sea.3 A contemporary review stated that the Histoiy o f  a Voyage to the 
China Sea was “the most complete and authentic account which has been published, 
at least in our language, o f the kingdom of Cochin China.”4
White observed Saigon, for the most part, as he walked through it in October o f 
1819.5 His views o f Saigon, while developed before the French established their 
colonial presence in Indochina, revealed a way o f interpreting the city. As White saw 
it, there was a somewhat developed area, courtesy o f colonial interests, surrounded by 
a indigenous periphery. W hite’s main area o f interest were the physical locations—  
the military citadel and the Governor’s Palace. The area and people existed outside 
of W hite’s city center included a market with female merchants selling different items 
in bamboo huts and a neighborhood with houses o f  different sorts “made o f wood,
1 John White, History> o f  a Voyage to the China Sea (Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1823), 
iv.
2 “History o f a Voyage to the China Sea,” The North American Review, January 1824, 
140.
3 White, 359.
4 “History o f a Voyage to the China Sea,” The North American Review, January 1824, 
140.
5 White, 200.
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and covered with tiles, and tolerably decent” as well as more “humble” structures.6 
These areas, however, were not without the presence of a nascent colonial system.
As White proceeded through the city, he noted that the streets were spacious and 
“regularly laid out, intersecting at right angles.”7 For White, these streets help lend 
order to what he recognized as “native”— linking them to the area o f the city 
containing the citadel.
Describing an area outside o f the citadel, White constructed the city by 
expressing his own discomfort with the people of Saigon:
Toiling under a scorching sun, through a street strewed with every species of 
filth; beset by thousands o f yelping, mangy curs; stunned alike by them and 
the vociferations o f an immense concourse o f the wondering natives, whose 
rude curiosity in touching and handling every part o f our dress, and feeling o f
o
our hands and faces, we were frequently obliged to chastise with our canes.
Here, W hite's view of Saigon condescended to Saigon’s indigenous neighborhoods 
and people. This part of the city and the people living there imposed upon W hite’s 
party. Grouping dirty streets, dogs and people together, W hite’s description provided 
an example of the colonial gaze. However, his gaze was challenged when the objects 
o f it attempted to understand him. White could not accept being subjected to 
someone else deconstructing the meanings o f his clothes and skin (the places he was 
touched), so he responded by assaulting the people around him. By “chastising” the
6 Ibid., 218-219.
7 Ibid., 233.
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“aide” behavior o f “natives,” White suggested he either brought with him, or 
absorbed, an understanding of “civilizing.”
The relationship between center (colonial) and periphery (indigineous) that White 
utilized in his memoir ran through later descriptions of Saigon. The center/periphery 
binary took shape both geographically and socially in an 1872 article by Walter Rose, 
“A Visit to Saigon,” in Appleton's Journal o f  Literature, Science and Art described a 
walk through the city and an encounter with dirty streets:
After leaving the bazaar, we passed through a long and narrow street, which 
teemed with mire and reeked with foul odors; for, though the French, since the 
city fell into their hands, have done much toward improving it, it is very 
difficult to impress upon Orientals the desirability o f proper sanitary 
measures.9
Rose differentiated between the “civilized” French population of Saigon and 
everyone else. By casually looking at the urban development of Saigon, Rose judged 
the French civilizing mission as virtuous. For Rose, dirty streets resulted from an 
innate quality present in the “Orientals,” not in the colonial system itself.
Writers looked to the relationship between center and periphery, civilized and 
uncivilized, French and Indochinese, in order to critique the success o f the French 
Colonial program in Saigon. On a trip to Saigon in the early 1870s, Frank Vincent,
8 Ibid., 219.
9 Walter A. Rose, “A Visit to Saigon,” Appleton's Journal o f  Literature, Science and  
Art (May 4, 1872), Vol. VII, No. 162, American Periodical Series Online, 488.
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an Ivy-league educated young man from Brooklyn, New York,10 documented a city 
with a growing colonial presence. Like Rose, he looked to the city’s development to 
judge France’s colonial system. He saw a rupture growing between the French 
Colonial presence (architecturally, developmentally, and culturally) and the rest of 
Saigon. His reason for the growing disparity stemmed from France’s inability to run 
a colony. Vincent compared Saigon to parts of the British Empire:
After seeing the healthy, growing, and usually paying colonies o f the British 
Empire in the east, a visit to Saigon, ‘the infant capital of Asiatic France,’ 
leaves a ludicrous impression indeed upon the mind o f  an observant, thinking, 
and reflecting traveller.11
The “ludicrous impression” Vincent had was caused by the contrast the French 
created in Saigon between the infrastructure and culture they created. In his 
description o f  a new building in Saigon— the Government house,12 Vincent noted 
how out o f place the two-story stucco and brick building looked when compared to its 
surroundings:13
The appearance.. .of this elegant modem palace, with its grand staircases and 
pillars.. .in the midst o f a tropical jungle and surrounded only by a few
10 Frank Vincent, “Walks in Phnom Penh and Saigon (1871-2)” in The Architecture o f  
South-East Asia through Travellers' Eyes, Oxford: Oxford UP (1998), 48.
11 Frank Vincent, The Land o f  the White Elephant: Travels, Adventures, and  
Discoveries in Burma, Siam, Cambodia, and Cochin-China, (Harper & Brothers,
1882), 312.
12 Frank Vincent, “Walks in Phnom Penh and Saigon (1871-2)” in The Architecture o f  
South-East Asia through Travellers' Eyes, Oxford: Oxford UP (1998), 53.
13 Ibid.
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bamboo huts is most droll.14
Vincent’s impression o f Saigon was based on the lack of development in the city. 
The “infant capital” did not yet look like what he expected from a colony. The 
French elements o f the city seemed disconnected from their surroundings. For 
Vincent, Saigon’s public spaces served up French leisure culture. On a street lined 
with trees next to the river, Vincent described how “after sundown, it is the custom of 
the residents to promenade, while listening to the music o f one of the regimental 
bands.”15 Implied in his description o f the “promenade” was the beginning o f a 
critique o f the French colonial system. Vincent believed Saigon not only provided a 
place for French citizens to participate in a culture o f leisure, but the city also eroded 
the character o f its French residents. Vincent claimed “morals are at the low ebb 
usually found among Europeans in oriental towns” as he observed that French 
residents “purchase” the “Annamite girls” with whom they live.16
By focusing on the French leisure culture in Saigon, Vincent created the 
impression o f a layer o f superficiality in the city. He critiqued the entirety of 
France’s colonial project in Saigon and questioned the validity of their presence in 
Saigon. According to Vincent, the waterway connecting the markets o f  China to 
Saigon that France hoped to find was merely an “illusion.”17 In fact, Vincent 
extended this idea of the “illusion” to the entire French colonial project in Saigon:
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 52-53.
16 Ibid., 54.
17 Vincent, The Land o f  the White Elephant, 312-313.
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a ‘France in the east’ is, as far as my limited observation goes, a great farce—a
travesty, a burlesque upon colonisation [sic] in general. The French character
is sadly wanting in many o f the virtues necessary for successful pioneering in
foreign lands; it lacks that sturdy, energetic, persevering trait which we see so
ably displayed by the English in India and Australia and by the German 
18settlers in America.
In Vincent’s eyes, France’s colonial project in Saigon was not only failing, but also 
mocked the idea o f colonialism. Blaming this, in part, on the character o f the French, 
Vincent championed the English in India and Australia and the German settlers in the 
United States.
While some American writers wrote o f Saigon’s aesthetic appeal and 
infrastructural improvements, others critiqued the French residents that accompanied 
these aspects of Saigon. Consequently, they not only cast Saigon’s design, but also 
its French population, as superficial. When talking of the French population, one 
other writer focused on a perceived inability of the French to do “real” work. 
According to this 1895 account, Saigon was “a city of fonctionnaires, and nine out o f 
ten Frenchmen are occupied in purveying either French luxuries or French personal 
services to the official and military classes.” 19 For Americans, Saigon’s reason for 
being seemed to be to deliver luxury to its French residents, without actually 
producing much of anything.
18 Ibid., 312.
19 Henry Norman, The Peoples and Politics o f  the Far East (Scribner, 1895). 78.
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Thus, for American authors, downtown Saigon was a place of comfort, luxury and 
familiarity. The luxuries available to American travelers in Saigon were embodied in 
the pleasing design of this part o f the city. One account described the downtown area 
as
laid out on the chess-board pattern familiar to all who have visited the western 
towns of the United States, and French taste has made it very attractive in 
appearance. The streets are lined with rows of trees, the roads are just like 
those of any European city, the public buildings are numerous and stately, the 
shops have all the external appearance of the magasins of Paris, the cafes are 
at every comer and are patronized with true French conviviality.20
Seemingly, the comfort American writers had in Saigon was provided by France’s 
ability to assert control over the city through the built environment. French store 
signs asserted visual control over the sidewalks, reinforced by “French buildings in 
the business parts of town and French people everywhere.”21 Frank Carpenter also 
noted that the French built “public improvements everywhere.”22 There was a bridge 
that crosses the Saigon River, dry docks telephone and telegraph lines and arc lights 
on the main streets. To American eyes, anything French, such as clothing and 
language, also helped keep anxiety at bay. When Carpenter landed in Saigon, he saw 
“a dozen natty French girls dressed in Parisian sty le .. .and scores o f well-dressed
20 Ibid., 77.
21 Frank Carpenter, “How the French are bearing the white man's burden in the 
colonies o f farther India,” Timely Topics, April 4, 1902, 489-490.
22 Ibid., 490.
23 Ibid.
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officials and merchants on the wharf dressed in white duck and white helmets, who 
spoke to me in French.”24 Ln addition to these conversations, Carpenter also 
mentioned that the French language is “everywhere” as “ the natives here talk pigeon 
French.”23 Flowever, the visual and aural dominance o f the French in Saigon seemed 
disproportionate to the population. Carpenter estimated the population o f Saigon at 
this time to be 40,000 people, including 2,000 French residents.26
While part of Carpenter’s Saigon was distinctly French, Cholon, the town a few 
minutes away by a “steam tramway” was not.27 Cholon, according to Carpenter, was 
“about twice as large as Saigon,” and was more Chinese than French. As he walked 
through the city, he noticed that most businesses were run by Chinese m erchants.29 
The Indochinese were apparently not included in his description. Fie did note that 
there were “natives,” as they had their own newspaper, or as he called it “native 
journal.”30 But for Carpenter, Saigon was separated into simply Chinese and French 
sectors— the former asserting itself in his mind.
The visual dominance that the French exerted over Saigon and its representation 
by Americans only increased over time. Jasper Whiting, an American traveler who 
had travelled to France, and published letters he wrote while on a 1900-01 tour o f 
China and Southeast Asia, dwelled on the French look o f the city. W hiting’s letters
24 Ibid., 489.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 490.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
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focused on Saigon’s cleanliness, the artistry o f the French colonial buildings, and the 
methods and overall success o f creating Saigon as “miniature” Paris. As a result, 
W hiting’s letters stressed the importance o f the city’s connection to France.
However, because street-level public spaces allowed for interaction between people 
of different cultures, W hiting’s letters revealed the dynamics of French Colonial 
policy as well as the place o f Americans within that dynamic. For Americans with 
often little investment in Saigon beyond their own desire for a good time, the street 
allowed experience and memory to mix. The version o f France built by planners and 
engineers could approach, but never replicate, what Whiting had previously 
experienced in France. While some French residents had the ability to sharpen the 
resemblance of Saigon to France, others, such as the Indochinese and Chinese, 
potentially diminished that likeness.
Whiting’s letters from Saigon detailed the ways in which Saigon felt like a 
diminutive version o f France by highlighting the French elements o f Saigon. “There 
is a miniature Champs Elysees, a miniature Bois de Boulogne, and a miniature 
Avenue de l’Opera, and each is adorned with statuary such as only French artists can 
produce.”31 W hiting’s appreciation o f French aesthetics present in Saigon’s 
downtown resulted in his declaring the downtown to be vital to the city. W hiting 
described the buildings on Rue Catinat:
a twin spired cathedral, the Notre Dame o f the city, and a beautiful Opera
3(1 Ibid.
J Jasper Whiting, The Journal o f  Jasper Whiting, 2 vols. (Boston: Napoleon 
Tennyson Hobbs, Junior, 1902), 451-452.
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House, o f which every resident is justly proud. As in Paris this latter building 
stands at the head o f grand boulevard in the very heart of the city.32
The constant comparison o f Saigon to Paris in W hiting’s letters related not only 
to the city’s architecture, but also to its cultural experiences:
To sit outside one o f these cafes late on an afternoon, at one o f the little round 
iron tables so peculiarly Parisian, a glass o f  absinthe by one’s side, an 
illustrated French journal in one’s hand, and a cigarette in one’s mouth, is to 
have a sensation such as one can experience only within the limits o f  the 
French Republic. It is indeed, very like ‘the real thing.’33
W hiting’s focus on Saigon’s authenticity weighed the merits o f  France’s urban 
colonial policy in Saigon against a complex representation o f  the past. For him, 
Saigon’s success lay in its ability to extend the feeling of being in France to Asia. He 
observed the sights of Saigon and processed them through the memories he had of 
France. These memories, in turn, seized upon an almost mythic version o f an old 
France— the France o f Notre Dame— as well as the more recent memory o f  sitting at 
a cafe. Needless to say, W hiting’s descriptions, like many travel writers, were highly 
personal. However, W hiting’s letters revealed important themes about American 
views of French colonialism. Saigon, ultimately, was about reconciling the current 
events o f the city with some version o f the past. To be sure, American writers 
consistently expressed a desire to find the “real” Saigon, and for Whiting, the “real
32 Ibid., 452.
33 Ibid., 452-453.
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thing” was France and he understood his trip to Saigon through France’s past and his 
past in France.
W hiting’s letter mentioned other aspects o f Saigon that made that city a close 
approximation o f French urban areas. For example, he cited “innumerable little 
French shops with bright attractive windows, and decorative signs over the portals, in 
effect exactly as in Paris.”34 But, more than physical spaces, however, Whiting 
credited Saigon’s reproduction o f  French city life to the people living in the city.
Even the people in W hiting’s Saigon are entrenched in the past:
It is the people at the tables that give to the place the real atmosphere o f  Paris. 
As in the older city, everybody in Saigon comes to the cafe at the end o f the 
day; men and women o f all classes spend the hours five to seven listening to 
music, sipping their favorite drinks and lightly talking with their friends on the 
topics of the time.
The French people populating W hiting’s Saigon are rooted, for him, in the “older 
city”—Paris. Saigon, however, was a close copy o f Paris, but would never replicate 
France’s capital completely. For him, the “natives” disrupted the French memories 
he drew upon in his understanding the city. Fie said, “were it not for the natives in the 
streets the stranger might very easily imagine that he was in one of the smaller 
provincial capitals of La Belle France.” The Vietnamese people in W hiting’s 
account contravened any colonial hope o f reproducing France in Saigon.
34 Ibid., 453.
35 Ibid., 454.
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As more American traveller-writers visited Saigon, they continued to view the 
city as an approximation o f French city. However, many described how they felt the 
Chinese and Indochinese residents o f the city ruptured the fantasy o f a Saigon as a 
transplanted French city. Hugh Clifford, writing for Living Age in 1910, wrote o f 
such a fantasy, and how it disintegrated as he examined Saigon. After first arriving in 
Saigon, Clifford wrote that he looked out o f the window of his hotel room on Rue 
Catinat, and had to “rub [his] eyes and force [himself] to remember that this in truth
n n
was Asia. For him, what he saw in the streets is what created the colonial dynamic 
in Saigon. He saw “Chinese” people in service positions in downtown Saigon—  
pulling rickshaws and waiting on French residents. However, those working in 
service positions “were the only Orientals within sight: the rest were white men and 
white women of sorts, and the Rue Catinat was a little tawdry pandemonium of their
'J  o
creation.” Clifford continued to describe Saigon as an
artificially engineered imitation [that] seemed to have strayed woefully far 
from its original, and in the process...acquired an added garishness, a new 
squalor, a peculiar ugliness and degradation.39
American reactions to the French downtown expressed ambililence towards 
the city and its French presence. For some writers, the French influence in Saigon 
represented luxury and provided an ideal place to live. For other authors, the French
36 Ibid., 450.
3 7 Hugh Clifford, “Saigon” The Living Age (January 1, 1910), American Periodicals 
Series Online, 34.
38 Ibid.
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influence simply was a fraud. Clifford’s view of Saigon as not only inauthentic but 
also “tawdry” introduced complexity into his version o f the city. Like those writers 
before him, he saw Saigon through the lens of a French past. Saigon did not fare 
well-—he measured the current Saigon by judging the distance between the original 
and the facsimile. Clifford assessed the city as being clumsy and ugly. However, in 
contrasting the Indochinese working in downtown Saigon with the artificial French 
surroundings, Clifford’s Saigon seemingly had two authentic selves. First, it strived 
to be like French cities and the better it replicated these, the more authentic it might 
be. Second, the ability o f the Indochinese to break the replication o f France 
suggested that somehow these people might be the real Saigon. Clifford concluded 
that the inauthenticity he perceived in Saigon came from the city’s lack o f 
engagement with Asia. To him, Saigon seemed engineered to replicate a French city, 
and cast aside as much influence from Asian cultures as possible.
American authors started to see imperfections in the Saigon’s French influence. 
For instance, one writer critiqued the segregation between French and Indochinese 
populations. The author o f the 1922 Round the World claimed that
The French have made this a veritable paradise. No cities o f California or 
Florida are half so immaculate or so beautiful. 1 am not now speaking o f the 
native cities, but o f the cities made by the French government, in which the 
French themselves live. The natives are allowed to come up to the edges in all 
these French-built cities.40
40 Paul Rader, 'Round the World (New  York: Revell, 1922), 162.
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Saigon for this author was luxurious, and that luxury was preserved by the separation 
of European and Chinese/Indochinese populations. The beauty of the city was 
maintained not only by the separation o f colonized/colonizer, but also by the 
employment of the colonized. “The streets, while not paved, are o f splendid dirt and 
sand, and are kept clean and smooth by thousands o f hands o f  the Annam ese.”41 The 
work of the Annamese was contrasted to the French patrons o f  cafes who populated 
the canopied sidewalks to watch the people walking around the downtown area.42 To 
the southwest o f Saigon, the author noted, there “ is a city o f  eight thousand Chinese, 
all doing business in Saigon.”43
As the number of American representations o f  Saigon accumulated, the city began 
to take on more complex dimensions. The mix o f people on Saigon’s streets not only 
provided something for Americans to watch, but also created their own culture of 
looking.
E. Alexander Powell’s account of Saigon published in McClure's in 1922 detailed 
his trip to the city, where he stayed in the French downtown area, at the Hotel 
Continental on Rue Catinat.44 After commenting about the hot weather, the statues o f 
French figures at street intersections,45 how the French razed the city and rebuilt it in 
their own image, and, in general, how Saigon was more or less the “Paris o f  the
41 Ibid., 161-162.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 162-3.
4 4 E. Alexander Powell, “To Pnom-Penh by Jungle Trail,” McClure's, 1922, 107.
45 Ibid., 75.
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East,”46 Powell delved into the public culture o f Saigon. In the evening, Powell 
remarked, the Rue Catinat filled with a “picturesque and colorful procession.”47 
Soldiers, “white-faced government employees,” tanned planters, and women in 
gowns and makeup created one part o f the promenade. The second half o f  his 
description of the scene focused not on the European faces and their expensive 
clothing, but on the people of color at work. For example, he wrote o f
shaven-headed Hindhu money-lenders from British India, the lengths o f 
cotton sheeting...form their only garments revealing bodies as hairy and 
repulsive as those of apes; barefooted Annamite tirailleurs in uniforms o f 
faded khaki.. .slender Chinese women, tripping by on tiny, thick-soled shoes, 
in pajama-like coats and trousers o f clinging, sleazy silk; naked pousse-pousse
4 8coolies, streaming with sweat, graceful as the bronzes in a museum.
Powell’s descriptions of peoples’ bodies captured in a performance on Saigon’s 
streets revealed a place where onlookers constructed meanings of the city. Applying 
racist comparisons of people to animals, Powell demonstrated how colonialism 
created a street-level understanding o f nation. He observed each person and placed 
previously acquired judgments on their present bodies. O f course, if  this type o f 
colonial gaze operated in multiple directions (beyond European/American to the 
“other”), Powell did not engage with it. Rather, he looked to the “cafe life” in Saigon
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 75. 107.
48 Ibid.
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as its most “characteristic feature,” in order to critique what he saw.49 He felt the 
priorities of the French in Saigon were inverted from what they should be:
There are too many people in front o f the cafes and too few in the offices and 
shops. There is too much drinking and too little work. It is not a wholesome 
atmosphere.50
Powell’s critique o f France resembles previous critiques until he searched for a 
lesson in France’s colonial policy in Saigon. Recalling an attempted jail break of 
political prisoners in 1916, Powell reflected on the imperial tendencies o f the United 
States:
I should not like to see our own brown wards, the Filipinos, look at Americans 
with the murderous hate with which the Annamites regard the French.51
With this statement, Powell at once acknowledged the precarious position o f the 
United States abroad and distanced American foreign policy from the colonial 
policies of France. Powell highlighted the relationship o f Americans to the French in 
Saigon by seeing them as involved in similar colonial projects, just in different parts 
of the world. By critiquing what he saw as a French (im)moral character, he cast the 
American colonial project in the Philippines as somehow virtuous. Powell implied 
the United States had “wards” in the Philippines who needed help where France had a 
system meant to extract money and resources from Indochina at the expense o f the
49 Ibid., 75.
50 Ibid., 107.
51 Ibid.
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Indochinese.32 Furthermore, his connection between American colonization and the 
French in Indochina turned Saigon into a cautionary tale playing out in real time.
Powell’s observation o f the street-level performance o f leisure and work, and his 
comparison o f the United States and France, placed Americans in a complicated 
position. As travelers to Saigon, Americans seemed to have access to some sort of 
colonial privilege that they appeared to enjoy. However, by critiquing the French 
colonial policy, writers like Powell cast the United States in a liminal position. The 
United States was not a colonizer, but was not colonized either. Instead, these writers 
placed the United States at the boundaries o f colonialism. The writers could enter 
into social colonial relationships if  they wished (for example, they could access 
certain parts o f the city), without committing to the oppressive practices inherent in 
colonial policy. In other words, Americans in Saigon could enjoy colonization 
without any o f the guilt or complication that the French dealt with. The enjoyment 
Powell derived from his colonial privilege, if  not already clear, became explicit at the 
end o f his article. After he left Saigon, he wrote how he wanted to return. He wanted
Powell does not elaborate a great deal on the expansionist policy o f the United 
States in his article. Instead, he simply implies there is a difference between the 
United States and France. However, using the seminal work of Walter LaFeber, The 
New Empire, can help us speculate what he meant. LaFeber argues that foreign 
policy was influenced by the development o f industry and the search for new markets. 
After the Civil War, Americans did not look for new land to farm, but new markets in 
which to sell their manufactured goods. This type o f policy, looking for new markets 
and the like, he termed “expansionist” and he contrasted to it “colonial” policies that 
attempted to formally exert control (militarily and economically) over a people and 
location in order to extract resources. Taking this into consideration, we might see 
more of what Powell meant. France’s colonial policy was harsh and strictly about 
obtaining resources from Indochina, while the United States expansionist policy in 
the Philippines might have been less formal and outwardly oppressive.
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to once again drink at a cafe on the Rue Catinat and watch “pouse-pouse coolies.. .in 
the gathering twilight.”33 He ended his recollection of Saigon by loosely quoting 
Rudyard Kipling’s poem “Mandalay.” Powell wrote, “when you've heard the East a- 
callin' you won't never heed naught else.”54
A 1937 article by Shannon McCune o f Syracuse University featured a dialogue 
between American authors writing about Saigon.55 She argued that Frank Vincent’s 
Land o f  the White Elephant had “not stood the test o f time.”36 While the city still had 
“broad tree-lined streets,”57 she had seen progress since Vincent’s 1872 descriptions. 
The palace that Vincent described as a blunt contrast to surrounding “bamboo huts”58 
in McCune’s description was now surrounded by a park. McCune’s Saigon also had 
a new focal point. Among cafes, stores, offices, all “ in the French style,” was the 
“red brick Cathedral” which “dominat[ed] the sky line.”59
McCune’s Saigon had not just changed in terms o f its architecture and city 
planning. During her visit, she observed a different relationship between the French 
colonial population and the Indochinese. “Now a closer harmony is being struck 
between the European and the Asiatic influences and Saigon is like a French
53 Powell, “To Pnom-Penh by Jungle Trail,” 107.
54 Ibid.
55 Shannon McCune, “Saigon French Indochina,” Journal O f Geography, January 
1937, 24.
56 Ibid., 33.
57 Ibid., 27.
58 Ibid., 26.
59 Ibid., 27.
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provincial town transplanted to an Oriental setting.”60 McCune cited a 1931 census 
that put the population of Saigon at 123,298 people. 11,115 of these people, said 
McCune, were “Europeans.”61 This harmony, however, was not rooted in the layout 
of residential districts. Connected to the French downtown were French 
neighborhoods “with fine boulevards, bordered by tamarind and teak trees forming a 
canopy, with villas in the midst o f tropical gardens, and with well-groomed parks 
scattered thru it.”62 Outside o f “this center” the residential district “gradually] 
transition[ed] to the native districts” that were crowded and contained the homes o f 
“the bulk of the population.”63 McCune pointed out that the Chinese people lived in 
nearby Cholon,64 making up “half the population o f 134,060 persons.”6" Despite this 
physical separation between populations o f Saigon, McCune claimed that
the streets show this mixture of Europe and the Orient even more plainly for 
all manner of people can be seen.. .totally different people mingling in the 
streets make the city very colorful and present strange contrasts.66
Virginia Thompson’s 1937 French Indochina synthesized much o f the work of 
other authors and aimed to “to lay before the English-reading public a background for 
the general problems in French Indo-China.”67 The culture the French created for 
themselves in Saigon interested Thompson the most. Rather than spend much time
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., 27-28.
62 Ibid., 27.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 27-28.
65 Ibid., 31.
66 Ibid., 27-28.
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discussing what Saigon looked like, Thompson reported that the city seemed 
“unmistakably French,”68 so much so that it would help new visitors feel less 
homesick.
Thompson wrote of a superficial existence o f the French in Saigon. The sybaritic 
life she observed and read about, dominated by drinking at cafes and other “routine 
entertainments,” spurred Thompson to claim that the “colonials are only a caricature 
of Europeans.”69 According to Thompson, the French filled their everyday lives with 
nothing beyond the most superficial leisure activities. Spending time in cafes 
“call[ed] for no reading or discussion o f ideas.”70 This “anti-cultural” existence in 
Saigon, to Thompson, lacked “spiritual nourishment” and contained “excessive 
gossip, and alcohol, constant conviviality, brutalizing the natives, isolation, and 
depressed nerves, which is fed by a climate productive o f general torpor and bad 
temper.”71
Thompson felt the overindulgence in leisure and lack o f productivity among the 
French population in Saigon stemmed from the interactions between people o f 
different racial groups— the problem French culture had in Saigon was a problem of 
being white in the “Orient” :
The decadent, destructive, atmosphere which encircles the white man in the 
Orient is contagious even for refined and sensitive people. The presence o f
67 Virginia Thompson, French Indochina, (New York: Octagon, 1968), 11.
68 Ibid., 416.
69 Ibid., 415-416.
70 Ibid., 415.
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new disruptive factors undermines what is left, and is completed by the 
absence o f restraint and discipline. A gentleman in Europe degenerates in the 
East to the point of shouting at his servant that he is as stupid as ten thousand 
pigs for having served him the wrong dish.72
The fall from being “civilized” that Thompson outlined here not only critiqued 
French culture in Saigon, but also engaged in the same Orientalist tropes that she 
critiqued. Disavowing the elite European chastising his servant and comparing him 
or her to a pig, Thompson attempted to distance herself from the colonial process that 
sapped refinement. However, by establishing a binary hierarchy consisting only o f 
those with white skin and everyone else in Asia, Thompson reinscribed the colonial 
relationships she saw as contagious and undermining.
Thompon’s critique of the French colonial culture in Saigon, like that o f  other 
authors, struggled with the sense o f the real— the culture she observed appeared to 
mask a deeper truth. For Thompson, French leisure masked the “brutal contrast” 
between different classes of French residents. As she put it, “behind the brilliant 
fafade was the stark misery of the white proletariat.”73 Drawn to a mythic version o f 
Saigon where they hoped to pursue a leisurely lifestyle, “many of the petty 
employees” did not find much but poverty.
Thomposon critiqued the fantasy o f colonial privilege by focusing her attention
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., 415-416.
73 Ibid., 416.
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on the position o f French women in Saigon. Specifically, she saw the non-French 
elements o f Saigon, and Asia in general, as a force corrupting white European 
womanhood. Thompson addressed the conditions of non-elite European women by 
comparing them to the “natives.” “Wives had to go to the market in person to be 
jostled by the contemptuous native servants o f their richer colleagues.”74 Not being 
part of the elite in Saigon put white people (specifically women) on the same level as 
“natives.” Thompson wrote differently o f elite European women in Saigon. Where 
working-women were like “natives,” elite European women actively distanced 
themselves from Vietnamese women. According to Thompson, when French men 
arrived in Saigon, many “surrendered] to the exotic,” seeking the company o f 
Indochinese women. Thompson speculated that European women, in their attempts 
to connect with European men, felt competitive towards Indochinese women and as a 
result they “tried to sever all connections with natives, except as servants.”75 
Thompson’s analysis o f European women suggests that she saw elite European 
women as a bulwark against the decent o f European people into “native” culture. 
Indochinese women represented the negative aspects o f Asia (those that created a 
“decadent, destructive atmosphere”) and elite European women could save them from 
such dangers.
French women played an active part in Thom pson’s representation o f Saigon.
They acted against the imagined Orientalist threats by stopping the interaction 
between white men and Indochinese women. According to Thompson, French 
_ _
women initially resisted life in the “colonies:”76
Their coming meant the resumption o f French social life, which introduced 
more pleasure, more grace and refinement into the colony, but which also 
involved bourgeois conventions and—far more im portant-the cutting o ff o f 
their husbands from a simpler life in contact with the natives.77 
Drawing a line between the unrefined leisure apparently present in Saigon’s cafes and 
more “refined” entertainments guarded by French women, Thompson saw French 
women intervening in the process o f the corruption Asia had on white men.
While Thompson saw Asian cultures corrupting along gender lines, she drew an 
additional line between the adult women who came from France and the daughters 
they raised in Saigon. Unlike the women coming from France, the “French girl 
brought up in the colony” was more o f a “hybrid.” Thompson thought these girls 
were “bolder and more independent than their Metropolitan contemporaries.’”78 The 
assertiveness o f these young women, said Thompson, came from their being 
accustomed to ordering servants. While these young women were ingrained within a 
hierarchy, Thompson claimed that they learned “early to mix with different kinds o f 
people in a less strictly class-bound society.”79 Life in Saigon might help young 
women leam social skills among different types o f  people:
Habits of false luxury, superficial accomplishments, and the demoralizing
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custom of being waited upon—all make for a lack o f perseverance, a 
rootlessness, and a restlessness...m any French women extract their daughters 
by sending them back to school in France. It is fundamentally the problem of
O A
too much leisure with no corresponding idea o f utilizing it profitably.
Once again, French women step in to save the French colonizers from the perils o f 
Asia. Here, they send their children away from the Saigon dangers to France where 
they can escape the unproductive leisure they participated in when in Saigon.
Representations during and after the First Indochina W ar
The inauthenticity that writers observed and wrote about in Saigon started to 
undergo a transformation once the First Indochina War started. While Americans 
could still expect to find a pleasant travel experience in parts of the city, writers 
created increasingly unstable versions o f Saigon. As authors searched for the real 
Saigon, they created representations focused on hidden dangers lurking behind a 
tranquil colonial facade. For many writers, Saigon was a treacherous and sinful place 
hiding behind a surface o f prosperity and French-colonial architecture.
Robert Trumbull, the New York Times's correspondent for Southeast Asia,81 
incorporated previous descriptions into his 1946 representation of Saigon, while 
dividing the city into two parts through the metaphor o f the body. To him Saigon was
80 Ibid.
81 “Robert Trumbull Dies at 80; Reported on W ar for Times,” New York Times, 
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R7a “a city o f two faces.” The first face consisted o f  a “beautiful and fascinating 
Saigon, the glittering ‘Pearl o f the Orient.” ,S3 Trumbull contrasted this with a second 
face that was a “dread city steeped in plot.”84 Placing Saigon in the context o f other 
Southeast Asian capitals undergoing a process o f decolonization in the 1940s,
8 5Trumbull saw the city as “one o f a dwindling number o f citadels o f privilege.” It
was not only a controlled French reproduction, but it was also an independent place 
with problems and politics of its own.
Trumbull’s first “face” o f Saigon seemed similar to the city described by 
previous journalists, but it added a new element in describing the “Pearl o f the 
Orient.” Introducing what would later become a theme running through American 
understandings of Saigon, Trumbull understood the city by understanding the body. 
Beyond using the metaphor o f a face to describe the untrustworthiness o f the city, 
Trumbull focused specifically on women’s bodies in order to convey to readers the 
“good” part o f Saigon. Available only to the privileged, the first “face” consisted o f 
leisure and women:
One [face] is the Saigon of the sidewalk cafes, o f the chic mademoiselles, the 
Parisian perfumes, and the shoes with their startling three-inch platform soles. 
This also is the Saigon o f the loveliest women in all the Far East—slender 
Annamese girls who invariably wear the native costume of fitted pajamas in 
shining white silk covered by a silk o f thin lace cassock with a Chinese neck
82 Robert Trumbull, “Saigon is Divided,” New York Times, December 19, 1946, 22.
83 Ibid.
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and slit on each side from the ankle to the waist.
And, more than just including women in what he deemed the positive aspects o f 
Saigon, Trumbull wrote about the process o f  looking, and having access to, the bodies 
of French and Vietnamese women. However, he clearly differentiated between the 
two groups by establishing a hierarchy through the nouns he used to reference them—  
French women were “chic mademoiselles,” while the Vietnamese women were 
“girls.” Trumbull’s first face o f Saigon was less about the women who moved 
through Saigon’s downtown spaces and more about the access white men had to these 
women. Trumbull’s description marked the consumption of female bodies as part o f 
the colonial privilege. The women were on display, not unlike the colonial 
architecture that surrounded them.
Where the “first face” was full o f accessible women, and the men who looked at 
them, the second face expelled women completely to focus on politics and fighting. 
Saigon’s other side included the institutions that attempted to maintain a colonial 
system and those forces opposing it. In this second face, Trumbull found
the Bank of Indo-China whose vast gray granite pile appropriately dominates 
the business section. This is the Saigon o f the French Surete, the Deuxieme 
Bureau and the puppet Government. It is also the Saigon of the Annamese 
underground o f Viet Minh incitation and the terror o f side street plotting,
8 7murder and kidnapping.
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Trumbull’s representation stands apart from other authors’ descriptions because 
it splits Saigon differently. Rather than focusing on a French center placing 
everything else into a periphery, Trumbull chose a different type o f binary. Instead o f 
splitting the city according to his understanding o f the relationships between Eastern 
and Western cultures (France versus everything else), he instead understood the city 
in terms of its positive characteristics and those forces, like colonialism and war, that 
threatned Saigon’s positive attributes. He took elements o f the French power system, 
like the Bank of Indo-China and combined them with the Viet Minh. While the 
French downtown contained the pleasurable parts o f the city for American travelers, 
elements of that area now were dangerous. For Trumbull, Colonialism and war 
threatened the good things about Saigon even as the legacy o f  colonialism in Saigon 
created cafes, shops, and women that Americans could enjoy.
Trumbull’s two faces of Saigon reveal a long-developing conversation about 
American views of colonialism in Saigon. For decades, American representations o f 
Saigon wrestled with how to portray colonialism. Many travelers enjoyed the leisure 
culture provided by French colonialism and the more critical o f these travelers sought 
distance from the aspects o f colonialism which oppressed local peoples or reflected 
poorly on the French government, such as financial miscalculations and inefficiency. 
Trumbull’s two faces attempted to solve this problem. Saigon’s first face contained 
those good things Americans could enjoy (architecture, cafes, women), while the 
second face contained conflict and oppression.
Trumbull expanded his critique of French colonial policy a few months later in
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another piece for the New York Times. With this update, he intensified his critique o f 
the French in Saigon. What was previously the “first face” now became more 
superficial. He wrote that
the city has a conspicuous air o f inflated prosperity. There are glossy motor
o o
cars, and Rue Catinat is lined with shops selling expensive luxury goods.
The first face, if  it ever existed, no longer applied to Saigon. Trumbull wrote o f 
Saigon in the past tense as
a city which once offered travelers and resident whites some o f the finest 
living to be found in the Far East. Its fine cafes, smart French shops and chic 
women, its airy spaciousness and generally exotic personality won it the 
appellation ‘the Paris o f the Orient.’ Here Western overlords lived a life o f
old-style colonial ease and the respectful native population worked hard to
80exploit the fruits o f empire.
This description certainly resembled his previous description of Saigon, but it 
collapsed the boundaries between his divided city. The colonial parts o f the city, all 
tainted by “Western overlords” no longer provided the luxury he saw only a few 
months previously. Perhaps more importantly, this description introduced the ways 
in which Americans started to see Saigon as both past and present. The architecture 
and culture still present in Saigon clashed with the atmosphere of decolonization.
Contrasting the city’s grand and problematic past, Trumbull described Saigon’s
88 Robert Trumbull, “Shadows in Saigon,” New York Times, April 20, 1947.
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tumultuous present in terms o f caste, race and ethnicity:
Today Saigon is a headquarters for revolution. Peacefully or violently. Indo- 
China—like most o f Indonesia—is in revolt against white domination. And 
despite the concessions to local ‘autonomy’ which the French have made, 
outright warfare is being waged by natives and French over a wide area.90
The juxtaposition o f the Saigon o f the past, one where a white person could find “fine 
living,” with a city in which “native” people revolted against white colonial actors, at 
first appears as a critique of colonialism. Instead, Vietnam’s post-colonial Saigon 
proved to be more inconvenience than revolution. The anti-colonial struggle in 
Saigon, according to Trumbull, did not change the city “much physically.”91 
Focusing on the standard o f living, he related that, “shops and cafes are still here and 
war scars are few .. ..White colonials struggling to retain their holdings can still live 
smartly and well— for a price.” However, Trumbull noted that even though some 
parts of the city did not show signs o f war, a feeling of decline, contained in 
“shadows and grimness,” persisted that “signified] the passing of an era in 
colonialism.”92 Specifically, he mentioned roadblocks and curfews— reminders o f 
possible violence. “Saigon is charged with tension even though the bright facade o f 
beauty and charm still survives.”93
The tension between the representations o f the downtown commercial area o f
_ _
90  , ,  - .
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Saigon and its surroundings became more pronounced as anti-French activities 
increased. A 1947 article in the Los Angeles Times by Waldo Drake contrasted the 
Rue Catinat with the developing war:
Open air cafes along tree-shaded Rue Catinat are crowded all day long, 
chiefly by members o f the French expeditionary force of 120,000 troops 
which is attempting to beat out almost with their bare hands the raging flames 
o f active revolt which are fast enveloping most o f this once fruitful country.”94 
Contrasting the cafes and “tree-shaded” streets with the conditions o f  war (be they 
violence or other hardships) became one of the dominant representations o f  the city 
until the United States left Vietnam in the 1970s. While the French were still in 
power, but struggling to maintain their control, authors describing the French leisure 
culture and its associated luxuries only intensified their critique of French 
colonialism. These critiques did not necessarily condemn the French, but argued that 
their colonial system was somehow broken. For example, as the same article in the 
Los Angeles Times continued:
The revolt which besets Saigon is a paradox of the Far East. Its glittering 
department stores are filled with recent Paris fashions in millinery and gowns 
and household wares. Even its comer groceries are stacked high with French 
wines, brandies, cheese and perfumes. Yet these same shops are so short o f
I3 Ibld‘
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foodstuffs that five days every week are meatless.93 
Like representations o f the French culture in Saigon years earlier, this writer saw the 
French providing a superficial layer o f comfort without addressing more basic needs. 
In this case, they supplied decadent food and wares without attending to staples.96
As the First Indochina War continued, American representations o f Saigon 
became more and more bleak. What was once vibrant, albeit superficial and infected, 
now was “dying.” Furthermore, the representations of the city described the 
loosening o f colonial power. A 1949 article in the Washington Post represented the 
city this way:
Saigon, the capital of Indo-China, is today a dying city. The hand o f change is 
upon it. Streets are half-empty, no trade is stirring, and life is unsafe for any 
European who moves beyond the city limits.97 
The changes threatened the Europeans in Saigon both financially as trade shut down, 
but also physically should they leave Saigon.
In the same way that earlier representations o f Saigon varied from period to 
period, American representations o f Saigon during the First Indochina W ar continued 
this pattern. What was dying to one author in 1949 was again an easy life to another 
in 1951. According to a 1951 article in the New York Times, Saigon offered a higher 
standard o f living than French residents could attain in France:
95 Ibid.
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Merchants, professional men and the hard-working civil servants all still live 
more comfortably and easily than they could in France. Off the wide 
residential avenues, houses are roomy, comfortable and staffed with 
inexpensive Chinese and Vietnamese servants who speak a little French.98
Descriptions of the Rue Catinat as “Saigon’s Champs Elysees,”99 and the many 
cafes, bakeries and bars in the immediate area continued to appear in the press, only 
now those descriptions were more likely to include the presence of French soldiers.100
Other parts of Saigon often described by Americans took on new meanings as 
well. Accounts of the luxuries available in Saigon, and the prosperity that often 
accompanied them, started to shift in the context o f the French War. Rather than 
attributing the leisure and prosperity o f the French in Saigon to the spoils o f colonials, 
one author attributed French prosperity to a wartime “boom” economy. Tillman 
Durdin, a New York Times correspondent for A sia,101 wrote in 1952 o f “an 
appearance of boom prosperity” in Saigon that had “an unhealthy basis, founded 
largely on the increasingly heavy French war expenditures in this country.” 102
The representations o f Saigon’s superficiality also went through a period o f 
transition. Wliile writers continued to talk in terms o f Saigon’s veneer or fafade, they
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increasingly defined the “real” or “authentic” Saigon as those parts affected by the 
French War. One 1951 article described the whole of Saigon as a “nerve center for a 
ruthless war between the French... Vietnam's capital wears a prosperous, bustling 
facade which serves as a thin disguise for danger and insecurity.”103
Journalists also constructed Saigon’s wartime facade journalists through the 
attitudes of the city’s residents. In multiple accounts, American writers portrayed the 
French residents of Saigon as indifferent to the realities o f the war spreading across 
the country. One author wrote how they were “stretched in endless summer along the 
banks of the Saigon river.” 104 The article continued to describe how the French were 
not concerned with the realities o f the city. “Little in the daily life o f  Saigon's twenty 
to thirty thousand French civilians indicates the fears and uncertainties which lie 
beneath the surface.” 105 The journalist then contrasted the oblivious French 
population with violence and the desperate social conditions present in Saigon:
French soldiers and sailors sit sipping leisured aperitifs in a sidewalk cafe on 
Saigon's main street, Rue Catinat....In a green park, fat French babies play in 
the shade of the trees.... Vietnamese police comb through a block of straw 
shacks in the suburb o f Giadinh looking for Vietminh terrorists....Six nuns 
glide in black-robed pairs past the great French cathedral in the Place de 
Pigneau de Behaine....On an informer's tip, plainclothes men o f the 
Vietnamese Surete unearth a hoard o f Vietminh weapons in the stockrooms of
24, 1952.
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a fashionable downtown lacquer and silver shop....A block away half-naked 
Vietnamese urchins stand transfixed before a window display o f pink-cheeked 
French dolls. French women in wisps o f bathing suits bake their tanned 
bodies by the green pool o f the Cercle Sportif....A Vietminh grenade kills 
three men on the terrace of a restaurant on Boulevard Chamer.106
The contrast here between inactive French and the active the Vietnamese recalls the 
two-face version o f  Saigon of before, but now the dangers are fleshed out as wartime 
issues.
A pictorial in the New York Times also published in 1951 did similar work as it 
juxtaposed fears, military action, and Saigon’s relative calmness. Showing images o f 
French Legionnaires marching through the city and French warships in the Saigon 
River with captions mentioning Viet Minh attacks, the article created a sense o f an 
occupied city under the threat o f attack. The caption read ‘“ Little Paris’—A French 
Army jeep moves down the Rue Catinat under a reminder that social life goes on. 
Saigon's Vietnamese population is overwhelmingly anti-French.”107 The image 
captured French troops in a military jeep driving down Rue Catinat, passing 
underneath a banner for a “recital de gala” hung across the street, one side connected 
to the Hotel Continental. By capturing the “social life” o f  French in Saigon, the 
pictorial portrayed a “ little Paris” that was either oblivious or resilient, or perhaps 
both.
105 Ibid.
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In 1954, a few months after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, authors noted the 
lack o f impact the French War had on Saigon. Peggy Durdin, a foreign correspondent 
who covered Asia,108 described Saigon as oblivious to the realities o f the world. For 
Durdin, Saigon was “its own little walled-in world, busy, imperturbable, self- 
contained, bustling and prosperous.” 109 She also felt the city was insulated from the 
war itself as visitors, after arriving in Saigon, often asked “where’s the war?” 110 
When the French War was over, Durdin quoted a French colonel’s assertion that 
wartime Saigon did not differ from peace-time Saigon. The colonel explained that 
“you know quite as well as 1 do that Saigon was never in the war.” 111 Another article 
written in late-April 1954 noted that even though “the military situation at 
Dienbienphu remains grave,” Saigon life maintained the status quo. In fact, “an 
outsider could not deduce from his first impressions here that there was anything 
special happening in I n d o - C h in a 12
As the dominance o f French rule faded in the city, journalists returned to an 
earlier model o f understanding Saigon. Writers defined the “real” Saigon as the local 
population and over which stretched a colonial faqade. As Bert Hephill writing for the 
Los Angeles Times phrased it, Saigon contained a European “veneer” stretched over
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an “Oriental” reality. “Thoroughly Oriental, its European veneer is most apparent on 
Rue Catinat where expensive shops are stocked with French and European 
luxuries.”113
Journalists relied on Orientalist notions o f Asian peoples and cultures to 
construct a sense of the “Oriental” city that existed outside the colonial veneer. Rather 
than describe the nuances o f different parts o f the city, writers established Saigon as 
binary— they saw the French colonial downtown and then everything else. For 
example, Durdin, writing in 1954, described the area beyond downtown:
Then, for miles, stretch the Vietnamese and Chinese areas: the cramped, 
tenement-style houses, the lively native markets, the quiet temples where coils 
of spiraled incense six feet in diameter hang before grimacing gods, the 
restaurants smelling o f spicy Chinese sauces and resounding with the sharp, 
insistent clatter o f mahjong tiles, the little shops displaying red-lacquered pigs' 
faces, duck eggs especially delectable because they contain the half-formed 
embryo, dried squid, strange medicinal herbs and beetles, birds’ nests (for 
soup) brought down from Annam, and the little bits o f reddish gold jewelry 
Vietnamese buy against inflation.114
These parts o f the city, or as Durdin referred to them, “ layers of the city,” differed 
from the French downtown, in atmosphere, leisure and culinary culture. The
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discussion of streets focused not on the architecture, but on strangeness and oddity. 
The broad boulevards and ordered city plan contrasted the “cramped” living 
conditions o f the Vietnamese and Chinese parts o f the city. The baked goods and 
aperitifs available at sidewalk cafes disappeared in this outer part o f  the city where 
unfamiliar foods and their respective smells mixed with a local mahjong game. 
Durdin’s description also casts the Vietnamese and Chinese areas o f  the city as 
dangerous. She called them places where “Vietminh plant their agents and spread 
their potent propaganda.” 115
Durdin, however, also found ways to close the physical distance between the 
Vietnamese/Chinese parts o f Saigon and the French downtown:
Asia is increasingly paved roads, Westem-style clothes for men, garbage 
collection and automobiles. But it is also the little Vietnamese boy sauntering 
past Saigon's chic Parisian style shop windows with a five-foot snake curled 
indolently around his shoulders and arms. It is the combined smell o f 
sundried fish, human excrement and soup from a traveling vendor's pot 
suddenly assailing your nose in front of a big modem hotel....the delicate 
floating of pastel silk on pencil-slim Vietnamese women, sweet-smelling 
white flowers tucked into shiny, long black Asian hair.116
Durdin, like many journalists, collapsed different elements o f Saigon into one 
physical space, specifically the familiar downtown with its ever-present shops and
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70
hotels. However, descriptions like this one spoke to the power relations between 
colonizer and colonized by describing different categories o f an urban scene— the 
fixed and the ethereal. The fixed parts o f the scene were those parts o f  the French 
infrastructure like the “modem” hotel and the “chic” shop. These were stable 
elements in the description. They belonged. The local inhabitants o f Saigon made up 
the more ethereal aspects o f the scene. The traveling vendor, various smells, and a 
“sauntering” boy all existed in the French world, but could not have any sense o f 
permanence there. However, their very presence signaled that the city was changing, 
the colonial system no longer had the control that it once did. The final piece o f the 
fixed-etheral dichotomy in this description was the Vietnamese woman’s body. She 
was stable while her clothing moved through the description.
The appeal o f Saigon to journalists and travelers seemed to be based in its 
ability to deliver surprising experiences. The ethereal parts o f  her description, those 
dynamic parts meant to contrast the French city, made up what Durdin felt was the 
“lure o f the East”:
To be specific, part of the authentic lure o f  the East is today, as it has been for 
centuries, the infinite richness and variety o f shape, color, smell and sound in 
every Asian town, on every Asian street. These never become too repetitive 
and familiar and they never pall. No matter how long you have been in China, 
Burma, Indonesia or India, every time you walk out the front door something 
impinges violently on your senses, you encounter something lovely or 
horrible, new, unexpected or unexplained. After Asia, the avenues o f New 
York, Paris, London or Geneva seem delightful and clean—and depressingly
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antiseptic, pale, well-regulated and standardized.117
For Durdin, the relationship between the static French and dynamic Vietnamese 
elements of Saigon distilled the relationship between “East” and “W est.” The West 
was boring, while the East was not. Other journalists engaged with Saigon’s 
excitement as well. One journalist writing in 1955 conveyed the same excitement, 
but focused on descriptions of violence. The writer claimed that Saigon looked nice 
on the surface, but “everything is out o f focus and somehow wrong. The cafe sitters 
joke nervously about their own bravery, because wasn't it only a couple o f nights ago 
that somebody tossed a grenade at the Hotel Majestic Cafe.” 118 The threat o f 
violence, at least to this journalist, caused “a quality of nightmare about Saigon. It is 
like one of those dreams in which the horror comes, suddenly, from the realization 
that the normal has become grotesque and the everyday has become strange and 
frightening.” 119 The idea that the mundane was unsafe and the unknown infringed on 
the order offered by the colonial power structure reflected the end of French control 
in Saigon.
As the French War came to an end, Saigon’s representation in the press changed 
from a city dominated by French interests to a city controlled by Vietnamese people. 
Durdin was the most outspoken about the legacy o f colonialism in Saigon in 1954- 
1955. Writing several articles that addressed decolonization, the “ lure o f Asia” and
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the Cold War, Durdin used a narrative o f progress to describe multiple countries in 
Asia and their distancing from Communism.120 She also wrote specifically about 
Saigon. According to Durdin, the city was in a period of transition:
Saigon is one of Asia's last great European-dominated cities, outdated like the 
rickshaw, nearing the end o f an era. The tragedy o f Saigon is that it will 
probably have insufficient time to shake o ff its heavy colonial heritage and 
grow into something strong—and Vietnamese—enough to withstand the 
Communists.121
For Durdin, this transition from a “European-dominated city” to a Vietnamese 
city was also about a transition in racial politics. Specifically, she felt white visitors 
to Saigon had to renegotiate their relationship to the city and its Vietnamese residents. 
Speaking generally o f Asian countries, Durdin argued that having white skin in 
decolonizing Asian countries meant adjusting to feeling uneasy as the protections of 
Colonialism faded. She wrote that
the white man is no longer a ruler. He is a guest; often Asians go to 
considerable pains to make him feel an unwanted one. His color is not a sign 
of caste or privilege but rather a badge of (historical) guil[t].122
For Durdin, people’s skin served as a marker of colonial legacy. The transfer o f 
power from the French to the Vietnamese in Saigon left distinct groups o f  residents,
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their skin color grouping them, but not necessarily granting them— or corresponding 
to a set of—privileges.
Seemingly eager to distance the current political situation in Saigon from its 
colonial past, Durdin also presented the “white m an’s burden” as antiquated and 
ridiculous. Durdin’s critique o f “the lure o f the East” as something grounded in the 
privileges available to the French and their allies in Saigon echoed earlier 
representations of Saigon. At the same time, the description of that “ lure,” and the 
accompanying “civilizing mission” also attempted to distance Americans from that 
viewpoint.
The descriptions o f  life in Asia offered by Durdin, however, vacillated 
between attempts to critique colonialism and frank descriptions of why it was good to 
be white in post-colonial parts o f the world. In a moment o f  honesty and self­
implication with her readers, Durdin described the benefits o f being white in Asia—  
white skin made Americans living in Asian countries feel special:
We must admit, though, in all honesty, that one reason Asia is more fun today 
for certain Europeans and Americans is that in the yellow-and-brown-skinned
123countries they felt, if  not superior to the multitude, at least distinct from it.
Being a white in decolonized Asian countries, for Durdin, no longer allowed for the 
privileges that might have existed under colonial rule, such as the leisure activities 
earlier travelers to Saigon wrote about. However, white skin allowed some travelers
123 Ibid.
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to be different from the people around them, which lent more excitement to their 
experience.
Dudin also addressed how American women might find Asia exhilarating. 
According to Durdin, moving to an Asian city might allow them to leave behind 
previous associations with their hometown. Because people did not know them in 
their new chosen home in Asia, they could recast their identities. Even though travel 
in general might also grant this privilege, Durdin explained that such possibilities 
were available in Asia, but not European locations. American women living in 
France would be lost “ in a mass o f  women” who dressed and spoke better than they 
did. So, by going to live in an Asian country, Americans could stand out. They had 
access to “a much finer house” and “better food” than their Asian neighbors. This 
ultimately created “for those who need[ed] it, a certain psychological satisfaction in 
being the only white face on an Asian street, even if  all the brown faces regard[ed] it 
sullenly.”1"'4
Even after the French no longer controlled Saigon, the racial tensions 
developed under French rule persisted. However, Americans were finding 
themselves in the position the French were in, but the French were no longer around. 
Durdin argued that Americans living in many Asian countries were unfairly the focus 
of “resentments and suspicions” previously attributed to “colonial rulers.” Durdin 
described the threats and benefits that white people faced in an area jettisoning
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
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colonialism:
The visitor with the white skin not only observes but also experiences the self- 
assertion o f ex-colonial peoples; he is the object o f their neurotic suspicions 
and fears, their long-suppressed resentments and hatreds as well as their 
gentleness and generosity.126
Durdin’s understanding o f what it meant to be white and American in Asia 
continued in a 1955 article titled “On Trial— The White Man in Asia.” 127 She 
claimed that there was a disadvantage to being white in the “Far East.” Regarding 
Vietnam specifically, Durdin wrote that “through the last tragic half decade, the hate 
and resentment o f the Vietnamese for Europeans seemed palpable enough to touch 
with the fingers.”128 The dislike of Europeans, or white people in general, claimed 
Durdin, extended to the foreign policy that accompanied them. In fact, she equated 
whiteness and policy when she said, “for Asians the white m an-and his government— 
are not on a pedestal. They are on trial, or at least on probation. Asians no longer 
think—if indeed they ever did—that the West has all the answers to the world's—or 
Asia’s— problems.” 129
Saigon in the mid-1950s was a city in transition. As the French left the city, 
Americans moved in. Once there, Americans learned how to inhabit the physical 
spaces left vacant by the French and many found they could harness the colonial
127 Peggy Durdin, “On Trial-The White Man in Asia,” New York Times, June 5, 
1955.
128 Ibid.
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privilege still present in Saigon’s culture and infrastructure. At the same time, 
Saigon’s Vietnamese population changed as well. After the 1954 partition o f 
Vietnam into North and South, the United States helped move those people located in 
the North to Saigon if they wished to flee the communist government in the North. 
Despite the relatively low numbers of Americans in Saigon before 1955, the early 
interpretations that writers created of the city shaped American understandings o f the 
city for the next twenty years. As the American presence in Vietnam increased, 
Americans would look to the English-language media for how to interpret the 
changing city. By the end of the 1950s, the United States would see the first film shot 
on location in Saigon and by the end o f the production, the process o f transferring 
power from France to the United States would be complete.
129 Ibid.
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The Quiet American: Graham Greene. Joseph Mankiewicz and the Imagining 1950s
Saigon
In the first half o f the twentieth century, American writers, as seen in the 
previous chapter, often understood Saigon through a binary o f authenticity. Different 
writers defined what the “real” Saigon was differently and in the process also created 
a geographic and figurative center and periphery in the city. Graham Greene’s 1954 
novel The Quiet American and Joseph M ankiewicz’s film by the same name engage 
in both these relationships. However, the “real” Saigon they look for is less about 
looking underneath a French facade, and more about how ideas mix with a lived 
environment to create meanings o f a place. While stretching the real/imagined divide 
in their representations of Saigon, both Greene and Mankiewicz used Saigon’s built 
environment to establish a set o f  conventions to represent the city to Americans, they 
also utilized the people living in Saigon to create a sense of the city for their 
audiences. The role people played in representations o f Saigon, however, depended 
less on their actions and more on the interpretation of their bodies. The meanings 
authors and filmmakers placed on the bodies o f the people populating their narratives 
acted in parity with the French colonial structures that provided the skeletal support 
for the creatively imagined Saigon. The meanings placed upon these fictional bodies 
were rooted in gendered understandings o f the body, which creators then extrapolated 
to map national boundaries within Saigon.
When deconstructing Saigon in the collective American imagination, or at least 
the imagination as structured through media, the line between fact and fiction started 
to fade. This chapter examines British novelist Graham Greene’s The Quiet
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American and the Joseph Mankiewicz’s 1958 film version o f The Quiet American.
On one level, these sources— whose genres often conjure associations o f “ fact” in the 
case of the news and “fiction” in terms o f narrative film and novels— participated in a 
dialogue despite their relationship to “fact.” However, we must look at each o f these 
texts to see how they engage the real/imagined divide. These cultural artifacts, 
usually categorized as “fact” or “fiction,” treated the line between real/imagined with 
such permeability that we must start to question the relationship between cultural 
texts and “historical” knowledge.
From the very beginning o f The Quiet American , Graham Greene disrupted the 
lines between the real and imagined. The novel, based on the raw material o f 
Greene’s experiences in Saigon starting in 1951,1 began with a short note to his 
friends Rene Berval and Phuong.2 Greene asked the couple for their “permission to 
dedicate this book to [them] not only in memory of the happy evenings [he] spent 
with [them] in Saigon,”3 but also because he used the location of their apartment in 
the novel for the home o f his one o f his characters. Greene’s dedication continued to 
explain that the “historical events” he included in the novel had been chronologically 
rearranged and stated that his novel was “a story and not a piece o f h istory .. .about a
1 Norman Sherry, The Life o f  Graham Greene, 1st ed. (New York, NY., U.S.A.: 
Viking, 1989), 364.
2 While Rene Berval’s last name has made its way into the historical record, Phuong’s 
last name seems to have not. Greene biographer Norman Sherry says Phuong was 
Rene’s girlfriend, and then inserts her last name as “ Berval” (409). Greene Wrote 
Rene Berval to ask permission to use his flat location and Phuong’s name in The 
Quiet American, her last name did not appear in Greene’s letters either. “From 
Graham Greene to Rene,” August 3, 1955, Box 46, Folder 6, John J. Bums Library.
3 Graham Greene, The Quiet American, New York: Penguin Books, 1996, 4.
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few imaginary characters.”4
Greene’s dedication simultaneously reveals The Quiet American as a work of 
fact and fiction. Indeed, Greene’s imaginary Saigon was so real he wrote a letter to 
Berval in 1951 to ask for permission to use Berval’s apartment as model for Fowler’s 
apartment.5 Outside of Berval’s/Fowler’s apartment lies additional real/imagined 
landmarks centrally located on and around the Rue Catinat (the street Fowler lives 
on) like the Continental Hotel, the Cathedral. Greene also included areas outside o f  
the downtown area in The Quiet American. At times, the characters travel to Cholon, 
which adopts meanings similar to those established by the journalists investigated in 
the previous chapter.
The blurred boundary between fact and fiction also extends to the plot o f The 
Quiet American. According to the dedication, at least some o f the events that took 
place in the novel were based on real happenings in Saigon (like the climatic 
explosion at the end o f the novel on Rue Catinat), although Greene says he altered 
them. Consequently, the Saigon o f Greene’s The Quiet American reveals the ways in 
which meanings o f a place get created. Greene mixed his feelings and memories o f 
being in Saigon in the early 1950s, with actual events and fictional characters to 
create the setting for the novel. Part imagination, part reality, the Saigon o f The Quiet 
American sheds light on how all writers, be they journalists or novelists constructed 
meanings around the city.
4 Ibid.
3 " From Graham Greene to Rene,” August 3, 1955, Box 46, Folder 6, John J. Bums 
Library.
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Greene’s letter and dedication did more than establish the permeability o f 
the line between a real and imagined places Saigon. They also showed how the 
process o f combining reality with imagination could also apply to people— in this 
case, Greene does this with the person/character o f Phuong. Greene borrowed the 
name “Phuong” for his character from an acquaintance of his living in Saigon— she is 
mentioned in a letter from Greene to Berval as well as in the novel’s dedication. By 
using her Vietnamese name, but nothing else, he creates a shell of women, into which 
he could create his own version o f a Vietnamese woman whose sole purpose was “ to 
be stolen from the English journalist by Pyle o f the American Economic M ission.”6 
Greene’s primary concern with Phuong was to provide an object o f desire for Pyle 
and Fowler. She was a body and a name. Greene needed to “borrow” the name, with 
permission like an apartment location, and then be free to create an imaginary 
character around that name— a name that provided a body, but not much else.
■ The novel itself focused on the relationships between three main characters: 
Thomas Fowler, Alden Pyle, and Phuong. Fowler, a British journalist (and the 
novel’s narrator) stationed in Saigon was older than the other two characters and had 
been in Saigon for some time— long enough to be able to explain the situation in the 
city and in Vietnam to newcomers. The 32-year-old Pyle worked for the Economic 
Aid Mission in Saigon. Pyle did not know much about Vietnam and what he did 
know came from texts, as opposed to Fowler who learned from his years o f  
experience in Saigon. In order to leam about the conditions on the ground during the
6 Ibid.
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French War in Vietnam, he studied the work o f diplomatic correspondents. Fowler 
saw Pyle as a naive American, who believed that American aid could solve the 
conflict in Vietnam. Specifically, Pyle believed that the American aid could spur the 
creation of an authentic “third force” made up o f indigenous peoples (rather than 
colonialists or Communists) to fight for democracy in Vietnam. Ultimately, Pyle’s 
knowledge based in books rather than experience , made him dangerous. Both 
Fowler and Pyle were in love with Phuong, a twenty-year-old Vietnamese woman. 
Greene does not develop Phuong’s character in the same way as the two main male 
characters— she speaks little and we never find out a great deal about her. She met 
Fowler when she was 18 and they moved in together for two years until she 
eventually moved out and than began living with Pyle.
Greene developed the characters in The Quiet American by creating a 
relationship between them and the places through which they traveled. By 
associating character with the nations from which they came, Greene critiqued the 
political situation in Vietnam in the early/mid-1950s. Pyle, the American character, 
came to embody the United States through Fowler’s description of him. Fowler 
created an imaginary past for Pyle by imagining a series o f snapshots from Pyle’s life 
in America.7 As imagined by Fowler, Pyle was an urban, affluent American who 
embodied a wholesome, corporate and leisurely lifestyle. Each of these 
characteristics came with a place attached. His affluence and ruggedness came from 
Fowler’s imagination of him “riding on a dude ranch, bathing on Long Island,” and
7 The Q uiet A m erican, 21.
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working with his colleagues in a skyscraper. Fowler’s imagined version o f Pyle was 
less about Pyle and more about Fowler’s understanding o f the United States and its 
role in Vietnam— he constructed his own mythic version o f America. To Fowler, the 
United States relationship to France and Vietnam was about an arrogant, naive, and 
over intellectualized application o f force. The memories he created for Pyle’s photo 
album took these characteristics and applied them to the Pyle’s body. Fowler saw 
Pyle riding a horse, swimming while on vacation, and working in a leisurely way. 
Consequently, when Fowler looked at Pyle, “the Quiet American,” he saw these 
elements of the United States. Having accomplished the mapping o f  national 
characteristics onto an individual body, Greene then could have Pyle move through 
the rest of the novel and his mere presence allows readers to think through the 
consequences o f American foreign policy.
Greene’s application of national characteristics to individual bodies runs 
throughout The Quiet American and it was not limited to Pyle’s American body. 
Through Fowler’s interpretations o f his own body, and the bodies o f others, Greene 
not only created a commentary about international relations, but also created 
meanings rooted in the local. That is to say, Greene lent meaning to Saigon through 
the bodies of his characters. This did not stop with Pyle and the United States. As he 
did with Pyle, Fowler interpreted different people through places, but he also 
understood places through people and their bodies. He described his first encounter 
with Pyle by describing the bodies o f not only Pyle, but also of himself and 
Vietnamese women:
I had seen him last September coming across the square towards the bar o f the
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Continental: an unmistakably young and unused face flung at us like a dart. 
With his gangly legs and his crew cut and his wide campus gaze he seemed 
incapable o f harm.8 
Fowler’s first impressions of Pyle were thus channeled through the boyish 
American’s body, focusing on his legs, short hair, and overall “campus” look. Pyle 
stood out; he was different from his surroundings, be they Vietnamese or French; he 
was American. Pyle’s young body reflected his character’s seeming naivete (while 
Pyle and Fowler were talking, a car backfired and Pyle hoped it was a grenade 
detonation). Fowler contrasted this view with his own aging body— he no longer 
found the intrigue o f Saigon exciting, or for that matter, newsworthy. Where Pyle’s 
body related to the relative youth o f American expansionism, Fowler’s represented 
the decline of the British Empire.
Fowler found little to be excited about as a reporter in Saigon. He explained 
that news of explosions only made the “back page o f the local paper” and they never 
made European newspapers.9 Despite Fowler’s disinterest many of the events in 
Saigon, the bodies o f Vietnamese women piqued his interest. As Fowler thought 
about his own numbing to the explosions that excited Pyle, he watched Vietnamese 
women walked down rue Catinat by the cafe at the Continental Hotel where the men 
sat. Wbile looking at the “ lovely flat figures” in ao dais, Fowler “watched them with 
the nostalgia 1 knew I would feel when I had left these regions for ever.” 10 Fowler’s
8 Ibid., 17-18.
9 Ibid.
1 0  t u ; a
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jaded perspective ultimately created a distinction between the Saigon for which he 
will be nostalgic, the Saigon of women and French colonial architecture, and the one 
in which a war was being fought— the Saigon of people who were not in power. The 
“other” Saigon was comprised o f those places the one the “European Press” no longer 
wrote about— the parts of town where grenades exploded.
The division between Saigon’s nostalgia-inducing downtown area and the rest 
o f the city emerged early in the novel. One evening, Fowler waited for Pyle in his rue 
Catinat apartment. On a landing on the stairs to his apartment sat a group o f 
Vietnamese women and Fowler could “see lamps burning where they had 
disembarked the new American planes.” 11 Fowler also “saw a girl waiting in the next 
doorway.” Even though he “couldn’t see her face, only the white silk trousers and the 
long flowered robe,” he knew it was Phuong.12 In this initial description o f Saigon, 
Greene created a sense of the familiar and o f the unknown. Fowler’s apartment 
above the rue Catinat was welcoming— quiet, o ff the street, a place to dine and 
disengage (Fowler later smoked opium in the confines o f his bed). The interior space 
was lent its atmosphere through the feeling o f nighttime rue Catinat. Once Fowler 
descended to the street, he met a more dangerous and unfamiliar Saigon. The street 
was empty except for a few people and shadows, and in the distance he could see the 
sign of the French War effort and the American planes that helped support them.
In addition to the street level being the place where one became aware of the 
war, the street also introduced women, sex, and drugs into Fowler’s Saigon.
11 Ibid., 11- 12.
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Phuong’s introduction obscured her face— Fowler saw only her body and her 
clothing. While readers were left wondering who she was and what she was doing 
there, Fowler knew both her identity and her purpose— she waited for his competitor, 
Pyle. The danger o f the street mounted as Fowler encouraged Phuong to accompany 
him upstairs, as the French police might arrest her— the streets were safe for a British 
man but not a Vietnamese woman. When Phuong and Fowler ascended to his 
apartment, Fowler’s apartment transformed into a “safe” opium den— Phuong 
prepared Fowler’s opium pipe for him. Fowler’s predicable narration described the 
characteristics he observed in Vietnamese women— they are fragile like birds when 
“taken to bed.”13
Fowler’s actions in his apartment and on the rue Catinat developed a dichotomy 
between unknown and familiar, or dangerous and safe. Fowler could move freely 
between these two places. Fie was comfortable on the street, he explained his opium 
use and his understanding o f sex between white men and Vietnamese women— he 
invited these things into his home. Fowler was in control over his own situation and 
comfortable in Saigon as he was able to control what elements went where— his 
quiet/safe apartment mingled with the exhilarating/dangerous street when he 
permitted it.
However, the relationship between familiar and unknown, and Fow ler’s 
negotiation of the two, perhaps functioned more as a spectrum than a binary. On the 
steps leading from Fowler’s apartment to the rue Catinat— physically separating the
12 Ibid.
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familiar from the unknown-—was a “landing.” When Fowler first left his apartment, 
Fowler saw a group of women, but did not think much o f them—warranting only a 
short description in his narration. However, when he and Phuong climbed the stairs 
again back to his apartment, these women left more of an impression. As he walked 
upstairs, Fowler thought about joking with Phuong, but he reconsidered because he 
felt she would not understand the irony in the languages with which he was 
familiar— French and English. At this moment, the couple reached the landing where 
the Vietnamese women were sitting and talking. As Phuong and Fowler passed by, 
Fowler heard the women start talking— he described it as hearing some sort of song. 
Fowler did not know Vietnamese and Phuong had to explain what they said to him.
The women on the landing created an area o f anxiety for Fowler. He 
understood his apartment, as presumably, there was not much to understand— it was 
his and he felt it was too quiet. He also understood the street and he could enter it 
whenever he wished. Fowler felt he knew more than Phuong— at least French and 
English— but at the same time, Fowler could not understand the women on the 
landing, or their language. The landing lay between the street and his apartment both 
physically and metaphorically. In this space, he was in between two places he 
thought he knew.
The women on the stairs o f Fowler’s apartment appeared again later in the 
novel. Fowler returned to his apartment from a series o f events that had him trapped 
and attacked in a watchtower overnight in the Vietnamese countryside and resulted in
13 Ibid., 12.
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a stay in a hospital. As he climbed the stairs to his apartment, the women gossiped 
“carrying Fate in the lines of their faces as others on the palm.”14 Fowler’s encounter 
with these women after his stay in the hospital revealed the conflicting ways his 
character understood the world around him. Clearly, he acknowledged there were 
parts o f Saigon, and Vietnamese culture, that he did not understand. However,
Fowler believed he could still “know” these women through their faces. Their bodies 
displayed their futures for public viewing. Fowler merely had to look at these women 
and he could know their present and future. The interactions between Fowler and the 
women on the landing revealed his understanding of Saigon as rooted not only in 
places, but also in the bodies o f the people who inhabited those places. This 
understanding, however, did not necessarily extend to communicating with people.
Fowler’s understanding o f Saigon came from the bodies of Vietnamese women. 
Depending on the context, the meanings he placed upon, or extracted from, female 
bodies, could denote a leisurely place, a dangerous place, or some combination o f the 
two. One night, Fowler, Pyle, Granger (a brash American journalist), and Phuong, 
went to Cholon for dinner and to visit a brothel named the “House o f Five Hundred 
Girls.” After sending Phuong to reserve a table at the restaurant next door, the three 
men ventured into the brothel. Inside, they saw hundreds o f sex workers with little to 
do as there “was trouble in Cholon and the troops were confined to quarters and there 
was no work to be done: the Sunday o f the body.” 15 Because of the lack o f  business, 
several o f the women working in the brothel fought over the customers that came in,
14 Ib id , 114.
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which reminded Fowler o f a story of a previous patron who had lost his pants as he 
struggled to escape the women and seek shelter at a police station. O f this visitor, 
Fowler said that “if  he chose to poach on military territory, he must look after him self 
and find his own way out.16
Here, Fowler uses women’s bodies to describe Cholon. The “trouble in 
Cholon” is at once the same danger, and a different danger, than that present at the 
end of the passage. The French military was on the ready for fighting in the city— the 
city posed a risk because o f the war. Having established the risk o f moving through 
Saigon-Cholon, the passage keeps that feeling alive through the story of the visitor 
who had to seek refuge at the police station. However, here, he was fighting the 
women who worked at the brothel. The bodies o f  the women in the brothel were 
what put men at risk. More specifically, the bodies of Vietnamese women put, 
presumably, white men at risk. The risk o f military action in Saigon, as Fowler had 
already expressed, seemed less important to the jaded journalist, but the risk posed by 
Vietnamese women seemed more real, or at least more relevant. For Fowler, the 
women and the city were inseparable. They were not only both considered 
“territory,” or something to be possessed, but also the same territory. Fowler 
understood these women as part o f Saigon-Cholon as he would a restaurant, street, or 
the House o f Five Hundred Girls. Each belonged to the city.
This passage also exposes Fowler’s understanding in Saigon-Cholon. Unlike 
newly-arrived Americans, Fowler had been in Saigon for quite some time so he had
15 Ibid., 37- 38 .
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local knowledge, such as the memory of the pants-less visitor to the brothel. He had 
seen this all before. When combined with his character’s experience, Fow ler’s body 
suggested a different commentary about Saigon, particularly, the relationship of the 
United States to Indochina. For example, while still at the brothel, a crowd formed 
around the three men. Fowler decided to “divide and conquer” and took a woman 
aside to prevent others from vying for his business. He told her, in French, that he 
was old and tired. As he said this he “caught sight of Granger flushed and 
triumphant; it was as though he took this demonstration as a tribute to his 
manhood.”17 Fowler then called to Pyle and as the American glanced back, “his face 
looked haggard” and Fowler speculated Pyle had never had sex before.18
Fowler’s tired body was also the body o f a tired colonial power. His body, the 
aging British Empire, had been through this before. Conversant in the language o f 
colonialism (here, French), Fowler looked at a newer entry into the colonial stage as 
represented in the dual bodies o f Granger and Pyle. On the one hand, Granger’s 
body, one side o f the American presence in Saigon, was virile and self-satisfied. His 
strong body was a hawkish American presence, welcoming American involvement in 
Vietnam— it was initially his idea to come to the establishment. On the other hand, 
Pyle was unsure, exhausted and disturbed by his surroundings. While Pyle, at first, 
wanted to be at the brothel, he quickly became terrified by the scene and his body, 
looking unwell, betrayed his inexperience to Fowler. He arrived at his current
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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predicament without understanding the reality o f what would happen. At this 
moment, Pyle’s and Granger’s bodies also signaled a transition between the old 
(French) and new (American) foreign powers in Vietnam. The House o f Five 
Hundred Girls was a hangout for the French military. The French troops have left 
and American male bodies have taken their place. The “ tradition” that Fowler 
recognizes of women crowding around men happens to them as they established a 
connection between old and new. The Americans had arrived and begun to make 
their mark on the city.
Fowler and Pyle eventually left Granger at the House o f Five Hundred Girls to 
meet Phuong at a nearby restaurant and cabaret. After watching a singer, a juggler, 
and a comedian, the group watched “a troupe of female impersonators” perform in 
“evening dresses with false jewelry and false breasts and husky voices.” 19 Fowler 
recognized several of the performers— he had seen them walking down rue Catinat 
“in old slacks and sweaters, a bit blue about the chin, swaying their hips.”20 As he 
watched them in the cabaret, “they appear at least as desirable as most o f the 
European women in Saigon.”21 As they performed, several military officers 
“whistled to them and they smiled glamorously back.”22
In a Saigon where the city’s meaning often came from people’s bodies and the 
idea o f the “real” was in flux, this drag show created an intriguing space. Fowler’s 
Saigon not only derived meaning from bodies, but those bodies needed to be strictly
19
20
21
Ibid., 45. 
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Ibid.
91
male or female. Each set of gendered bodies carried a set o f possible meanings that 
could be mapped onto the city. The appearance o f men in drag challenged those 
possibilities. Fowler’s marking o f “false” jewelry and breasts established the 
existence, at least to him, of a real gendered divide— these were not real women.
Their hybrid bodies, however, leant meaning to the city all the same. They were 
desirable and glamorous. While the drag show took place in Cholon, Fowler noted 
that he had seen “many o f them during the day in the rue Catinat.” As such, the 
hybrid bodies of the drag performers were not confined to the seemingly dangerous 
Cholon. Because they traveled through the different parts o f the city, the bodies o f 
these men in drag transformed the entirety o f Fowler’s Saigon. Flowever, while on 
the rue Catinat, these bodies were perverse— they were dressed in worn clothes and 
showed a hint of facial hair. The imperfect performance o f gendered expectations, as 
Fowler described it, marginalized the men through their bodies. This marginalization, 
however, was confined to downtown Saigon. During the evening in Cholon, the drag 
performers were transformed in Fowler’s mind. While still “false,” they were not 
only acceptable, but desirable. In each location, the performers had “ false” elements, 
but in Cholon, Fowler accepted the liminal space.
Fowler’s acceptance of liminal bodies in Cholon, but not downtown Saigon, 
was rooted in the relationship between the performers and the audience. On the rue 
Catinat, Fowler looked at people as they passed by and did not allow for the gaze to 
be directed back at him. However, the audience in the cabaret had a different
22 Ibid.
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relationship to the performers. Like Fowler on rue Catinat, they took enjoyment from 
the bodies o f others, but in this instance, the objects of the gaze also gained more 
control over the situation and they interacted with the audience—the Air Force 
officers’ whistled and the performance smiled “glamorously back.” Fowler’s reaction 
to the performance was more introverted. He recalled how he engaged with the 
performers while they were offstage. By engaging with a memory o f the performers 
when he was seemingly in control o f their interaction, he regained control o f the 
experience. Here, in a part of town where the drag performers were powerful, Fowler 
invokes rue Catinat where gender expectations were easily sorted and his control o f 
the situation went unchallenged.
Where Fowler could mentally return to the safety o f rue Catinat in his mind, 
Pyle, unnerved by this conscious manipulation o f gender expectations, needed to 
return physically. Pyle told his companions that the performance was inappropriate 
for Phuong, but her silence in this passage confirmed that Pyle was the uncomfortable 
one. His discomfort lead Pyle to want to leave the restaurant and return to the safety 
of the part o f Saigon he called home.
Later in the novel, the relative safety o f  the rue Catinat disintegrated as a bomb 
exploded near the Continental Hotel. In the passage before the bombing outside the 
Continental Hotel, Fowler sat down in a cafe and described his surroundings. In 
addition to a “dowdy middle-aged Frenchwoman,” two young American women sat 
in the cafe, “neat and clean in the heat” eating ice cream “with concentration as
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thought they were making an experiment in the college laboratory.”23 They had 
identical handbags and identical legs. The women checked the time and left—  
someone told them to leave the area by a certain time. While they didn’t know why 
they had to leave, one speculated that it was because a demonstration was planned—  
something she was bored by. As they left, Fowler judged them—they came from a 
“sterilized so different from [the] world [he] inhabited.”24 They existed in a place 
devoid o f passion and “they did not belong to rumpled sheets and the sweat o f sex.”25 
In his observation o f these two American women, Fowler created tension 
between his expectations o f these women’s bodies and the reality o f the meanings o f 
their bodies. Above all else, Fowler saw these women as wholesome. As the Pyle o f 
Fowler’s imagination belonged to a city with martini lunches, these women belonged 
to a college campus. Fowler’s understanding of these women’s seemingly sanitary 
(and identical, as if  mass produced) bodies merged with his construction o f the 
“sterilized” world they inhabited— rooted in naivety and youth. In it lived 
Americans, like these American strangers and Pyle, who, at first examination, were 
pure and righteous. The gap between the sterilized American world o f  Saigon and 
Fowler’s Saigon started to widen as the American women revealed they possessed 
knowledge of the city that Fowler did not have. They knew something was going to 
happen in downtown Saigon. Not only would the eventual bombing unsettle the 
cornerstone o f Fowler’s safety in Saigon as it took place on rue Catinat, but it would
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also demonstrate that Fowler no longer had control over his own Saigon. The 
Americans’ Saigon now controlled the knowledge of the city and Fowler’s 
experiences became less relevant. In this passage, for instance, his understanding o f 
Saigon through the bodies of these women was inaccurate— the meanings he assigned 
to their world were wrong. By looking at their legs, and the general campus-look, he 
assumed their world did not involve violence or complication. Their knowledge of 
Saigon ended at, what he assumed, was the interest o f tourists. Instead, as Fowler 
started to realize, their understandings o f the city were proactive (as expressed 
through one o f the women’s knowing glance). The two Americans left the area o f the 
bombing before it happened, leaving behind a French woman and Fowler— both, 
presumably, not as youthful and attractive, not part o f the new reality o f an American- 
influenced Saigon.
Fowler’s world, the Saigon he knew, began to fall apart as the bomb went off 
on rue Catinat. Still seated in the cafe, Fowler’s reaction to the explosion narrated the 
disintegration of his version o f Saigon at the hands o f the American version o f the 
city. He described how mirrors fell off the wall and the compact mirror previously 
used by the Frenchwoman in the cafe to apply makeup “lay open and unhurt in 
[Fowler’s] lap.”26 Fowler sat undisturbed although his table was destroyed and he 
couldn’t hear. He heard a “garden-sound” in the cafe caused by European liquors and 
wines as they dripped from shattered bottles.27
As the cafe collapsed around him, Fowler’s body remained unmoved— he was
26 Ibid., 160.
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constant in a changing world around him. The Frenchwoman’s body was uninjured, 
although thrown from her chair, and she prioritized the restoration o f  the appearance 
of an unphased body by looking for her compact. While the explosion spared 
Fowler’s body, it shattered his understanding of Saigon. Fowler’s world o f leisure he 
enjoyed earlier on the me Catinat now lay in the form of puddles o f French liquor on 
the floor. Even his descriptions o f the space around him betrayed him— he associated 
the sounds he heard with the peaceful noise o f fountain rather than the outcome o f an 
explosion near bottles of alcohol. In this moment, the American world he previously 
saw as sterile started to reveal its true self. It was irrational, intense, and colorful. 
Indoors became out as garden sounds were mimicked by the vibrantly colored 
European liquors, no longer held by their bottles, dripping down the bar.
The explosion left more wreckage outside the cafe. As Fowler went to the 
street, he learned experienced more o f the bomb’s devastation and how it continued to 
transform the Saigon he knew. The wreckage juxtaposed violence with the French- 
designed landscape. The explosion had left wreckage o f cars scattered across the 
Place Gamier near the theater on me Catinat, Rather than observing the graceful 
figures he previously coveted on m e Catinat, he now saw a destroyed male body 
“without his legs .. .twitching at the edge of the ornamental gardens.”28
The bombing further transformed Fowler’s understanding of Saigon as he 
realized that his knowledge of the city, and his and Phuong’s place in it, was eroded 
by the Americans. Fowler saw Pyle at the scene of the explosion and Fowler worried
27 Ibid.
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that Phuong was might have been injured at the nearby “milk bar” she often 
frequented during that time of day. Pyle assured Fowler she was not there— he had 
known about the explosion before hand and warned her to stay clear o f  the area.29 
Pyle’s knowledge of the bombing, along with the American women in the cafe, 
finalized a transition in the Saigon Fowler thought he knew. After the explosion, and 
learning of his ignorance concerning its execution, Fowler was unsafe in the city he 
previously knew and no longer knew how to seek refuge.
As Fowler wrestled with the idea o f not understanding his surroundings, he left 
the wreckage walking up rue Catinat to where the “hideous pink Cathedral blocked 
the way.”30 Fowler also reflected on the position o f the United States in Vietnam. 
Fowler felt Pyle “was impregnably armoured by his good intentions and his 
ignorance.”31 Fowler wrestled with his feelings as well. While he was thankful that 
Phuong survived the bombing because she was warned, he also felt conflicted as the 
victims of the bombing received no warning— “they had not been sufficiently 
important.”32
Once Fowler understood the Americans’ role in the bombing, he saw the lines 
drawn between the factions present in Saigon more clearly. Americans and their 
allies, who had knowledge of the bombing, knew to stay away from the downtown 
area. Everyone else, most o f the Vietnamese population of Saigon and outsiders like
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 161.
30 Ibid., 163.
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Fowler lay outside this group and as a result were left in danger of the bomb. The 
bomb, exploding in front o f the theater on rue Catinat, did “not discriminate,”j3 but 
knowledge of that explosion did. The two young women in the cafe, Pyle, and 
Phuong all knew about this plan and made sure not to be in the area and told the some 
people to stay away as well. The indiscriminate explosion was a display o f 
Americans creatively destroying the landscape o f Saigon. As they tried to forward 
their policy goals o f seeing a “third force” come to power, they asserted their control 
over the city. Americans now had the power to help, hurt, or hinder the residents o f 
Saigon. Americans now loomed over the French part o f the city and the bombing 
marked the transition from French control to American, through who controlled the 
colonial part of the city.
Joseph M ankiew icz’s Saigon in The Quiet American (1958)
Like Graham Greene’s novel, American director Joseph Mankiewicz’s film 
adaptation o f The Quiet American created a hybrid version o f Saigon. Not quite real, 
but not quite artificial, the Saigon o f the 1958 film combined exterior shots filmed on- 
location in Saigon and interior shots filmed on a soundstage in Rome.34 Mankiewicz 
also used people’s bodies to help lend meaning to the city. He created a hybrid 
Saigon by stitching together a population from actors and extras and meshing on- 
location filming with soundstage reproductions. Specifically, by casting Italian 
actress Giorgia Moll in as a the female Vietnamese character Phuong, Mankiewicz
33 Ibid.
34 W illiam  Russo, A T h in ker’s D am n: A udie  M urphy, Vietnam, a n d  the M akin g  
o f  the Q uiet Am erican, (X libris C orp, 2001), 157.
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literally placed (racialized) meanings about national boundaries onto the female body.
The film version of The Quiet American depended on exterior shots of 
downtown Saigon to create a sense o f the city. Mankiewicz filmed many of the same 
locations that Graham Greene wrote about. However, Saigon in 1957, when the crew 
filmed these exterior shots, and Saigon in 1952, when the story was set, differed a 
great deal. Principally, the story required a Saigon under French control, but 
Mankiewicz was filming in a city where the South Vietnamese government, in 
conjunction with the United States, ruled. The ability o f the downtown Saigon 
landmarks to stand in for previous versions o f themselves was enabled by a unique 
attribute of downtown Saigon. The colonial architecture, at the moment o f its initial 
design and construction, was imbued with a set o f  colonial meanings. These 
meanings had to change over time as French power waned in Saigon. However, 
colonial meanings of the buildings transformed into another layer o f meaning on the 
city. It was a view into the past from the present. Mankiewicz’s film mobilized this 
layer o f past meanings that were part o f the French colonial buildings. When put onto 
film, they were meant to give a “sense” o f Saigon—a place where colonial structures 
attempted to rule over the people living there.
The Quiet American had eight, or so, exterior sequences in Saigon and each one 
revealed different aspects o f Mankiewicz’s Saigon. Fowler’s witnessing o f the 
bicycle bomb explosions showed how cinematography could use old buildings to 
establish a sense o f an “old” French-controlled Saigon. The seemingly controlled 
Saigon contrasted the “other” Saigon that Mankiewicz created in scenes o f  markets
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and Tet celebrations. Fowler’s recollection o f seeing Phuong and Pyle as they went 
out around town demonstrated a nostalgic/romantic version of the city. The scene of 
bicycle bombs exploding in the fountain used the backdrop o f Saigon’s architecture 
and editing to create two versions o f Saigon: the first, Fowler’s Saigon o f the early 
1950s and the second, the American Saigon present in the novel that had come to 
fruition for the 1957 on-location filming o f the city.
At the beginning o f this scene, Fowler arrived at the comer o f Le Loi and 
Nguyen Hue in downtown Saigon to investigate a tip. After checking his watch, 
Fowler heard sirens and then looked in their direction as a number o f trucks entered 
the traffic circle. Vietnamese police exited the trucks and removed a number of 
bicycles from racks on the street comer and threw them into the nearby fountain 
where they exploded. The bicycle bombing scene gave viewers a sense o f the city by 
visually placing Fowler in downtown Saigon. From the com er of Le Loi and Nguyen 
Hue, the camera captured several downtown landmarks left by French colonial rule 
and thereby helped construct a colonial presence through the architecture. From this 
comer, we see the French designed and built theater a block away on the m e Catinat. 
The Hotel de Ville is one block down the next street from Fowler’s comer. These 
French-designed buildings anchored the scene in the French colonial legacy by 
providing visual markers o f French power.
The colonial architecture present in downtown Saigon allowed Mankiewicz to 
set his story before the end of the French War. The bicycle bombing scene not only 
showed visual markers o f French power, but also the symbolic power o f  the
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architectural elements of the city. The Vietnamese police prevented the bombs from 
destroying part o f downtown Saigon by moving the bombs from the part o f  the city 
meant for public use (the sidewalk) and tossing them into the decorative element o f 
the city (the fountain). The threat o f  the people against the French-controlled Saigon 
was neutralized by containing the physical energy within the design o f the French 
downtown.
Through the camera work o f the bicycle bombing scene, Mankiewicz 
exposes the multiple Saigon’s present in The Quiet American. The film used 
Fowler’s perspective and a seemingly omniscient camera angle to relate the events o f 
this scene. The camera shots in the beginning o f the bicycle bomb sequence focused 
on Fowler’s reaction, or at least the direction of his gaze, by placing him in the frame. 
For example, the film captured the traffic moving around the traffic circle from over 
Fowler’s shoulder. Similarly, the camera cut back to Fowler watching the bicycle 
bombing. The presence o f Fowler’s body in the frame establishes this is his Saigon. 
He received knowledge o f the bombing and knew something would happen in the 
area at a certain time and, as such, his perspective is one o f control.
Even though Fowler’s Saigon was one of control and knowledge, there was a 
competing shot interspersed in this sequence not tied to Fowler’s perspective. The 
initial choice o f height for this shot freed it from Fowler’s point of view. Once freed 
from Fowler’s line-of-sight, the camera could not only track the actions o f  the police 
officers, but could also move around the square. The wide street provided an 
unobstructed view of Saigon’s landscape and the camera captured nearby landmarks,
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such as the Opera House. These shots, unconnected to Fowler’s understanding o f the 
events unfolding, acknowledged the presence of another set o f meanings placed upon 
Saigon. This “extra” perspective was the explicit demonstration o f an American 
point o f view in the city. Like Greene’s Saigon, created from his memories o f real 
aspects of the city, this perspective highlights the Saigon Mankiewicz constructed.
Fowler’s Saigon, the Saigon of the plot (supposedly from 1952), and the current 
Saigon in which Mankiewicz filmed (1957), however, could work together because of 
the latent colonial meanings present in the city’s structures. When first conceived, 
French planners constructed Saigon in a way that they hoped would help control the 
indigenous population through enabling observation. Designing a city that allowed 
for easy surveillance of the population allowed those in power to maintain control 
over that the city. The end result, wide streets and imposing white structures different 
from the rest o f the city, reflected the power o f France’s empire. After the French 
War ended these structures still remained in downtown Saigon. Surprisingly, the two 
versions o f Saigon (fictional 1952 and current 1957) can coexist. Because Americans 
increasingly inhabited this downtown area and took control o f  downtown area (see 
the upcoming chapters), Mankiewicz had access to this space to film. The buildings 
still convey power and control, and by simply setting events in the past, they 
represented French power instead o f American and Vietnamese power. Additionally, 
the addition of a Mankiewicz’s perspective to Fowler’s itself attempts to control the 
city. The camera’s ability to construct a version o f Saigon highlights the Power 
Mankiewicz had to remake the city as he saw fit. M ankiewicz’s Saigon is an 
American version of the city— claiming it from Greene and the French.
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The multiple versions o f Saigon in Mankiewicz’s The Quiet American continue 
to develop through the movie by associating the bodies o f the characters with their 
Saigon surroundings. This work happened both in the exterior settings Saigon and 
the interior sets filmed on a soundstage in Rome. Not only did Mankiewicz used the 
bodies of Pyle, Fowler, and Phuong to lend meaning to their surroundings, he also 
used the surroundings to construct the meanings around their bodies. After observing 
the bicycle bombings, Fowler returned to his apartment, labored up the single flight 
o f  stairs, and negotiated his collapse into a chair with the help of his cane. At this 
moment, he realized Phuong had left him. Fowler looked around his apartment to all 
the places he expected Phuong to be. He glanced at the empty table, then to the 
sideboard that held the drink-mixing supplies, next, the kitchen, and lastly the bed.
He confirmed Phuong’s absence by opening an empty dresser drawer— her clothes 
were gone. Fowler understood Phuong’s company in terms o f these spaces, 
constructing a connection between Phuong and domestic and sexual service: he could 
only be sure she had left after he looked to kitchen and the bed. In these various 
shots, Fowler’s apartment seemed empty: Phuong’s body had been part o f the 
domestic space.
Immediately after witnessing Fowler’s realization o f  Phuong’s departure, 
Fowler considered where Phuong had gone— she had left him for Pyle. Fowler 
lamented Phuong’s absence on his way to a cafe and recalled how he saw the couple 
about town—  “at the cinema, strolling, with his dog, of course, in the botanical 
gardens, driving past the Continental in his car, laughing and being young together.” 
Fowler’s recollection of Pyle and Phuong’s tour o f  Saigon stressed the difference in
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these two men’s bodies. Fowler, who in the previous scene had sweatily limped into 
his apartment, aided with a cane, and collapsed into a chair, now remembered Pyle 
and Phuong’s youth. Their bodies were newer than his, as was their understanding o f 
Saigon. Fowler viewed Phuong as part o f  his domestic space, focused inward, on the 
care of his body, rather than outward, on experiencing the city. Pyle’s Saigon 
captured the nostalgia Saigon had to offer as he and Phuong moved through its spaces 
of leisure— the rue Catinat and the botanical gardens.
The juxtaposition o f Fowler’s aging body against Pyle’s young body, on the 
surface, was not entirely complicated. An American presence in Saigon came with 
fresh, albeit, naive, perspectives and got involved in Vietnam. What made the 
relationship between British and American bodies in The Quiet American was the 
linking o f these bodies to the built environment. Specifically, in these scenes that 
focused on the old/young dynamic o f Fowler’s and Pyle’s bodies, the film employed 
an interior set built in Rome for showing Fowler’s torpid body and an exterior setting 
located in Saigon for Pyle’s mobile body.
Creating sets meant to look like scenes in Saigon allowed Mankiewicz to create 
a version of the city he could control. When on location, the meanings o f the city 
were more nebulous as the film captured Vietnamese people moving through the city. 
But dividing Saigon into seemingly real and artificial sections involved the bodies o f 
the actors as well. Giorgia Moll’s yellow face portrayal o f Phuong brought a 
different set of meanings to the city and extended the real/artificial divide to bodies. 
By having the main Vietnamese female character in the film played by this Italian
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actress, Mankiewicz exerted control over the exterior areas o f  Saigon he filmed. The 
fictional character moved through real Saigon spaces, with the meanings Mankiewicz 
constructed placed onto her body. The earlier interior scene cast Phuong as a 
domestic/sexual being and the application of the Vietnamese race to an Italian actress 
removed any sort o f national meanings that might have been placed on Phuong’s 
body otherwise. Any national meanings, such as those demonstrated in Greene’s 
Phuong, were those constructed by Mankiewicz. Unlike the existing colonial 
meanings of Saigon’s built environment Mankiewicz utilized, Phuong’s body was 
first stripped of its Vietnamese meaning, and then that meaning was carefully 
reapplied.
At times, the multiple versions o f Saigon diverged in The Quiet American , but 
many times, Mankiewicz’s Saigon is the same as Fowler’s, and Greene’s, and many 
other contemporary writers (see chapter 1). The main similarity between all these 
versions of the city was the creation o f the “other” Saigon. The beginning of the film 
focused on a Vietnamese crowd outside the central market in downtown Saigon 
celebrating the Chinese New Year, and the end o f  the film showed Fowler walking 
into a similar crowd in Cholon. These two moments carried different meanings for 
the film’s narrative, but together helped create a contrast to the Saigon o f white 
buildings and nostalgia. The opening sequence o f  the film presented the credits and 
explained the general political context for the film against still images o f  celebrating 
Vietnamese people in Saigon. The first slide that established the location o f the film 
as Saigon did so against the background o f a dragon. This dragon moved around the 
square in front o f the central market during a dark night amidst the sound o f music
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and firecrackers. Thus, the first introduction to Saigon in The Quiet American  is the 
image of the exotic— the other. This place, and its customs, was different for the 
American, British and French characters that moved through this space than it was for 
the local people. Not only was this Saigon different, but also it was also dangerous. 
Even though French troops patrolled the crowd, Pyle’s body inevitably turned up 
dead floating in a river— his lifeless body pointing to the dangerous aspects o f the 
city.
The dangerous and exotic Saigon in The Quiet American was not a total 
departure from previous descriptions o f the city in the American media. However, 
what made this description of the city different was the use o f Phuong’s body to 
mediate between a “safe” and “known” Saigon and the “dangerous” and “unfamiliar” 
city. Phuong’s body, a white female body with Vietnamese racial and ethnic 
prosthetics applied to it, functioned in the narrative to move from one part o f the city 
to another. But this body also bridged the gaps in the “on location” Saigon and the 
fictional Saigon created by the film production. In real time, Phuong’s body helped 
the production to the control public spaces.
As far as The Quiet American's narrative was concerned, Phuong seemed to 
belong to the city. Her character was first introduced as standing in the shadows o f a 
building (according to the story, this would have been on rue Catinat). Her body, half 
in shadow, half in light, straddled the line between the two Saigon’s. She was part o f 
the dangerous Saigon where Pyle was just found dead, but she also had access to 
Fowler’s Saigon of privilege and leisure— the shadows in which she waited were
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underneath his apartment. Her ability to move between these two versions o f the city 
also appeared in this scene. She was waiting for Pyle when Fowler found her and she 
agreed to wait with him off the street. Before doing so, she went to inform the 
women on the street. After speaking with the group of women, Phuong translated 
their conversation for Fowler (they were laughing because they thought she was 
returning to Fowler). Phuong’s ability to move between the women and Fowler, 
between the foreign and the colonial city helped create the boundaries between these 
two spaces
While most o f the time Phuong’s character is strictly controlled, there are times 
in which her character reveals a potential for critiquing the imperial powers at work in 
Saigon. For instance, in the previous example, she has the ability to move between 
groups and engage with the women who might have been critiquing Fowler and the 
Western power structure present in Saigon he represents. Her skill at existing in 
multiple parts o f Saigon, both the French and “other” Saigon, allows her character to 
escape scrutiny of the French power structure as well. For instance, after Pyle’s body 
was discovered, she and Fowler went to the French police station for questioning 
about Pyle’s death. Fowler was the one questioned while Phuong remained outside. 
While the men watched her from a window, still under surveillance, she stood in the 
“other” Saigon (literally in the shadows), and avoided being questioned by police
In sum, Graham Greene’s The Quiet American used the bodies o f  Saigon’s 
inhabitants to cast the city as romantic, dangerous, unknown yet familiar.
Descriptions of, and relationships between, characters’ bodies created a sense o f a 
city affected by years of colonialism. Each body absorbed and projected meanings
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that negotiated categories o f race, ethnicity, nationality, class, gender, and sexuality to 
create a sense o f the “ local”— Greene’s construction of Saigon—and the “global”—  
Vietnam’s relationship to the French, American and British. Greene’s Saigon 
emerged from within these corporeal negotiations to interrogate the power 
relationships present in colonialism and how we ultimately understand “place.”
The inability to separate “real” places from “ imagined” bodies in G reene’s 
Saigon suggested a relationship between people and the cities in which they lived.
By contemplating the physical attributes o f the characters in The Quiet Am erican , the 
narrator’s focus on people’s bodies revealed the ways in which the relationships 
between people and physical places were not intertwined, but, in fact, mutually- 
constituted. The Quiet American exposed the ways people’s bodies and the places 
through which they moved were part o f the same discourse.
The adaptation of The Quiet American for the 1958 film pushed the relationship 
o f bodies to the city and the boundary between real and imagined further. By mixing 
studio shots with on-location footage, Mankiewicz created different versions o f the 
city. A dangerous Saigon mixed with a romantic one; a dated version o f the city 
created by an old correspondent fell apart and gave way to a newer American version. 
Mankiewicz, however, complicated these versions o f the city as he not only created a 
Saigon for the narrative o f the story, but also placed a layer o f  meaning on the' city 
that was beyond the scope of the film ’s story. Giorgia M oll’s body clad in yellow 
face absorbed the meanings of the city created through the narrative and, in turn, 
brought those meanings to the on-location filming o f the city. As a result, the line 
between where the fictional American version of Saigon ended and where the real
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Saigon started became hard to locate.
Graham Greene’s novel and Joseph Mankiewicz film, both set in Saigon, 
use the bodies o f Saigon’s inhabitants to cast the city as romantic, dangerous, 
unknown yet familiar. Descriptions of, and relationships between, characters’ bodies 
create a sense o f a city affected by years o f colonialism. Each body absorbs and 
projects meanings that negotiate categories o f race, ethnicity, nationality, class, 
gender, and sexuality to create a sense o f the “local”— Greene’s construction o f 
Saigon— and the “global”— Vietnam’s relationship to the French, American and 
British.
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Protest and Public Space: Saigon during the 1963 “Buddhist Crisis”
On May 8, 1963, tensions between Roman Catholic Vietnamese government 
officials and Buddhist monks came to a head. In the city o f Hue, about 400 miles 
north o f Saigon, Government o f Vietnam forces ordered Buddhist monks to take 
down the Buddhist flag flying over their pagoda. The order prompted a riot where 
Buddhists alleged that Vietnamese government officials fired weapons into the 
crowd. The Government o f Vietnam accused Communist militants o f detonating the 
two explosions that occurred during the riot.' Regardless o f who was responsible, 
nine people died in Hue on that day.2 Consequently, Buddhist leaders demanded that 
the Diem administration halt Buddhist persecution immediately or they would start 
protesting.3 The Government o f Vietnam did not meet Buddhist demands. Until a 
coup removed the Diem administration from power in November 1963, Buddhists 
protested their treatment by the Government o f Vietnam.
The original events at Hue and the Buddhists’ demand to fly their flag over their 
pagoda gave rise to what the press would call the “Buddhist Crisis.”4 Buddhists made 
their religious persecution into a political matter, challenging it both privately, 
through closed-door diplomatic meetings, and publicly through street protests. The 
Diem administration, often unwilling to concede in either context, encountered 
Buddhist leaders and everyday practitioners in the streets in clashes between Buddhist 
protestors and police.
1 “Equality Promised Buddhists By Diem,” New York Times, May 16, 1963, 3.
2 David Halberstam, “Saigon Replaces Three In Dispute,” New York Times, June 2, 
1963.
3 “Equality Promised Buddhists By Diem,” New York Times, May 16, 1963, 3.
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However, the Diem Administration and Buddhist protestors were not the only 
actors in the protests happening in Saigon’s streets. Members of the Foreign Press 
amplified the public presence o f the Buddhist protests and enabled the Government o f  
Vietnam, Buddhist leaders, young protesters, and United States officials like Henry 
Cabot Lodge Jr. to impose their own meanings on images of Saigon.5 At a time when 
American officials could not endorse either side for fear o f losing support o f the other 
and damaging their progress against Communist forces elsewhere in Vietnam, the 
United States State Department asserted itself in Saigon through the spaces it 
controlled and, in one case, by walking through spaces it did not. By looking at both 
textual and visual representations o f the Buddhist protests and the coup that followed 
a few months later, we can see how Buddhists protestors, journalists, and American 
officials used Saigon’s public spaces to forward their respective agendas.
Buddhist Protests in Saigon, Thich Q uang Due, and the Role o f the Press
After the altercation in Hue, Buddhists protested in many locations throughout 
Vietnam and they had a large organized presence in Saigon— the seat o f President 
Diem’s power. On May 17, unsatisfied with Diem’s response to their demands, two 
Buddhist monks travelled from Hue to a pagoda in Saigon to address 300 monks.
They shared pictures and recollections o f the Hue riot.6 Several days later, 500 
Buddhist monks and nuns marched through Saigon in remembrance o f those who 
died in Hue. They walked from the An Quang pagoda, where the Hue monks had
4 Halberstam, “Saigon Replaces Three In Dispute.”
5 I am using the term “Foreign Press” to refer to non-Vietnamese journalists writing 
for American news outlets.
6 “Buddhist Leaders Angered,” New York Times, May 19, 1963.
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spoken a few days earlier to the Xa Loi pagoda— the main pagoda in Saigon. They 
did not meet any resistance from the Government o f Vietnam as police, fire trucks 
and Vietnamese government troops stayed a few blocks away.
The Buddhist protests o f 1963 started from a contestation of space. Buddhists 
displayed their flag and publicly asserted their identity. Flying this flag, instead of, or 
above, the Government o f Vietnam’s flag challenged the state’s power. Buddhists in 
Saigon used public spaces to contest their oppression by the Vietnamese government. 
By bringing these protests to downtown Saigon, the location of Diem’s palace and 
residence, Buddhists specifically targeted Diem’s control o f the country. The 
Buddhists also placed their cause in clear view of the American press.
The Buddhists marched again in Saigon on May 30; this time an Associated
o
Press photographer captured the event. This image, likely taken from a roof or 
window of a hotel on Tu Do Street, ran a caption that described the action. As the 
image showed, Buddhist monks and nuns staged a four-hour demonstration that 
ended in front of the Vietnamese National Assembly building (the most recent 
function of the French-built opera house on Tu Do street). Under the watchful eyes 
of the police, the Buddhist demonstrators remained in front o f the National Assembly 
giving speeches and chanting hymns.9 According to the caption, the marchers carried 
signs in Vietnamese and English that expressed the monks were “we ready to 
sacrifice [themselves] for Buddhism” and called for the Diem administration to
7 “Buddhists in Saigon Mark May 8 Clash With Regime,” New York Times, May 22, 
1963.
8 Associated Press, Image 6305300334, AP Images, May 30, 1963. 
http://www.apimages.com/, accessed November 2, 2012.
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“practice equality.” These banners referred to the sacrifice these Buddhist protestors 
were willing to make: the 48-hour hunger strike was starting that day.10
Whether by coincidence or by design, the Buddhist protests in Saigon leveraged 
the city itself to gain exposure for their cause. Carrying banners in Vietnamese and 
English allowed the Buddhists to communicate with Americans, and marching to the 
National Assembly, which was located on the street that traditionally housed foreign 
reporters, provided a good possibility for coverage o f their cause in the American 
press.
This image, the first to appear in the AP image archive about the Buddhist 
protests in Saigon, exposed the role of the city itself in such protests. By marching in 
the French-planned area o f Saigon, Buddhist demonstrators encountered a physical 
space designed to manage an unruly population. The original French design o f the 
city avoided using large open spaces where demonstrators could gather. It also 
included wide streets that would allow colonial administrators to easily observe their 
colonized subjects. While this urban plan still worked to control protests in 
downtown Saigon, unintended consequences emerged from the decision to allow the 
presence o f the modern press corps. The French-planned downtown assumed that 
government officials, not a foreign press corps, would observe the population. The 
introduction of the United States into Saigon placed an additional presence in the city 
and left an opportunity for Buddhist demonstrators. While they could not all gather 
in one place, they could march through the wide streets, which put them in easy view
9 “Buddhists Stage Protest In Saigon,” New York Times, May 31, 1963.
10 Ibid.
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of police forces, as well as the press. As this image shows, wide streets lined with an 
occasional tall building allowed for the press to stay away from the protest, but still 
report the happenings to American readers across the world.
The authorities in Saigon did not let Buddhists use the streets for long. On June 
3, the police arrested eight Buddhist monks for “unlawful assembly” in a Saigon 
street.11 President Diem defended the police’s actions by reminding Saigon residents 
that gathering in streets was illegal, because it caused a security threat that could be 
taken advantage of by the communist forces.12
Along with Diem’s acknowledgment that the war, mostly confined to rural 
areas, could come into Saigon’s streets, other South Vietnamese leaders linked 
Buddhists and Communists in another way. Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem’s sister-in- 
law and leader o f a prominent women’s group, called the protesting Buddhists pawns 
of the Communists. This statement came shortly after a partial apology by Diem, 
who claimed that his administration lacked “sensitivity” in dealing with Buddhists, 
but did not accept responsibility for anything else, and rolled back any progress in 
negotiating a solution that the Buddhists and South Vietnamese government groups 
might have made.13 Saigon’s streets reflected this lack o f progress as stockpiles of 
barbed wire and barricades appeared on the city’s street comers in preparation for 
protests.14
The actions o f the Vietnamese Government created problems for American
11 “8 Buddhists Seized At Saigon M eeting,” New York Times, June 3, 1963.
12 Ibid.
13 “Diem Concession Won By Buddhists,” New York Times, June 8, 1963.
14 David Halberstam, “Saigon Situation Moving To Crisis,” New York Times, June 9,
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officials in Vietnam. From a diplomatic standpoint, Americans did not want to make 
any statement in support o f equality for Buddhists, as it would suggest that the United 
States did not support the actions o f Vietnamese governm ent.15 The recalcitrance of 
the Diem administration also frustrated American officials as it confirmed Am erica’s 
lack o f influence in South Vietnam.16 American officials in Vietnam, however, had 
another problem. Any sort o f reporting that followed Buddhist protests potentially 
put the United States in a precarious position. Press coverage, regardless o f political 
underpinnings, broadcast images o f  Vietnamese police brutality against Buddhists to 
the global public. Vietnamese troops were armed with American-made weapons, a 
troubling fact for some American officials as regardless o f  what actions these amis 
were used for, they implied complicity on the part o f  the United States.17
Previous aid to the South Vietnamese government was part o f  this image 
problem. The Vietnamese Government had asked the United States to use its planes 
to fly Vietnamese troops to Hue to aid in suppressing the Buddhist protests, and the 
United States had refused. Consequently, the troops traveled to Hue in Vietnamese
1963.
15 David Halberstam, “Americans Vexed By Inability To Act In Vietnam Dispute,” 
New York Times, June 10, 1963.
,6 Ibid.
17 Halberstam, “Americans Vexed By Inability To Act In Vietnam Dispute” ; While 
Buddhists demonstrated in Saigon during The Spring and Summer o f 1963. Civil 
Rights leaders in the United States led non-violent protests in Birmingham, Alabama. 
The parallels between these two movements, and the images and stories that appeared 
about them in the press did not escape David Halberstam. In his 1964 book Making  
o f  a Quagmire, Halberstam compared the two protest movements: “as Bull Connor 
and his police dogs in Birmingham were to etch indelibly the civil rights movement in 
the minds o f million Americans, so the Buddhists used the Government’s repeated 
clumsiness to commit their people further to their cause and to strengthen the 
movement.” (215)
transports, which happened to be American-made planes that the United States had 
transferred to the Vietnamese earlier. Halberstam asserted that “to the Vietnamese
I Q
these planes still look like American aircraft.”
The United States military actively disassociated itself from the oppression of 
Buddhists. They stopped transporting reporters to Hue to halt the image o f American 
planes arriving in the city from being broadcast. Lee Baker, head o f the Press 
Information office (and husband o f Else Baker), commented “we don't want the 
Vietnamese to think we are participating in this.” 19 Along the same lines, General 
Paul Harkins, Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, ordered 
American military advisors to distance themselves from Vietnamese military forces if  
they were involved in the oppression o f Buddhist protestors.
Yet discussions around controlling the images of Buddhist protests soon 
became irrelevant. On the morning of June 11, Thich Quang Due, a Buddhist monk, 
set himself on fire in protest over the oppression o f Buddhists in Vietnam. When this 
spectacle took place in downtown Saigon a few blocks from the Presidential palace, 
on the comer of Le Van Duyet and Phan Dinh Phuong streets, Associated Press 
photographer Malcolm Browne captured it on camera.21 Browne, writing about the 
event a year later, recalled the events leading up to and immediately after the June 11
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 “U.S. Avoids Part In Saigon Dispute,” New York Times June 11, 1963.
21 “ 163. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department o f  State,”
Foreign Relations O f The United States, 1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January- 
August 1963, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990; Malcolm 
Browne, Image 080708020260, AP Images, June 11, 1963. 
http://www.apimages.com/, accessed March 1, 2012.
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protest. The images o f Thich Quang Due that Browne filed with the Associated Press 
did not include any images of American involvement. There is, instead, Thich Quang 
Due, Buddhist monks, the city o f Saigon, and the foreign viewer, constructed through 
Browne’s perspective.
Browne, in his article in the Columbia Press Review , recalled that the Diem 
administration held tight control over the Vietnamese press. This allowed him, for 
the most part, to prevent negative stories o f his administration from appearing in 
public.22 The Buddhists needed something that was dramatic enough to get past 
Diem’s control o f the press. As such, Buddhist leaders contacted the foreign press 
present in Saigon, because without foreign coverage, Buddhist leaders knew their
'y  "i
protests could be silenced. A few weeks prior to Thich Quang D ue’s self- 
immolation, Buddhist leaders told members of the Saigon press corps that if  the 
Vietnamese government did not accept their demands, a monk would set him self on 
fire and another would disembowel himself. 24 After several weeks o f  uneventful 
protests in Saigon, journalists pursued the story o f  the Buddhists less vigorously, 
which resulted in only Browne attending the June 11 protest.25
The images of Thich Quang Due’s protest transformed Saigon’s streets into 
political spaces. Because the layout o f downtown Saigon forced protesters into the 
streets, images o f the protesters took on an aggressive tone. If protests took place 
away from the tall buildings to which the foreign press had access, the press had to
22 Malcolm Browne, “Viet Nam reporting: three years o f crisis,” Columbia 
Journalism Review (Fall 1964), 6.
23 Ibid.
24
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cover those protests from street level. The street level perspective had the effect o f 
transforming viewers from observers to participants, as it violated the distance 
intended by the city’s original plan. The monks in this image further countered 
Saigon’s lack o f open spaces in which to stage protests when they formed a wall o f 
monks along the back side of Browne’s frame. In a city designed to prevent protests, 
Buddhists redrew their own city— making walls o f  people. This wall created a clear 
stage for Thich Quang Due’s protest.
Buddhists in Saigon followed Thich Quang Due’s protest by increasingly 
asserting their presence in Saigon, and doing so in a way that captivated the foreign 
press as they confronted the Diem regime. On June 13, Buddhists flew the Buddhist 
flag, still forbidden, at half-mast over Saigon pagodas in memory o f Thich Quang 
Due.26 This visual symbol, however, was countered by government forces in the 
form of special police guarding, and limiting access to, the pagodas.27
A few days later, the less active representation (flag flying) o f  the Buddhist’s 
resistance to Diem policies to changed again. After Buddhist leaders and Diem 
signed an agreement meant to ease the tension between the two groups, young 
Buddhists not involved in Buddhist leadership’s cooperation with Diem protested on 
downtown streets.28 While ten thousand people attempted to pay their respects to
25 Browne, “Viet Nam reporting: three years of crisis,” 6-7.
26 David Halberstam, “Buddhists Defy Regime In Saigon,” New York Times, June 13, 
1963, 5.
27 Halberstam, “Buddhists Defy Regime In Saigon,” 5 .; David Halberstam,
“Buddhist Women Protest,” New York Times, June 14, 1963, 10.
28 The Government o f Vietnam issued a jo int statement meant to resolve Buddhist 
demands. In this statement, they agreed that the national flag “should always be 
respected and put at its appropriate place,” to established a committee that would look
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Thich Quang Due as his body lay in state at the Xa Loi pagoda, a crowd confronted 
the police. After 45 minutes o f rioting, in which several hundred young people 
threw shoes and rocks at police, police used tear gas to disperse the protestors.30 To 
control the riot, police set up barricades and prepared for a large conflict; or perhaps 
they just wanted to send a visual message of their own, as Vietnamese government 
forces positioned “tanks and armored cars in the courtyards o f Government 
buildings.”31 Troops also set up at street intersections with machine guns and barbed 
wire.
Another image from this time was this one from the Associated Press showing 
a Saigon street strewn with shoes, a tear gas grenade exploding, part o f  a dismantled
32barricade, and a police officer wielding a branch against a shoeless protester. Like 
the images o f Thich Quang Due, this image used Saigon streets to frame the political
into the “Buddhist complaints,” that Buddhists had the right to practice their religion 
inside pagodas without government interference, to investigate the circumstances 
behind the May 8 events. “Document 178,” Foreign Relations O f The United States, 
1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January-August 1963, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1990, 397-398; While violent clashes with police often 
contained young Buddhists and students, the United States Embassy in Vietnam did 
not believe that there was a clear divide between older more moderate Buddhists and 
young protestors. Although, the Embassy did realize that there were factions that 
either backed or questioned the agreement between Diem and Buddhist leadership. 
“Document 194,” Foreign Relations O f The United States, 1961-1963, Volume III, 
Vietnam, January-August 1963, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1990, 430; “Document 177,” Foreign Relations O f The United States, 1961-1963, 
Volume III, Vietnam, January—August 1963, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1990, 396.
29 David Halberstam, “Buddhists in Saigon Clash With Police,” New York Times, 
June 16, 1963.
30 Ibid.
31 “Troops and Tanks Quell Buddhist Riots in Saigon,” New York Times, June 17, 
1963.
32 Associated Press, Image 080708020260, AP Images, June 16, 1963.
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actions of Buddhists. While the images o f Thich Quang D ue’s protest were shocking, 
they were also orderly. A crowd circles his burning body, giving a wide margin 
around him, and he sits still in meditation. This controlled visual image o f protest 
also appeared in the earlier image of monks and nuns protesting in front o f the 
National Assembly. The neatly formed column o f robed marchers were surrounded 
by a margin around them— it is a Saigon street. In the image of the June 16 riot, the 
margin around the protest breaks down. While there is a still a focal point in the 
image (the confrontation between the uniformed police officer and the shoeless 
protester), and there is also a ring o f people around the outside of the image, the clean 
divide that separated protest from city is gone. Shoes, tear gas and scattered people 
crowd the action in the center o f the image. The only open space is between the 
photographer and action.
During the second half o f June, the conflict between the Buddhists and Diem’s 
administration continued to escalate. On June 19, Buddhists cremated Thich Quang 
Due’s body amid— as one reporter wrote— “an awesome display o f police power.”33 
During the procession, police used barricades to prevent people from getting too close 
to the procession.34 The police’s use o f barricades contributed to a changing 
atmosphere in Saigon. On June 22, David Halberstam wrote o f a city being forcefully 
managed and under surveillance. “The populace o f this city is sullen and resentful. 
There is a nervous edge to life. Streets around the palace are blocked off. Security
http://www.apimages.com/, accessed March 1, 2012.
33 “Saigon Police Out in Force As Buddhist Is Cremated,” New York Times, June 19, 
1963.
34 TU
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policemen with radiophones keep watch at many corners.”35
After Thich Quang Due died, Buddhist monks established his legacy and 
Malcolm Browne’s images o f his death began to broadly circulate. In the weeks 
following his death and cremation, Buddhists held many processions and services in 
his memory. At the front o f their marches through Saigon, monks often carried 
enlargements o f Browne’s image with them.36 For example, this image shows the 
June 21 funeral procession for Thich Quang Due.37
Browne’s image circulated abroad as well. On June 27, a number o f  American 
religious leaders took out a full-page advertisement in the New York Times. At the 
top of the page, they included one o f Browne’s images o f Thich Quang Due with the 
headline “We, too, protest.” Underneath the headline, they listed four items—  
seemingly referencing Norman Rockwell’s illustration o f FDR’s “Four Freedoms” 
two decades earlier— that they were protesting: US military aid that enabled the 
oppression of Buddhists, spraying o f pesticides and the use o f  strategic hamlets as 
“concentration camps,” use of aid to and American lives to “bolster a regime 
universally regarded as unjust, undemocratic, and unstable, and “the fiction that this 
is ‘fighting for freedom.’”38
The “We, Too, Protest” advertisement confirms the success o f Buddhist 
leaders’ plans to gain international attention. The advertisement, however, also raises
35 David Halberstam, “Discontent Rises In Vietnam Crisis,” New York Times, June 
22, 1963.
36 Browne, “Viet Nam reporting: three years of crisis,” 7.
37 Associated Press, Image 6306211860, AP Images, June 21, 1963, 
http://www.apimages.com/, accessed March 1, 2012.
38 No Title (Advertisement), New York Times, June 27, 1963.
a question. As Lee Baker suggested, the United States military did not want to be 
associated with the oppression of Buddhists. Nonetheless, in this advertisement, by 
pairing Browne’s image with the four issues to which they objected, these American 
religious leaders suggested that the United States was culpable for D iem ’s repressive 
tactics against Buddhists.
Increased Involvement and Conflict in the Buddhist Protests by the Foreign  
Press
As the “We, Too Protest” advertisement acknowledged a connection in print 
between United States policy in Vietnam and the Diem administration’s treatment of 
Buddhists, members of the foreign press corps forged their own connections with 
Buddhists. On July 7, a few hundred Buddhists gathered at the Chantareansy Pagoda 
to conduct a memorial service for Thich Quang Due.39 Buddhist leaders notified the 
foreign press, as well as the American Embassy, ahead o f time so they would receive 
press coverage.40 After the ceremony, the monks left the pagoda to process through 
the city. After turning down an alley to reach a main street, police stopped them.41 
While the procession paused peacefully, the foreign press had trouble with the 
Vietnamese police. Shortly after a photographer took this picture, police turned their 
attention to the press. Police officers tried to prevent photographers from capturing
39 “210. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department o f State,” 
Foreign Relations O f The United States, 1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January- 
August 1963, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, 470.
40 Ibid.
41 Associated Press, Image 6307081262, AP Images, July 8, 1963, 
http://www.apimages.com/, accessed March 1, 2012.
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the images o f the police interactions with the monks 42 According to United States 
Embassy reports, when the police halted the procession, the press, working for 
American media outlets,43 moved into the alley to take pictures.44 Police took 
Associated Press photographer Peter Arnett’s camera and broke it on the ground,43 
while other uniformed police stood by. The reporters gave a more detailed account o f 
their story. According to David Halberstam’s report of the incident, police first tried 
to confiscate the camera o f CBS photographer Joseph Masraf. When the other 
reporters tried to help Masraf, police turned their attention to Horst Faas, another 
photographer from the Associated Press, and Peter Arnett. Arnett tried reclaim his 
camera from the police, but they knocked him down. Malcolm Browne, writing 
about the assault a year later, remembered Arnett bleeding on the ground while 
getting kicked by police.46 The group of reporters then tried to get in between the 
police and Amett, at which point someone threw a rock at Malcolm B row ne’s chest 
and broke his camera.47
After the incident, a group o f the reporters sent a cable to President Kennedy.48 
In the letter to the President, Malcolm Browne, David Halberstam, Peter Kalischer
42 Ibid.
43 David Halberstam, “Police In Saigon Jostle Newsmen,” New York Times, July 8, 
1963.
44 Associated Press, Image 6307081262, AP Images, July 8, 1963, 
http://www.apimages.com/, accessed March 1, 2012.
45 “210. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department o f State,” 470.
46 Malcolm Browne, “Viet Nam reporting: three years o f crisis,” Columbia 
Journalism Review  (Fall 1964), 4.
47 David Halberstam, “Police In Saigon Jostle Newsmen,” New York Times, July 8,
1963,3.
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and Neal Sheehan described the incident 49 The reporters concluded that the assault 
by police signaled the beginning of a larger problem. This was the start o f a 
“campaign of open physical intimidation to prevent the covering o f news which we 
feel Americans have the right to know.”50
The United States Embassy, in a telegram to the State Department, disagreed 
with the reporters’ version of the incident. Embassy officials asked Government o f 
Vietnam officials about their policy towards the foreign press and Vietnamese 
officials said there had been no change in their treatment o f  the press. The Embassy 
telegram added that the Government o f Vietnam believed reporters provoked the 
incident by objecting to the police initially stopping the procession, and that a reporter 
attacked the police first.51 The next day, Arnett and Browne were charged with 
assault for the incident,52 and were interrogated by police.53 The Embassy intervened 
on behalf of the reporters and asked the Government of Vietnam to drop the charges.
It took several meetings before the Diem administration finally dropped the charges 
against the reporters on July 17, and only after releasing a Government o f Vietnam 
report that confirmed the police’s version o f the incident.54
49 “211. Telegram From Malcolm Browne of the Associated Press, David Halberstam 
of The New York Times, Peter Kalischer o f CBS News, and Neil Sheehan o f United 
Press International to the President,” Foreign Relations O f The United States, 1961- 
1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January-August 1963, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1990, 471.
50 Ibid.
51 “210. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department o f State,” 471.
52 “210. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department o f  State,” 471 
Footnote 4.
53 Malcolm Browne, “Viet Nam reporting: three years o f crisis,” Columbia 
Journalism Review (Fall 1964), 5.
54 “210. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department o f State,” 471.
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After the altercation between the police and the press, William Trueheart, 
charge d'affaires for the United States Embassy,55 told the State Department that he 
did not think that the Government of Vietnam planned to harass the reporters, 
considering they had covered an earlier service without problem.36 He claimed that 
the incident represented a “relatively commonplace contretemps” between reporters 
and Vietnamese police.57 In a later telegram, Trueheart added that the tensions 
between the Government of Vietnam and reporters were running high. He 
commented by cable that
resident correspondents had become so embittered towards GVN that they are 
saying quite openly to anyone who will listen that they would like to see 
regime overthrown. GVN no doubt has this well-documented. GVN also 
unquestionably considers that correspondents have been actively encouraging 
Buddhists. Diem is therefore most unlikely to accept view that 
correspondents merely carrying on normal functions of keeping US public 
informed.58
Browne’s 1964 reflections on the assault saw the events of July 7, 1963 from a 
slightly different point of view. He wrote that “one of the major pitfalls any reporter 
faces is the possibility of becoming an element in one of his own stories—a cardinal
55 David Halberstam, “Police In Saigon Jostle Newsmen,” New York Times, July 8, 
1963.
56 “210. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department o f State,” 471.
57 Ibid.
58 Quoted in “210. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department o f 
State,” 471 Footnote 4.
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breach of the rules o f our game.”59 Unfortunately for Browne, the July 7 assaults put 
him in just this position. After police interrogated and released Browne, he and Peter 
Amett had to write a story about the day’s events, despite their own involvement in 
them. On this day, they made the news as writers and as residents o f Saigon/’0
The incident between the foreign press and Vietnamese police, as Browne 
argued, put the press in a precarious position. The press already served the political 
purposes of Buddhist leaders just by covering the events in Saigon. The assault by 
police, however, functioned a little differently. The police prevented Americans, and 
other members of the press corps working for American news corporations, from 
freely moving through Saigon. Moreover, the attack on photographers prevented 
American viewers from engaging in Saigon in a specific way.
Besides the attack on reporters and bombings o f American space, Buddhist 
protests continued to bring Americans into the fold o f Saigon’s politicized public 
spaces. On July 16, Buddhists staged a protest in front o f the American 
Ambassador’s residence, requesting that the United States persuade the Diem 
administration to compromise with Buddhists.61 One report claimed that the protest 
took place at Ambassador Frederick Nolting’s home because of its close proximity to 
the Xa Loi pagoda.62 This protest was one of many that Buddhists held around 
Saigon. After a month-long cessation o f violence between Buddhists and the
59 Browne, “Viet Nam reporting: three years o f crisis,” 4.
60 Ibid.
61 “Buddhists Ask U.S. Help,” New York Times, July 16, 1963, 10.
62 David Halberstam, “Saigon Buddhists Beaten By Police,” New York Times, July 
17, 1963.
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Government o f Vietnam,63 police stopped a protest in front o f a Giac Minh pagoda by 
physically attacking protesters. The police used the same tactics at another protest at a 
downtown market.64 Police also barricaded streets in Saigon.65
This Associated Press image taken by Horst Faas,66 which accompanied a July 
18 article by David Halberstam in the New York Times!" shows what would turn out 
to be an early stage in the struggle between the Buddhists and Government o f 
Vietnam. The photograph captures protesters and police at the Giac Minh pagoda on 
July 17. Police are barricading the street in front o f the pagoda. This image o f police 
and Buddhists, one group trying to maintain control over the barbed wire, the other 
trying to take control, starkly differs from earlier images o f more restrained protests. 
Upon closer examination, the role o f the United States in this image comes through as 
well. The partially-collapsed banner on the right o f the image, as in earlier protests, 
reads in both Vietnamese and English.
A second day o f protests followed on July 18; and reporters relayed Saigon’s 
tense atmosphere.68 In addition to sealing off parts of city streets with barricades, 
police also restricted access to Saigon’s pagoda, preventing anyone from entering or 
exiting. David Halberstam reported that the riot police was not only enforcing the 
boundaries of barbed wire barricades, but were also using violence to “club
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Associated Press, Image 630717026, AP Images, July 17, 1963, 
http://www.apimaues.com/, accessed March 1, 2012.
67 Ibid.
68 David Halberstam, “Vietnam Orders Rein On Protests,” New York Times, July 18, 
1963.
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[protesters] into submission.”69 However, not all the protests in mid-July were 
violent, or for that matter, conducted by Buddhists. One group of Buddhist 
protesters, after being thwarted by barbed wire, sat down in the street to protest. The 
police, rather than responding immediately with violence, staged a counter­
demonstration— plainclothes police officers carried signs stating that the Buddhists 
were influenced by the Communists.
While the United States did not commit publicly to supporting the Buddhists, it 
seemed that the two sides at least were spatially connected. One of the sealed 
pagodas was next to the offices of the United States Aid Mission. In the morning, a 
monk went to the roof of the pagoda, attached a message to a rock and threw it into 
the parking lot o f the Unites States Aid Mission where Buddhist employees o f the 
Mission took the message to deliver it.70
Police restricted access to the pagodas for two more days, and on July 20, the 
Government o f Vietnam released over two hundred Buddhists detained during the 
protests.71 The foreign press reported that subsequent Buddhist protests met with 
little government resistance— police were present, but they did not physically engage 
with the protestors.72 For instance, on July 30, an estimated 60,000 Buddhists 
gathered across Vietnam in memory of Thich Quang Due— a quarter o f  these
69 Ibid.
70 David Halberstam, “Saigon Police Seal O ff Shrines To Control Buddhists' 
Agitation.” New York Times, July 19, 1963.
71David Halberstam, “Saigon Frees 267; Buddhists Firmer,” New York Times, July 
21, 1963.
72 David Halberstam, “60,000 Buddhists March In Vietnam,” New York Times, July 
31, 1963.
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gathered at Saigon’s pagodas.7j An image o f  these peaceful memorial gatherings that 
ran in the New York Times shows several continuities present with previous images o f 
Buddhist protests in Saigon.74 Thich Quang Due’s death was a public display o f 
Buddhist protest—  protest that asserted the Buddhist cause by capturing the image o f 
Saigon locally and internationally through the foreign press. Now, in his memory, 
Buddhists took to the streets to pray. Where Thich Quang Due’s protests and 
associated images managed to combine violence and peacefulness within a single 
event, these later images straddled a similar boundary as a group. Here, Buddhists 
peacefully occupied the streets, which offered a clear contrast with the violence o f 
riots. However, as both the caption and photograph itself—showing Saigon as the 
location—reminded readers, this event was connected to a larger protest movement. 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. and the Voicing o f Am erican Support through Saigon  
Spaces
By the second half o f August, the Buddhist protests started to become tense 
once again, partly due to a statement from the Archbishop o f Saigon dismissing any
75responsibility of the Catholic Church in discrimination against Buddhists. On 
August 18, 15,000 Buddhists, “most of them young people,” gathered outside the Xa 
Loi pagoda and pledged to protest the Diem administration. After confrontations
7 7  7Rbetween protesters and police, the Government o f  Vietnam instituted martial law.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
David Halberstam, “Thousands o f Buddhists Rally at Saigon Pagoda,” New York 
Times, August 19, 1963.
7,1 Ibid.
77 “Buddhists Seized,” New York Times, August 21, 1963.
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On August 21, police and Vietnamese government troops raided several pagodas in 
Saigon, including the Xa Loi pagoda, arresting more than one hundred monks.79
Into this environment came a new ambassador: Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
Arriving in Saigon on August 22, and scheduled to meet with President Diem a few
on
days later, Lodge had very little time to grow acclimated to his new surroundings. 
However, the press felt he was up to the challenge— they represented him as a no- 
nonsense diplomat. A New York Times article claimed that he possessed “beneath his 
aloof handsome and impeccable facade a capacity for toughness and inflexibility that 
he will need in his dealings with President Ngo Dinh Diem.”81 Referring to his 
record as the United States delegate to the United Nations for President Eisenhower, 
the article characterized Lodge as “a man who loathed intrigue and who demanded o f 
his own staff that the United States' position always be presented straightforwardly, 
often with undiplomatic bluntness.”
The impression Lodge left on reporters, and the demands of his new job, 
resulted in representations of Lodge as a calming force entering a tense political 
situation. A few days after Lodge’s arrival, Jim Dobbins published a cartoon 
depicting Lodge’s new job. This copy o f the cartoon appeared in the Boston Traveler 
on August 26, 1963, and the Lodge family saved a copy in one of their fam ily’s
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 “Calendar, 1963,” 1963, Carton 43, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. papers, Massachusetts 
Historical Society.
81 “New Man in Saigon,” New York Times, June 28, 1963.
82 Ibid.
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scrapbooks from their time in Vietnam. The cartoon, depicting Lodge’s well-coifed 
head barely suspended above the mud o f a Vietnamese jungle, described the 
diplomatic situation he found him self in Saigon— unable to move and with little time 
to get used to his surroundings. As plants and trees stand in for buildings and streets, 
the perils of the jungle (like a mythic pit o f quicksand) become the diplomatic 
problems of the United States. Dobbins captured a public political culture, even as he 
removed Vietnamese culture for comedic impact. The “Welcome to Vietnam” sign, 
and the man holding the small sign in the foreground saying “it didn’t become long to 
become acclimatized” resemble the nearly ubiquitous signs appearing in images o f 
the Buddhist Crisis in Saigon.
The earlier New York Times description of Lodge not only depicted him as a no- 
nonsense diplomat, but also someone who was above becoming mired in intrigue.
The article stated that “in Saigon, where Americans often succumb to the weird, 
secretive atmosphere engendered by a suspicious and dictatorial regime, the arrival of
o 4
Mr. Lodge may clear the air like a summer thunderstorm.” Lodge, the person who 
some expected to fix the problems in Saigon, arrived in Saigon and instead o f 
ushering in a clarifying storm, as the New York Times had predicted, was stuck in the 
mud that an earlier storm had created. Upon arrival in Saigon, a number o f  pressing 
issues awaited Lodge. Reporters wrote o f his arrival and “acclimatizing” in a city 
under martial law with new rounds o f protests. Because the Government o f Vietnam
o -»
Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. Papers I, Massachusetts Historical Society.
84 “New Man in Saigon,” New York Times, June 28, 1963.
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had already declared martial law, along with a curfew and press censorship,85 the 
enforcement o f public spaces took on a more militant tenor.
As the presence o f protesters and security forces became an increasingly 
common sight on Saigon’s streets, journalists wrote of a city trying to regain 
normalcy. Public spaces were shared, albeit by force, between different political and 
religious factions (Buddhist, Government o f  Vietnam, and everyone else). One 
article from the New York Times wrote o f Saigon’s new normal, that under martial 
law Saigon had “the same bustle, the same energy” that it always had. However, 
traffic was worse, “soldiers with new American-made rifles” stood on the street 
comers, and jeeps with large machine guns patrolled the city.87 Other than that,
o n
“Saigon looked the same and business went on as usual.” In many cases, Saigon’s 
return to normalcy involved recycling old conventions developed by previous 
generations of writers to describe the city— stable on the surface, populated by 
strolling women, but dangerous at its foundations. After a bout of riots one journalist 
wrote that Saigon “appeared to slip back to its quiet charm. Young girls in their 
sheath like ao dais promenaded on the Catinat. But Vietnam was deceptive, for this 
was a most explosive city, perhaps more now than at any time in the last four uneasy 
months.”89
Besides returning to the American way o f looking at Saigon, complete with the
85 Roy Essoyan, “Saigon Revolt Nipped; Thousands Arrested,” Washington Post, 
August 26, 1963.
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use of female Vietnamese bodies to describe the city, journalists began to note other 
signs o f the American presence in Saigon, and created representations o f the city 
based on these changes. Because o f military aid from the United States to the 
Government of Vietnam, many images and reports of martial law had recognizable 
elements of American influence. Whether it was military equipment or guns, or riot 
control tactics, journalists recognized American influences in Saigon’s public spaces. 
Robert Trumbull wrote in the New York Times that “everyone has seen American 
equipment being used to put down protesting Buddhists and students. Police trucks 
bear the clasped-hands symbol o f the United States foreign aid program.”90
On August 25, students in Saigon called for a city-wide strike and held protests 
against the Diem administration. Around Saigon, police, working alongside military 
equipment and personnel and a paramilitary youth group called the “Republican 
Youth,”91 arrested hundreds o f student protesters.92 At the University o f Saigon, 
police forces arrested students as they arrived at the protest, often taking them straight 
from their bicycles to a police transport. At the Central Market, police tore down
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protesters’ signs and arrested more students. Downtown, police directed most traffic 
onto Pasteur Street, a main thoroughfare, and anyone approaching the streets was 
searched and any student was arrested.93 As a precautionary measure, the 
Government o f Vietnam stationed armored cars and anti-aircraft guns by the 
Presidential Palace94— remembering a 1962 assassination attempt by two Vietnamese 
Air Force pilots who used their planes to attack on the Palace in which guards used 
anti-aircraft guns against the incoming planes.95
One reporter argued that martial law hurt the United States efforts in Vietnam. 
Quoting an American general, he claimed that diverting troops from the war in the 
countryside to put down civilian protests in Saigon might set back the fight against 
the communist forces.96 Lodge, embodying the image that the New York Times had 
described months earlier, spoke to reporters during the student protests. Avoiding 
giving any sort of statement on the situation in Saigon, Lodge told reporters “I don’t 
have to tell you I have arrived under very special circumstance and my time to make
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declarations has not yet arrived.”97 He also retained a sense of humor, quipping:
QQ
“ I ’ve also been advised not to take any long w alks.”
Henry Cabot Lodge and Emily Sears Lodge’s arrival in Saigon, and the press 
that followed them, provided other insights into American spaces in Saigon. Emily 
Sears Lodge spoke to the press a few days after arriving in Saigon.99 She had gone 
for a swim at the Cercle Sportif, but had not ventured much into the city because of 
the demonstrations. She spoke mostly o f her private spaces at the residence. Her 
yard, “although nothing in the garden has anything to do with anything in 
Massachusetts,” made her happy. Within this relatively private space, the reporter 
cast Emily Sears Lodge as wishing to connect, at least somewhat, with the 
Vietnamese people. The reporter mentioned how Mrs. Lodge walked to the servants’ 
quarters and played with their children, talking to them in French. Later, speaking to 
one of the Ambassador’s aides, she wondered why the children did not play in her 
yard by her, he thought there might be some sort o f rule against it. Always fond of 
children, having ten grandchildren herself, Mrs. Lodge responded “Oh, heavens.. .tell 
them to come over and play in the grass often. I like to watch them.” 100 Emily Sears 
Lodge’s exchanges with her servants in her private yard suggests that she was, at the 
least, not interested in creating distance between her and Vietnamese people.
Moving outside their private residence, Emily Sears Lodge and Henry Cabot 
Lodge went for their first “ leisurely stroll” through downtown Saigon on August 31,
97 David Halberstam, “Plan Said to Be Nhu's,” New York Times, August 23, 1963.
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1963.101 Dodging a rainstorm, they browsed sidewalk stalls and wandered down Le 
Loi Street— a path surrounded by French colonial architecture built at the end of 
nineteenth century. They then turned down Tu Do Street, an avenue made 
recognizable to many Americans by Graham Greene’s 1955 novel The Quiet 
American; only then it was called rue Catinat. They passed several bars and chatted 
with a few American soldiers. Having arrived in Saigon only a few days earlier, this 
hour-long walk would have been a nice way to get acquainted with the neighborhood 
they were to call home. However, this was neither a leisurely, nor a private, walk—  
behind the couple, a throng of twenty or so reporters and photographers took notes, 
talked to onlookers and snapped pictures. The press, with a little help from the 
Lodges, transformed an afternoon walk into an informal act o f diplomacy.
In the days following the Lodges' walk, papers around the United States 
picked up the story. One quoted a Vietnamese civil servant who exclaimed, “ it’s a 
revolution! This is the first American ambassador who has ever walked along this 
way.C” 102 Images of the Lodges’ walk showed the couple walking alongside cafes103 
and across streets.104 These images, when compared to earlier depictions o f Lodge 
and Saigon, signal a departure, or an evolution, o f representations o f Saigon— they 
place the United States squarely within the frame.
As Lodge said upon his arrival in Saigon, he could not yet comment publicly
101 “Lodges See Market O f Saigon In Stroll,” New York Times, September 1, 1963.
102 Associated Press, “Lodge Stuns Vietnamese By Tieless Shopping Stroll,” Boston 
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on the conditions o f the city. However, by taking this walk with his wife, with 
reporters following closely behind, he could make a statement, of sorts, without 
speaking. As the comments in the press showed, this walk put Lodge, and the United 
States, closer to the people of Vietnam. The image o f Mr. Lodge walking in front of 
Mrs. Lodge also contrasted Dobbin’s political cartoon o f a few days earlier.
Dobbins’ cartoon suggested that Lodge was immobile, stuck in mud, and unable to 
get used to Vietnam before he could act on anything, having inherited a bad situation. 
Here, Henry Cabot Lodge is mobile, active, albeit with his hair slightly less refined, 
and he is free to conduct himself how he pleases. While he cannot speak about the 
situation in Saigon, he invents meanings of the city by placing his body in the middle 
o f Saigon. By replacing Buddhist protesters, police, or military troops and machinery 
with the Lodges, these images imply a shift o f power in Saigon—they demonstrate 
the potential for American influence in the city. The significance o f the Lodge’s walk 
through downtown Saigon did not escape the press. One article noted that “Lodge's 
unorthodox stroll was considered a demonstration o f his belief in an open society and 
that national leaders should be as close to the people as possible.”105 The article 
continued by pointing out that Diem and his family were “criticized frequently on 
grounds that they have relatively little contact with the residents o f the nation they 
rule, except on occasionally guided tours.”106
The foreign press’s representation o f Diem and Nhu presented the South
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Vietnamese leaders’ as private and removed from the Vietnamese people. On August 
25, correspondent Robert Trumbull published an article based on an interview with
1 0 7Mr. Nhu. Not only did he relay N hu’s statements, but he also recounted the
surroundings o f the interview. Trumbull wrote that “Mr. Nhu was at ease in a short-
sleeved, open-necked white shirt in his office at the Gia Long Palace, where he and
108his wife and the President are living under heavy guard.” The foreign press also 
illustrated N hu’s distance from the Vietnamese people through images. For example, 
on September 5, Nhu sat for an interview with the foreign press. This image, taken at 
the time o f the interview by Horst Faas, showed Nhu in his study.109 The framing o f 
this image, when compared to the images released of the Lodge’s walk through 
Saigon a few days earlier, points to two different understandings o f Vietnam. While 
Vietnam is present in both of these images, they suggest quite different 
understandings o f the country. For Nhu, secluded in a palace, Vietnam enters the 
frame as a representation— a map on the wall behind him. For the Lodges, Vietnam 
is the real place around them as they step out into Saigon’s streets. Certainly, not all 
images of South Vietnam’s leaders were interior shots o f secluded leaders. But, they 
did not meet the standard set by Lodge on his walk. An image, taken in July, o f 
President Diem shows him beyond the confines o f  his interior space, but he is dressed 
in a suit— not only removed from the people of South Vietnam through dress, but also
107 Robert Trumbull, “Nhu Declares Americans Are Deceived by Buddhists,” New 
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by the rows of troops his is inspecting.110 The diplomatic impact o f Lodge’s walk is 
hard to gauge. However, a reference to his walk did appear in a letter to him from 
Under Secretary o f State for Political Affairs Averell Harriman. Harriman wrote 
supportively that “the photographs in the press o f your short-sleeved walk through the 
market place got you a lot of votes here, and I am sure make a new impression of an 
American Ambassador and his wife in Saigon.”111
Lodge’s assertion of an American presence in Saigon’s public spaces worked in 
tandem with reports o f other Americans’ uses of more private spaces. On the evening 
o f September 1, Thich Tri Quang, a leader among the Buddhist protesters, and two 
other monks entered the US Embassy to seek shelter from police forces. This was the 
second such incident. A few days earlier, two monks had fled the raid on the Xa Loi 
pagoda and sought in the Saigon USAID office next door. The earlier incident 
occurred before Henry Cabot Lodge arrived in Saigon; but before he visited President 
Diem, he stopped to see the monks. He ordered vegetarian food for them to be 
delivered everyday.112 The two monks said that they could leave because they finally 
felt it was safe. The monks living in the USAID offices left on the same day Thich 
Tri Quang went to the United States Embassy, and it seemed that the American 
Embassy was happy to have them. David Halberstam reported that “the official
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http://www.apimages.com/, accessed March 1, 2012.
111 “ 107. Letter From the Under Secretary o f State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to 
the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge),” Foreign Relations O f The United States, 1961— 
1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August -December 1963. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1990.
I IDDavid Halberstam, “Ranking Saigon Buddhist and 2 Aides Flee Into American 
Embassy,” New York Times, September 2, 1963.
139
embassy reaction when [Thich Tri Quang] first took refuge was the Americans were 
‘delighted that of all the embassies in the city he chose ours.” ’113 When asked by the 
Government o f Vietnam several days later to turn over the Buddhists, the US 
Embassy refused.114
Once again, the United States diplomatic corps, under the leadership of Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Jr., used their management o f the spaces around them to achieve 
political ends. During his walk, Lodge left the private (for Americans) spaces 
available to him and demonstrated a commitment to the people of Vietnam without 
making a verbal statement. Now, by seizing two opportunities to shelter Buddhist 
monks in American spaces, the US Embassy took a slightly more pointed, but still 
non-confrontational, stance against the Government of Vietnam’s treatment of 
Buddhists.
Other Americans in Saigon also used American spaces to engage in the political 
environment in Saigon. The Associated Press reported that United States officials 
had instructed Americans living in Saigon to change their behavior. During some of 
the demonstrations in Saigon, American service members living in downtown billets 
went to the roofs o f their billets to watch the demonstration.115 Officials requested 
that the service members stop throwing garbage at the police officers squaring o ff 
against the Buddhists. The reporter also mentioned that during one protest, officers
113 David Halberstam, “Vietnam Asks U.S. To Give Up Monks,” New York Times, 
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on the roof cheered for the Buddhist protestors.116 As a result, Americans, 
representing all different roles and levels o f official involvement in diplomacy, 
utilized their “private” spaces to influence the relationship between the Government 
o f Vietnam and the United States.
While Henry Cabot Lodge and other Americans in Saigon quietly influenced 
the relationship between the United States, Vietnam, and Vietnamese Buddhists, the 
Diem administration had been steadily devoting part o f its energies on the foreign 
press. In late August, Ngo Dinh Nhu spoke out about the foreign press and their 
understanding of Buddhist protesting. Nhu saw the self-immolation o f  Thich Quang 
Due as a “clever tactic” used by Buddhists for gaining attention for their cause.117 
Furthermore, such “clever tactics” were so successful that there was little the 
Government of Vietnam can do to counter them .118 Self-immolation, and other 
protests, created a “climate of formidable intoxication” that spread to Americans 
through the press.119
Later in September, President Diem him self made a stronger connection 
between the Buddhist protests and the foreign press. In an interview with an Indian 
journalist, the reporter quoted Diem as saying that “Thich Quang Due burned him self 
to death ‘with the connivance o f foreign television.” ’120 The article continued that the 
“President said ‘extremist elements’ in the Buddhist protest movement, with
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television reporters, ‘organized the spectacular murder o f  Thich Quang Due.”
Placing the blame for the current problems within Vietnam on external forces, Diem, 
according to the New York Ties, noted that “this clearly proves that the aim o f the 
international plotters was to prevent a settlement o f the misunderstanding between the 
Government of Vietnam and the Buddhists.”121
Diem and N hu’s willingness to implicate the press in the Buddhist protests o f 
1963 recalls Malcolm Browne’s remembrance o f the time a year later. The story 
about the conflict between the Buddhists and the Government of Vietnam was 
shifting to increasingly include the press corps as an actor in the conflict. As Browne 
maintained, the press became part o f the story. Furthermore, it seems that the various 
groups with an investment in the plight of Buddhists in Vietnam (Government o f 
Vietnam, Buddhists, and the United States) all used the foreign press for their own 
ends. Henry Cabot Lodge used them to make a statement about the United States’ 
position on the Buddhist Crisis through his non-verbal spatial actions. The Buddhists 
themselves used the foreign press to get past the Diem administration’s control over 
the local press and gain worldwide attention. The Government of Vietnam talked 
about the press, in the press, which started to change stories from depicting a standoff 
between Buddhists and the Government o f Vietnam to a second-level discussion o f 
the press and representation o f the Buddhist protests.
The idea o f the press becoming the story and creating different meanings for 
Saigon’s public spaces became even more noticeable in October 1963. On October 5, 
another monk set himself on fire to protest the treatment o f Buddhists. That morning,
121 Ibid.
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news agencies got phone calls tipping them off that something would happen at 
12:00pm in front of the Central Market in downtown Saigon. This resulted in several 
reporters being on scene for the protest.122 The police responded to the protest by 
sealing off the downtown area with tanks and barricades.123 After the monk set 
himself on fire, plainclothes police officers attempted to stop the photographers on 
the scene from leaving with the images they took. After failing to take the camera 
from NBC television journalist Grant Wolfkill, police assaulted him. Journalists John 
Sharkey, NBC, and David Halberstam attempted to help him and prevent the police 
from taking his film with the images o f the m onk’s protest on it. After the attack, 
Henry Cabot Lodge spoke to the reporters, then filed a formal complaint to the 
Vietnamese Foreign Ministry.124
Other United States government officials objected to the most recent attack on 
reporters by the South Vietnamese police.125 Senate majority leader, and Democrat 
from Montana, Mike Mansfield said he was “shocked” by the attack and felt that the 
reporters should be compensated with money and an apology.126 Secretary o f State 
Dean Rusk also objected to the treatment of the reporters, and relayed to reporters 
Henry Cabot Lodge’s actions on behalf o f the reporters in Saigon.127
While the foreign press stressed the treatment of the reporters who had observed 
the latest self-immolation, a local pro-Govemment o f Vietnam English-language
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newspaper owned by Americans,128 emphasized a different part of the story. The
Times o f  Vietnam editorial accused the foreign press of “stage managing” the
Buddhist’s self-immolation protest, stating that “foreign correspondents should be
tried as accessories to the crime.” 129 Mrs. Nhu, an always vocal leader and wife to
Ngo Dinh Nhu, expressed a similar critique while on a trip overseas. However, rather
than aiming her words strictly at the foreign press, she targeted her criticism toward
the United States in general. In an interview in Paris for an ABC news show, Mrs.
Nhu said that Buddhists in Saigon were using Americans as “ instruments.” 130 She
felt that the United States was not acting as an ally— it seemed to not want to get
involved. Instead of participating in the events in Saigon, “they give the impression
that they consider themselves just spectators to a show.” 131 Mrs. N hu’s comments,
when combined with the Times o f  Vietnam editorial, cast the relationship between the
Government of Vietnam and the United States in visual terms. The United States,
enabled by the foreign press, watched events in Saigon unfold without intervening.
On October 27, yet another Buddhist monk set himself on fire in protest. This
time, Horst Faas was able to capture and file his images o f the event with the 
1
Associated Press. ~ The monk staged his protest in front o f the cathedral in 
downtown Saigon while “Sunday churchgoers,” one press account described, “drove
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past a few feet away on their way to the Cathedral across the square in the center of 
Saigon.”13j Horst Faas’s photograph of the monk’s protest captures a changing 
Government o f Vietnam attitude toward the Buddhist protests. Mr. Nhu had 
previously maintained that there was little the Government o f Vietnam could do about 
these protests. Malcolm Browne’s initial photograph o f Thich Quang Due showed 
Buddhists in control o f a public space in Saigon as they circled Thich Quang D ue’s 
body. Later reports o f self-immolation protests focused not on the police trying to 
prevent Buddhists setting themselves on fire, although there were “anti-suicide 
squads” patrolling the city occasionally. Rather, police attempted to control the 
images, or the circumstances of spectatorship around the protests. However, this 
image differed from the ones before it. First, the monk chose a different location for 
his protest. He chose a distinctly Catholic space— a space in front o f the Cathedral—  
as a place for his protest. Doing so on a Sunday morning only made his protest more 
pointed as it was a time when the Cathedral was in use for services. Second, the main 
Cathedral downtown was also in the center of where Americans were in Saigon.
Horst Faas’s image captured different elements that identified the location o f the 
monk’s protest. To the left, we see the French colonial architecture. He captured the 
“tree-lined” streets of Saigon— written about so many times by Americans in 
different contexts— as well. Third, directly above the monk, Faas captured the street 
sign identifying the exact location o f this protest— Tu Do Street.
When compared to Browne’s earlier image, Faas’s image depicts a similar
http://www.apimages.com/, accessed March 1, 2012.
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margin of space around the protesting monk. The obvious difference here is that a 
police officer is attempting to extinguish the fire. According to one press account o f 
the protest, police rushed to stop the monk and were in turn stopped by the crowd, but 
eventually one got through and tried to put out the flam es.ij4 The police officer in 
this image breaks the margin between crowd and protester, as in so many o f the 
images of protests taken in Saigon. The crowd in this image also differs from that in 
Browne’s photograph: the scene lacks monks. The onlookers who circle the monk, as 
in the previous images, appear to lack Americans.
Images o f the Novem ber 1964 Coup and Its A fterm ath
A few days after Faas took this picture, the images the foreign press captured, 
and the way politics played out in Saigon’s streets changed. On November 2, military 
forces, led by Vietnamese Generals and Colonels, overthrew the Diem administration 
in a coup.135 At the end o f the coup, both Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu were 
dead.136 The coup took place inside Saigon, with many o f the images o f the fighting 
coming from the downtown area around the Presidential Palace. Diem and Nhu 
sought refuge in the Presidential Palace, where they could be defended by the 1500 or 
so members of the loyal Palace guard and special forces who lived in barracks near
137the palace. The coup forces took over various headquarters in the city as well, such 
as the Ministry o f Communication, the Navy Headquarters, the Ministry o f  Defense
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and the headquarters of the police.1’8 New York Times reporter Hedrick Smith 
reported that the group executing the coup was “firmly anti-Communist and pro- 
Western. it was viewed as eager to eliminate the repressive features o f  the Ngo Dinh 
Diem Govemment.” lj9
As in previous months, tanks and guns appeared on street comers, but now they 
were directed at the Diem administration instead o f the Buddhists.140 As information 
about the coup spread throughout Saigon, many shop owners closed their stores. 
However, Americans still frequented downtown bars and restaurants during the 
fighting.141 After the fighting stopped, residents o f  Saigon started to run through the 
streets celebrating the overthrow of the Diem administration.142 A group o f young 
people burned copies of the Times o f  Vietnam outside o f the publisher’s office.143
The New York Times, along with the story reporting the events o f  the coup, 
published a map o f downtown Saigon— plotting the places o f interest for the coup.144 
The paper also ran an aerial photograph o f downtown Saigon highlighting the various 
landmarks of the coup. The map and photograph mark Saigon’s downtown as the 
location o f both the coup and o f government power. The New York T im es's map and 
aerial photograph also inserted American locations into the area. They not only mark 
the U.S. Embassy, but also the Majestic Hotel— a likely place for the foreign press to 
stay while covering the events in the city. Press reports and photography also
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captured the downtown environment. A Los Angeles Times article mentioned that 
“troops carrying light weapons swarmed over the red tile roofs of buildings near the 
palace.” 143 Images o f the coup and its aftermath disrupted most of the photographic 
conventions developed in the previous months. For example, military troops 
conducted funeral processionals through the streets. Boundaries between Vietnamese 
civilian and military forces broke down. Private spaces previously heavily regulated 
(like the interior o f the Presidential Palace), became public spaces.
While photographers ventured onto the streets during the fighting, the majority 
of images that emerged from the coup were from the moments after the fighting had 
ended. O f these images, many were in direct contrast the types of images the foreign 
press had taken previously. For instance, one image featured two women walking 
across the intersection in front o f the Caravelle Hotel (the residence o f many 
Americans while in Saigon and next to the National Assembly building.)146 One 
Vietnamese woman brings a soda, the other, a straw, to an armed Vietnamese military 
guard. In the background, the photographer captured a news crew filming the scene. 
Images of the foreign press were not too common. The image in general contradicts 
the pre-coup images that featured uniformed troops or police either enforcing a 
boundary (barbed wire, or just a wide area o f empty space) or physically engaging in 
a fight with people on the street. Here, the people in the street are thankful and 
cooperating with the troops. The change exemplified in this image parallels the
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changes within the press itself. Here, by capturing the film crew on film, the foreign 
press acknowledged itself as part o f the environment of Saigon’s streets.
Images o f physical boundaries also appeared. Some o f these were military-only 
images, such as a hole blown in the palace grounds,147 but the images o f transgressing 
barricades, something that was so fraught with tension weeks before, also included 
cooperation between civilians and military personnel. One photograph taken on 
November 5, 1963, showed a crowd o f civilians standing behind, and hanging over, 
the palace fence.148 Rather than resisting them, as would have been expected in the 
images before the coup, here the people of Saigon are handing the troops a large 
machine gun to the troops. While the image of a crowd passing a machine gun over 
the fence to troops inside the palace grounds still maintained a boundary, albeit 
loosely, other photographs captured a connection between civilians and uniformed 
service members. The soda delivery was one such image. During the fighting, 
photographers recorded scenes o f tanks in Saigon streets,149 and people hiding behind 
them to protect themselves from gunfire.150 After the coup, a photograph showed 
Vietnamese in civilian clothes standing on top o f a tank, looking at the palace and 
talking to the Vietnamese troops.151
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Thus, the public / private divide present in images o f the Diem administration 
and Henry Cabot Lodge changed in the post-coup images. Photographers, enabled by 
the initial actions o f military forces, took pictures that gave the public access to 
Diem’s previously private spaces. Images gave evidence o f troops, photographers, 
and a crowd o f looters making their way through the Presidential Palace.152 This 
image, o f a Vietnamese soldier inside the palace,l5j appeared in the New York 
Times. l54 By highlighting the troops inside the ransacked Presidential Palace, the 
photographer was able to reveal the upset o f power in Saigon. Like images o f tanks 
parked in the streets, this image displays a calm setting around the subject. Violence, 
for the time being, has passed. The soldier in this image smiles—the oppression of 
the Diem regime is over.
In post-coup Saigon, photographers captured other events that upset the themes 
o f the past months. Before the coup, photographers published images o f Buddhist 
processions through Saigon that memorialized figures like Thich Quang Due. After 
the coup, they published similar images, only these processions included different 
types of people. During the coup, Captain Buy Nguon Ngai died in his tank during 
the fighting near the palace. On November 5, an Associate Press photographer took 
this image of his funeral procession.155 Like previous images of processions, there is 
an image o f the deceased at the front with a crowd behind. However, now, troops and
152 “Coup Puts New Life in Saigon Night Club,” Los Angeles Times, November 4, 
1963.
153 Associated Press, Image 631101055, AP Images, November 1, 1963 
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civilians follow through Saigon’s streets instead o f monks.
The contrast between pre- and post-coup Saigon also appeared in editorial form. 
The November 15, 1963 issue o f Life featured a cover-story photo essay about the 
event. The opening full-page image was o f the monk who set himself on fire outside 
of the Cathedral a few weeks prior to the coup. The next page consisted o f an image, 
a soldier lifted above a crowd o f civilians. The caption read: “Death and Victory: A 
week following the flaming protest of the last Buddhist suicide (left), happy 
Vietnamese lift a victorious rebel soldier high into the air.” 156 The article itself, 
mostly told through images and captions, linked two contrasting images o f Saigon. 
“Clutched by searing flames, a Buddhist monk martrys himself on a Saigon sidewalk. 
A few days later, joyous hands hoist a Vietnamese soldier in a victory that belongs 
both to him and the suicidal monk.” 157
After the contrasting pre-/post-coup images subsided in the press, 
representations o f Saigon settled into a new pattern. In stories about the city, many 
reporters focused on a new environment emerging in the city. What was previously a 
“tense Saigon,” was now a permissive Saigon. In April 1962, the Diem 
administration enacted morality laws prohibiting things like “beauty contests, 
dancing, cock fights and boxing matches.” 158 With Diem and the Nhus no longer in 
power, these laws were suspended and, according to the press, Saigon residents 
celebrated the overthrow o f the Vietnamese government leadership by dancing and
http://www.apimages.com/, accessed March 1, 2012.
156 “ 17 Hours that Destroyed Diem,” Life (November 15, 1963), 35.
157 Ibid.
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going to night clubs. Hostesses at bars changed their clothes from “hospital-like 
smocks” to skirts, dresses, and pants.159 One Associated Press photographer recorded 
the return of dancing in Saigon by going to the Tu Do Bar.160 This image, taken on 
November 3, 1963 and appearing in the New York Times on November 5, 161 depicted 
two Americans, one in uniform, one not, dancing with Vietnamese women. After 
months o f Buddhist protests and Government o f Vietnam police actions, the press and 
this photographer were starting, again, to focus on Vietnamese women and American 
men’s relationship to them and the city.
While reporting shortly after the coup attempted to depict a Saigon returning to 
normal, other events in the city crept into the news cycle. After the provisional 
government lifted the curfew and stopped the press censorship imposed during the 
coup on November 7— two actions that signaled the pace o f change in Saigon—  
people in Saigon returned to their routines. During the Buddhist protests, Saigon 
had continued to endure violence and bombings because o f the war. Now, however, 
the bombings did not compete for attention with protests in the news, and a new 
“terror campaign” conducted by the Viet Cong that started with Diem’s overthrow 
continued with a new bomb exploding almost daily.163 After months o f  reporting
1963.
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about the public nature o f politics in Saigon, reports o f these bombings assumed 
meanings that returned to an older version o f Saigon. On November 14, a bomb burst 
at the Imperial Cafe in downtown Saigon, injuring two American service members.
In describing the incident, one story slipped into an older version o f Saigon: the 
bomb, “thrown through a w indow .. .wrecked the Imperial Cafe on Catinat Street, in 
the main entertainment district.”164 Referring to Tu Do Street by its old name 
“Catinat,” while most likely a simple mistake, suggests a memory o f an older Saigon 
returning to the representations o f the city.
The combination o f reporting violence and leisure in Saigon, a formula 
employed by journalists and authors for decades, continued through the end o f 1963, 
while the thrill o f the coup still enthralled reporters. Even though the stories 
describing life in the city attempted to recapture the romance of the city created by its 
earlier representations, these stories also showed a changing city. Hedrick Smith, a 
reporter for the New York Times who had covered the “Buddhist Crisis,” published an 
article titled “The Unreality of Saigon” on December 7, 1963. In his article, Smith 
embraced many of the previous conventions that writers before him used to talk about 
Saigon as the “pearl o f the orient.”
If one did not look at the date of the article, at times, it would be hard to tell 
when Smith was writing. He wrote that “ there is an air o f unreality in this lush and 
sophisticated city with tree-line[d] boulevards that bask in a tropical sun as sampans
164 “Saigon Terror Bomb Hurts 2 G .I.’s in Cafe,” New York Times, November 15,
1963.
quietly ply the Saigon river.” 165 He described Saigon as alive—it “throbs with 
activity, as if it were asking a new pleasure in life.” After detailing streets crowded 
with vehicles and pedestrians, he evoked images o f Vietnamese women: “bird-like 
women glide along on bicycles, their flowing orange, black, strawberry, ice blue or 
lemon-colored costumes billowing behind them.” 166 He quoted an American 
businessman who expected to see signs o f war in the city, but said that visitors to the 
city might never know there was a war going on.167 For those looking for the war, he
wrote that the “ninth-floor restaurant o f the Caravel le Hotel” provided a view o f
168military actions going on across the Saigon River. He described luxury goods on 
sale in the city and at “coffeehouses along Rue Catinat, Saigon’s famous rumor-mill, 
where stories are swapped of intrigue.” 169 Smith went so far as to acknowledge that 
he was writing about Saigon through the memory o f  past representations o f  the city. 
He said o f the things to do in Saigon, “almost every item from novels o f  the East is at 
hand.” He cited opium dens, “bar girls,” and the smell o f food cooking on the 
sidewalks. He did, however, acknowledge some change between the Saigon he was 
writing about and the Saigon that had passed. He mentioned that the American 
Embassy was getting more strict with security— people now had to sign in. 
Furthermore, he spoke of the removal o f  sidewalk cafes “for Westerners” because o f 
violence. “American soldiers sip beer and sit with girls in bistros that are protected
165 Hedrick Smith, “The Unreality o f Saigon,” New York Times, December 7, 1963.
166 Ibid.
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by screening and iron grillwork to deflect grenades.”170
The focus o f the press in Saigon was clearly changing. Time magazine on 
December 13, 1963 reported that several self-immolations had occurred since the 
coup, one near the Lodge’s residence.171 These deaths, said Time, did not seem to 
have the same weight as previous self-immolations. Perhaps the lack o f backing by 
Buddhist monks, or as some expected, the lack o f relationship of these people to the
] 72Buddhist cause, contributed to the lack o f attention these events garnered.
Regardless, it seemed that the strategy o f public protest in Vietnam so well utilized by 
Buddhist leaders was less relevant than under the Diem regime.173
In January 1964, Halberstam wrote an article in the New York Times describing 
Saigon and the diplomatic and military planning going on there. In this article, he 
harkened back to an older version o f Saigon— a version o f the city in which violence 
faded to the background and leisure and romance gave meaning to the city. 
Halberstam’s article, like Smith’s, applied many of the conventions o f  previous 
writers to describe the city. He commented how “the lovely, slim Vietnamese girls 
promenade down Rue Catinat, intent on seeing and being seen,” and noted vendors 
cooking soup on the street, children “scurrying,” and cyclo drivers that were
170 Ibid.
171 “End of the Glow,” Time, December 13, 1963.
172 Ibid.
173 The press report o f these self-immolations described all three people as civilians—  
a 17-year old women, a “22-year old pedicab driver” and an “older man” and 
“telephone operator” who apparently left a note explaining his death as a result o f his 
poor relationship with his father. The reported mentioned that the young women was 
suspected of having Communist associations. “End of Glow,” Time, December 13,
1963.
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“reminders o f the endurance and patience o f the county.” 174 Halberstam further 
mentioned how one could hear, but not see, the war while sitting in the city’s cafes 
and walking down “wide and tree-lined” streets175— apparently, excluding the 
occasional bombings of establishments in Saigon.176 Perhaps in his strongest 
connection to an older versions o f Saigon representations, Halberstam referred to the 
different faces o f Saigon, as he quoted a Vietnamese person as saying that “ the face 
of Saigon is European; but do not be fooled, the heart is Asian.”177
Halberstam, Smith, and others, summoned a different vision o f Saigon after the 
Buddhist crisis. Saigon, for them, was returning to normal and their articles 
constructed Saigon in this way. Returning to a “normal,” calmer version o f Saigon 
meant recasting the characters in their stories. Gone were the monks, nuns, and 
young protestors, to be replaced by the return of service workers, bar girls and 
scurrying children. A “calm” Saigon to Americans was a Saigon steeped in the 
writing constructed under French colonial rule. Public spaces in the foreign press 
articles could be drained o f political potential. Women were not protesting on the 
streets, but rather available to be looked at by foreigners or as Halberstam put it, 
Vietnamese women on the street were “intent on seeing and being seen.” 178
At the end of January 1964, Saigon’s calm was not necessarily upset, but its
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 One such bombing, albeit “some distance from downtown” at the Bamboo Bar 
occurred a little more than two weeks before this article was published. “4 Americans 
Hurt In Saigon Bombing,” Washington Post, January 10, 1964.
177 David Halberstam, “Saigon is Calm—But the W ar is Near,” New York Times, 
January 26, 1964.
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normalcy was. In a “bloodless coup,” that included no gunfire, troops under the 
command of Vietnamese General Nguyen Khanh ousted the new ruling military 
leaders from their positions in the government.179 The coup would usher in a period 
of terrorism, where Saigon, while still described as a city not really at war, once again 
had its streets made political, but this time, through violent actions including 
bombings. The increased violence in Saigon, combined with feelings o f anti- 
Americanism on the part o f many Vietnamese, and the escalation o f the war was to 
further transform Saigon from previous versions o f itself.
179 Ibid.
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Else Baker: Viewing Saigon through American Domestic Spaces
Else Baker arrived in Saigon in June of 1963 to join her husband, Lee, Air 
Force Lt. Colonel and chief of the MACV Public Affairs Office. 1 Mrs. Else Baker 
lived in Saigon until 1965, when all American dependents were ordered to leave 
Vietnam. For a little less than two years, she explored the city, made new friends, 
wrote letters home, threw countless parties, and became a published writer. Mrs. 
Baker was one o f many American women living in Saigon in the early-1960s, but her 
writing and documenting o f American culture in Saigon, and the timing o f her stay, 
makes her story unique.
Mrs. Baker’s experiences in, and writing about, Saigon reveal the importance 
of domestic spaces in American foreign relations. Her house in Saigon and her job 
“keeping it” served as both a physical and ideological hub for her interactions with 
the people of Vietnam. Physically, the Baker house brought Else Baker in contact 
with three Vietnamese women as the Bakers hired them to staff their home. Inside 
private American spaces, Mrs. Baker came to have a better understanding of Buddhist 
and Vietnamese views of the political turmoil taking place in Saigon in 1963 and
1964. Because o f Lee Baker’s position rank and position in the Public Affairs Office, 
the Baker household also proved to be a venue for interactions between military 
officials and the press corps. The Bakers hosted parties that allowed the press to talk
1 Correspondence from Lee Baker to Else, 12 June 1963, Folder 23, Box 01, Lee 
Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University; William M. 
Hammond, Public Affairs the Military and the Media, 1962-1968 (Washington, DC: 
Center for Military History, United States Army, 1990), 75.
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to officials in a domestic setting. The understanding Else Baker developed about 
Vietnam through her interactions with her staff, interactions with military officials 
and the press, and other daily activities she undertook as she moved about Saigon, 
allowed her to pitch her stories to magazine and newspaper editors as a view different 
from that o f the press corps. In this way, Else Baker’s writing filtered her 
experiences in Saigon through the perspective she developed through her domestic 
space, and re-released her version o f Saigon and the events taking place there for 
consumption by readers. Ultimately, Mrs. Baker’s tenure in Saigon shows the 
importance o f non-state actors in the development o f American-Vietnamese relations 
and the role domestic spaces played in the American role in Vietnam during 1963 and
1964.
Once a week (sometimes twice), Mrs. Baker wrote letters to her mother in
Seattle. She wrote to her friend Mary in Denver and her husband Lee when he was
away on business. In these letters, Else Baker recorded the things she witnessed and
events she experienced for both others and herself—she asked her mother to save her
letters as a makeshift diary.2 Her letters detailed both public events, such as coups
and bombings, as well as more private moments such as her social life, development
as a writer, exploration of a new city and culture, and establishment o f new personal
relationships. The copious record Mrs. Baker kept through her published and private
writing, however, took a great amount o f her time; her busy life did not always allow
her the time she wanted for writing. As she said in one o f her letters to her mother, “ I
2 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 29 December 1963, Folder 06, Box 01, 
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
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think I could spend most o f my time writing and that would leave little time left over 
for ‘living’ the events 1 want to write about.” 3
Mrs. Baker reserved her more private experiences for her letters, but while in 
Saigon she pursued publication for her more public experiences. Even though she 
wasn’t part o f the press pool, Mrs. Baker had her articles picked up by newspapers 
and the news wires. Mrs. Baker’s public writing leveraged “a different angle.” When 
discussing the possibility o f putting together a book, she said “people are interested in 
more than the news accounts o f political and military happenings in this country.” '4 
Else Baker’s “angle” was that she w asn’t an insider. She wasn’t formally employed 
in Saigon. Her status as a “dependent” or “wife” allowed her to write about the 
American war from a perspective that significantly differed from the normal press 
corps— she ran the events o f the day through a domestic space.
The crux of Mrs. Baker’s articles dealt with the public nature o f  Saigon’s 
political culture. The events she chose to cover in article form often shared their 
settings— public Saigon spaces. While Else Baker’s explicit purpose for being in 
Saigon— like that of other wives like her— may have been to support her husband, her 
writing also informs us o f other jobs, duties, and opportunities women had while 
living in Saigon. Baker’s day-to-day life in Saigon consisted of many different tasks. 
In addition to writing, she hosted Americans new to Saigon and showed them around 
the city; and she tended to her own household, managing several domestic workers.
3 Ibid.
4 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mary, 02 February 1965, Folder 19, Box 01,
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
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Additionally, one o f her roles was to serve as an “unofficial ambassador”— to borrow 
the words of Donna Alvah. According to Alvah, “military families in foreign 
locations [were] considered strategically crucial in the Cold War [and] represented 
the American commitment to anti-communism internationally, as well as the alleged 
superiority of the American way o f life.” 5 Baker seemed to agree to serve this type 
o f function as well. After attending a briefing at MACV headquarters given to wives 
about how to answer questions about the situation in Vietnam once they returned to 
the United States, Baker wrote her mother: “I’ve always felt that the wives can be our 
best emissaries, if they know what’s going on— and our worst advertisements abroad 
if they don’t know what they are talking about.” 6 Furthermore, Baker saw her job 
as a writer through the prism of being an emissary. She felt that by “writing about 
what it is really like for American women living here— and how they contribute by 
being here,” 7 she could serve her duty.
The idea of being an “unofficial ambassador” for the United States may serve 
as a general starting point for understanding Else Baker’s life in Saigon, but looking 
at the smaller details of her day-to-day life reveal far more complicated themes. 
Specifically, by looking at the domestic space she created, we are able to see the ways 
in which international relations, as well as American political culture, were, at times,
5 Donna Alvah, Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and  
the Cold War, 1946-1965 (New York: NYU Press, 2007), 6.
6 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 13 April 1964, Folder 10, Box 01, Lee 
Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
7 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 26 November 1964, Folder 17, Box 01, 
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
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worked out at the most granular and personal level. The Baker household revealed 
the complicated relationships between different groups living in Saigon. The house 
itself, located in the French downtown, owned and rented to the United States 
Mission in Vietnam by a Chinese citizen, highlighted some o f the complicated past o f 
■ the relationships between the Chinese and Vietnamese residents o f Saigon. The 
relationship between the Vietnamese and Chinese residents in Saigon was also 
distilled in the Baker’s household through the presence o f three domestic workers. 
Americans had hired “servants” for decades, and much o f the advice concerning their 
employment was rooted in American understandings of Vietnamese and Chinese 
ethnic groups in Saigon.
The Baker’s domestic workers, three Vietnamese women, and Mrs. Baker’s 
relationship to them and their families, also showed the American home in Vietnam 
to be a place where different cultures came to understand one another. In a colonial 
framework, it seems, while in an employer/employee relationship, the four women 
became friends, and spent a great deal o f time together. As a result, they expanded 
Else Baker’s network beyond the confines o f the American community in Saigon and 
allowed to her to create meaningful relationships with Vietnamese people.
Describing the Saigon “Post” and Else Baker’s Entrance Into Journalism
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The Bakers lived in downtown Saigon across the street from the Presidential 
Palace grounds" on Cong Ly Street.8 Their two-story house sat on a courtyard behind 
an iron gate and, like much o f the architecture in downtown Saigon, was made o f 
white stucco with a red tile roof.9" Mrs. Baker wrote o f the house’s character that it 
was “somewhat New Orleans-French in style.”10 Police protecting the Palace guarded 
their street (Cong Ly), making it relatively quiet.11 Starting from here, Mrs. Baker 
could explore different parts o f Saigon, but for the most part operated in downtown 
Saigon. Her description o f her first tour o f the city provided a map o f different 
American points o f interest in the city:
My first tour o f the city was a jum ble in my mind—MACV Headquarters, The 
Embassy, The Abraham Lincoln Library, above which was located USIS, The 
Rex and Brink Hotels (Bachelor Officers' Quarters for unaccompanied 
Americans), The Caravelle Hotel (newest in town and headquarters for 
visiting members o f the western press), the National Assembly Building and 
City Hall and the Saigon cathedral. Two places we did not see that day 
because the streets leading to them were barricaded—Gia Long Palace and Xa
o
Correspondence from Lee Baker to Else, 12 June 1963, Folder 23, Box 01, Lee 
Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
9 Else Baker, “Entry concerning arrival in Vietnam and first view o f Saigon,” No 
Date, Folder 26, Box 01, Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech 
University, 2.
10 Ibid.
11 Correspondence from Lee Baker to Else, 12 June 1963, Folder 23, Box 01, Lee 
Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
163
Loi Pagoda, headquarters o f the Buddhist attempt to overthrown the 
government. It was to be months before 1 saw either place.12 
Mrs. Baker’s tour of downtown Saigon highlighted many of the landmarks indicated 
on contemporary American maps o f Saigon. What this brief recollection introduces 
is the role o f women in “mapping” the parts o f the city accessible to, and frequented 
by, Americans. By engaging with the space around her, processing what people had 
written about Saigon before her, and creating an interpretation of the city through her 
writing, Baker created an interpretation of Saigon, and Vietnam, for those who were 
to come to Vietnam after her. Serving as guides, women like Else Baker helped to 
shape what others knew o f Saigon. In other words, through her writing, Else Baker 
translated her everyday experiences, and the gender, race, class and sexually-based 
systems that she encountered became embedded into what other people knew about 
the country.
While most of her published writing focused on the political events taking 
place on Saigon’s streets, perhaps the most substantial, or at least lengthy, article 
about her stay in Saigon was a guide for Americans new to Saigon. “Post o f  the 
Month— Saigon” addressed the topics that one might expect to see regarding the 
logistics of living in a new locale. Mrs. Baker covered things like housing (what it 
was like and its availability), shopping (where to do it and what goods one could 
purchase), bringing children overseas, entertainment, and the like. Else B aker’s “ Post
12 Else Baker, “Entry concerning arrival in Vietnam and first view o f Saigon,” No 
Date, Folder 26, Box 01, Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech 
University, 6-7.
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of the Month” article revealed a specific interpretation o f Saigon. For many 
American women, their husbands went to work, while they tended to everything else. 
Their day-to-day activities, often falling along traditional gendered expectations o f 
work for women, took them out into the city in ways their husbands did not. Their 
time in the city, and their interpretations o f those experiences, allowed American 
women to construct a version of the city for all Americans.
The editor of U.S. Lady, Alvadee Adams, asked Mrs. Baker to write the “Post 
o f the Month” article because she believed that Mrs. Baker was “capable o f turning 
out a factually correct and properly colorful picture o f what Saigon is like as a place 
to live, both from the military and Foreign Service point o f view.” 13 U.S. Lady, a 
magazine intended to reach members o f the “Foreign Service as well as military 
wives and families,”' 14 published Else Baker’s “Post o f the Month” article in January 
1965.15 ~ Adams asked Else Baker to write for the audience o f their magazine, while 
including information “for a wife who is about to go to Saigon with her husband and
"ll f tseveral children.” Adams wanted not only the logistics o f managing a household in 
Saigon— for example, she requested for information about schools for children and
13 Letter from Alvadee Adams to General and Mrs. Westmoreland concerning U.S. 
Lady, 10 September 1964, Folder 22, Box 01, Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam 
Archive, Texas Tech University.
14 Ibid.
15 Baker, Else. “Post of the Month— Saigon.” U.S. Lady, January 1965, 10-20.
16 Letter from Alvadee Adams to Else Baker concerning U.S. Lady, 20 October 1964, 
Folder 22, Box 01, Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech 
University.
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where to go shopping— but she also asked Baker to “tell about the host people, and 
describe the flavor of Saigon in these troubled times.”17
In addition to covering both the logistics and “flavor” of living in Saigon, 
Adams also instructed Else Baker to include the wives o f the highest American 
officials in Saigon— Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Westmoreland, ideally capturing them in 
the act o f entertaining .l8 To accommodate Adam s’ requests. Else Baker read the 
Post Reports put out by the American agencies in Saigon, and combined that 
information with her own experiences. “I found some gaps in all o f them, from the 
woman’s point o f view,” said Baker of the Post Report.19 She also interviewed both 
Mrs. Taylor and Westmoreland, attending a dinner with both families, with a 
photographer on loan from Lee Baker’s office.20
Adams also wanted Mrs. Baker to arrange for a photograph the magazine 
could use for the issue’s cover. In her correspondence with Else Baker, Adams 
iterated that “a color shot for the cover is very important. It should be feminine, with 
an immistakeable [sic] Saigon background.” 21 Adams went on to suggest that Else 
Baker might include “two pretty American teen-age girls— one a military daughter
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Letter from Else Baker to Alvadee Adams concerning U.S. Lady, 22 November 
1964, Folder 22, Box 01, Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech 
University.
20 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 30 October 1964, Folder 16, Box 01,
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
21 Letter from Alvadee Adams to Else Baker concerning U.S. Lady, 20 October 1964, 
Folder 22, Box 01, Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech 
University.
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and the other the daughter of one o f our embassy people— getting ready to celebrate 
the TET (the Chinese New Year which General Westmoreland mentioned as being 
held the last of January this year)....Remember, nothing is ever better than a closeup 
of pretty girls for the cover o f a woman’s magazine.” 22 In a letter a month later, 
Adams suggested another possibility for the cover. While the setting for the 
photograph seemed flexible, the subject o f American girls was not:
If getting a typical Vietnamese background is difficult, perhaps you could 
have two pretty American g irls.. .dressing up in a costume for the TET 
celebration...in her parents’ quarters, and [that] would cover a lot o f points—
->3
pretty American girl in Saigon, colorful native dress, typical quarters.
The cover that Mrs. Baker and an army photographer came up with featured 
two American girls with two Vietnamese girls at “ the temple built in honor o f 
Marshall Le Van Duyet.. .lighting] tapers in honor o f the dead.”24 The American 
girls, as requested, were the daughters o f people working in USOM and MACV in 
Saigon. By providing an article and cover focused on elements of American life in 
Saigon that might interest women, even though Baker also felt “much o f the material 
is o f general interest,”~'25 Adams and Baker leveraged the domestic sphere in order to 
show Saigon as less threatening and the US mission there as cooperative.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Baker, Else. “Post o f the Month— Saigon.” U.S. Lady, January 1965, 2.
25 Letter from Else Baker to Alvadee Adams concerning U.S. Lady, 22 November 
1964, Folder 22, Box 01, Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech 
University.
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The cover photograph highlighted part o f  the work that Else Baker’s writing 
in U.S. Lady accomplished. It successfully placed Americans in Saigon in a position 
where they were not just there to do a job, but also to foster cooperation with the 
Vietnamese. Adams’ letters to Baker insisted on some sort o f  representation o f 
engaging with Vietnamese culture. While her ideas amounted more to “dressing up,” 
the final cover conveyed cooperation between Americans and Vietnamese rather than 
a one-way consumption of Vietnamese culture by Americans. Staging this 
cooperation through the bodies o f young women revealed how families were used to 
bolster the American agenda in Saigon.
Much like Adams’s idea to dress an American girl in Vietnamese clothing, 
Mrs. Baker’s “Post of the Month” article needed to give readers a representation o f 
Saigon and Vietnam. What she delivered engaged in a theme used by many 
journalists for decades. She wrote of a city that seemed calm on the surface, but 
contained layers o f complexity underneath. To portray Saigon’s complexity and 
multi valent meanings, Baker sought to call upon the different senses o f her readers. 
We were sitting in the garden o f a Vietnamese friend one night after dinner. 
The air, fresh and clean after a rain, was filled with the perfume o f tropical 
flowers. The street outside bustled with traffic and the sidewalks were 
crowded with children looking for the prized fighting crickets which always 
appear after the first rains. ’I can understand why the French hated to give it 
up,’ someone commented. ‘This must have been a wonderful place to live ’
168
Then, over the city noises, we heard in a distance the dull thudding thump of
artillery fire. It was the sound o f war.26
This description negotiated the French past o f Saigon, along with the present 
American/Vietnamese relationship. Baker, mobilizing the smell o f  flowers and 
sounds o f children and traffic, created a sense o f nostalgia, engaged our senses with 
descriptions o f smells and sounds, and captured the negotiation of the French colonial 
past and the American present in Saigon. The comment about how the French had to 
“give up” the city, presumably voiced by an American, hints at a complicated 
relationship Americans had with the city. Americans lived in Saigon to cooperate 
with the South Vietnamese government and its people, and this cooperation extended 
to people’s homes. However, Americans also entertained some sort o f association of 
Saigon with a mythical colonial past o f excitement, exoticism and luxury. The 
“sound of war” layered on top o f an otherwise sensuously described scene completed 
the description o f this one moment: the jarring sounds were a reminder o f the 
American present— why these Americans were in Saigon.
The mixing of the serene and nostalgic with some element o f  violence was a 
theme often used by journalists writing about Saigon. Baker’s article engaged with 
the duality of Saigon by noting a superficial layer, as well as a layer o f meaning 
linked to the people living in Saigon.
On the surface Saigon shows little evidence of the war being waged around it.
However, one doesn’t have to scratch very deep to find the signs. After more
26 Else Baker, “Post o f  the M onth— Saigon,” U.S. Lady, January 1965, 10.
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than twenty years o f war o f one sort or another, a generation has grown up 
knowing nothing but war, and they have learned to live with it as part o f their 
daily lives. We American diplomatic and military wives learn to live with it 
too as we go about our job o f providing our husbands with a home, instead of 
a hotel room, to return to at night. That’s why we are here.27 
Like previous versions o f the city created through journalists’ descriptions discussed 
in early chapters, Baker saw a superficial layer o f calm in Saigon. She used a 
physical metaphor of “scratching” to get beneath the physical environment o f  Saigon 
to expose a seemingly more authentic version of the city. This revealed layer was one 
where war and violence had become normal— an everyday occurrence. In this way, 
Baker added a new element to the idea o f Saigon’s facade. The calmness displayed in 
Saigon came not from a colonial facade, but rather from the acceptance o f  war and 
violence into daily routines.
Else Baker’s description o f Saigon recalibrated the idea of what war looks like. 
While the city may not have been under siege in 1964, the experiences o f war had 
been logged into the minds of the residents, regardless o f their cultures. Again, the 
memory o f the past, in this case, the beginnings o f the American War, the French W ar 
and Japanese Occupation, impacted how Americans like Else Baker lived their “daily 
lives.” These memories were not their own— the Americans Mrs. Baker refers to 
most likely had not been in Saigon for too long. Instead, the impact o f war on the
27 Else Baker, “Post o f  the Month— Saigon,” U.S. Lady, January 1965, 11.
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local population living in Saigon and those past experiences were felt by the people 
and somehow conveyed to the newly arrived people in Saigon.
Dom estic Relationships and W orkers in Am erican Households in Saigon
While the “Post o f  the Month”, article condensed Mrs. Baker’s experiences 
into general guidelines for living in Saigon, her writing also provided details unique 
to her and her husband’s life that reveal more about how American domestic spaces 
functioned in Saigon. In her entry from November 1964, Mrs. Baker mentioned how 
writing about women, and the issues that might impact them directly, was only one o f 
the topics she would like to cover. She asserted that she would like to focus more on 
“what the Vietnamese people are like,” as she didn’t think it was “fair to label the 
whole lot [as] bad just because [it] is what makes newspaper headlines.”28"
To communicate more about Saigon and Vietnam than just logistic 
information, Baker outlined the different relationships between groups in Saigon 
often at the same time as covering the ins and outs o f living as an American in Saigon. 
In describing her house, for example, Mrs. Baker told a story of international 
relationships not only in where they lived, but also with their landlord, Mr. Tihon.
The Baker’s landlord, Mr. Tihon, an ethnic Chinese man in Saigon, who was a 
past president of the Rotary Chapter in Saigon, owned a furniture store next to the
■JQ
Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 26 November 1964, Folder 17, Box 01, 
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
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Baker’s house. 29 Partly through the Tihons, Mrs. Baker came to understand the 
status o f Chinese people in Saigon. Writing to her mother about Mr. Tihon, Else 
Baker described her understanding of the relationships between the Vietnamese and 
Chinese in Saigon:
I think I’ve written you before that the Vietnamese don’t really like the 
Chinese here— because they have never become assimilated. Vietnam took in 
hundreds o f thousands o f refugees from China when they moved south ahead 
o f the communist advance in their own country. But they still live their own 
lives, in their own communities completely separated from the Vietnamese.
30The Chinese who have been born here speak Chinese— not Vietnamese. 
Speaking specifically of the Tihon family, she mentioned that Mr. Tihon was 
educated in France and moved to Saigon because o f its relationship with France— it 
was the seat o f power for the French colonial structure in Vietnam.31 The T ihon’s 
children lived overseas, mostly in the United States.32 One o f their sons was 
“studying music in Paris,” the other attended Vanderbilt, while their daughter 
graduated from the University o f Maryland and moved to Denver with her husband 
from Flong Kong. On Else Baker’s second night in Saigon, the Tihons threw a party
29 Correspondence from Else Baker, 26 August 1963, Folder 02, Box 01, Lee Baker 
Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
30 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 01 December 1963, Folder 06, Box 01, 
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
31 Ibid.
32 Correspondence from Else Baker, 26 August 1963, Folder 02, Box 01, Lee Baker 
Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
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to welcome her and her husband to S aigon /3 Mrs. Tihon travelled to Denver to visit 
her daughter, and while she was there, Mrs. Baker asked a favor of her friends in 
Denver:
I think Mrs. Tihon is a delightful person— she speaks English very well-—but 
most important....I don’t imagine she knows many people in Denver and I 
think it would mean a great deal to her if  you would contact her for lunch 
perhaps or have her over for dinner.. .they’ve been so kind to us here and 
there’s so little I can do to repay that kindness except perhaps to give her visit 
to Denver a lift....Their name rimes [sic] with T-Bone incidentally/4 
Mrs. Baker’s friends in Denver did invite Mrs. Tihon and her daughter’s family for an 
outing. After receiving a letter from Mrs. Tihon, Mr. Tihon brought the Bakers a 
bottle o f liquor to thank them for setting up the introduction.35
Mrs. Baker reported to her Denver friends that Mrs. Tihon’s visit also left her 
impressed by her the Tihon’s daughter’s domestic skills:
Mrs. Tihon was telling me how impressed she was with all the things her 
daughter could do, like cooking, washing and ironing and running a house. In 
this part o f the world— especially in a family of means a woman just never
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mary and Everybody, 30 September 1963, 
Folder 03, Box 01, Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech 
University.
173
does anything of this sort— servants do it. Even maids have m aids....This is 
real status, I tell you.J°
The practice o f hiring domestic help, however, predated the Bakers’ arrival in 
Saigon. For example, the 1947 Post Report advised Americans about hiring servants. 
It suggested that an American “household in Saigon [would] usually require four 
servants: a cook, a houseboy, a wash man, and a coolie for the garden work and odd 
jobs.”37 The Post Report scaled down this estimate for apartments, noting that one 
should hire “at least a cook and one houseboy,” and studio, which required “one 
servant for cooking and cleaning.” ’8 A cook had the highest salary, followed by the 
“houseboy” and “wash man.” ’9
The 1947 Post Report advice for employing servants depended on the 
nationality o f the potential employee. For example, it informed potential American 
employers that “good Indochinese servants are paid about 50 piasters less per month 
than their Chinese counterparts.”40 The difference in salary, according to the Post 
Report, came from the differences inherent in Chinese and Indochinese servants. 
Chinese servants were “better and more trustworthy” than Indochinese servants, and 
those who spoke English or French were in high demand, unlike Indochinese servants
36 Ibid.
37 Post Report 1947, Dept. Of State, US Embassy, South Vietnam, General Records, 
1936 -1963, ARC 1742016, RG 84, Stack Area 350, Row 70, Compartment 33, Shelf 
5-2, Box 47, p. 19. This section appears to be crossed out.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 20. This section appears to be crossed out.
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who were “always easily obtained.”41 The Post Report also warned not to hire both 
Chinese and Indochinese servants because “ if the two are mixed, quarrels, 
recriminations, and mutual lack o f responsibility usually result.”42
Even as it recommended Chinese over Indochinese servants on the grounds o f 
trustworthiness, the Post Report told Americans to remain cautious o f  all servants. 
Because “servants in Saigon tend to be careless and are not noted for their 
honesty,”43 the Post Report suggested that Americans not rush into trusting their 
domestic workers, and to not
bring delicate china nor expensive silverw are.. ..The dishonesty may be petty 
but it may also be on a large scale—a number o f houses in Saigon have been 
thoroughly ransacked by thieves who worked in complicity with the servants. 
Until one is certain of the trustworthiness o f servants it is advisable to lock 
drawers and closers containing clothing, linen, and valuables. Servants who 
are found to be dishonest, or are suspected o f dishonesty, should be 
immediately dismissed.44 
The 1947 Post Report’s advice for employing domestic workers not only articulated 
tensions in Saigon between Indochinese and Chinese populations, and the 
understandings the Embassy staff had o f these ethnic groups, but also created distance 
between Americans and the people that would be entering their homes. The solution 
the Post Report provided for dealing with any sort o f “dishonesty” was simply firing
41 Ibid., 18-19. This section appears to be crossed out.
42 Ibid.
4j Ibid., Page 19-20. Section appears to be crossed out
44 Ibid.
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the employee. In fact, the Post Report went as far as to say that dismissal was the 
only option as “reformation of a servant's character appears to be impossible in 
Saigon.”45
In one instance, the Post Report bordered on acknowledging that there might 
be a cultural issue at work, and communication between servant/employer might be 
an issue. The advice about communicating with one’s employees was limited, for the 
most part, to saying that Americans must have “a knowledge of French in order to 
effect mutual understanding” with their servants. When talking about having 
domestic workers do things like grocery shopping, the Post Report claimed that a 
servant would “exact a certain percentage of the money spent; this percentage is 
called ‘squeeze’ in the Orient.”46 This skimming couldn’t be stopped, and if  an 
American employer tried to do so, they might end up losing the servants or they 
would by “buy inferior and spoiled food at lower prices.”47 The description o f the 
“squeeze” suggested that this phenomenon was more cultural than dishonest. While 
the use of the word “Orient” unfortunately does not acknowledge the diversity o f 
Asian peoples and brings to mind different legacies of oppression perpetrated upon 
the “east” by the “west,” here, it also signaled the presence o f some sort o f  cultural 
signifier. In this instance, the term “orient” marks an attempt to go beyond the 
discussion o f a local culture and generalize about all Asian cultures. By saying that 
employees might quit over their employers policing grocery bills, and that employers
45
46
47
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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simply had to come to terms with it, the author o f the Post Report managed to remove 
any blame that Americans might have shouldered. Rather than saying that this might 
have been an issue o f communication, or something that Americans in Saigon might 
need to understand, it was grouped into a category of generally dishonest behavior.
The ideology surrounding domestic workers seemed to change between the 
issue o f the 1947 Post Report and Else Baker’s tenure in Saigon. Peggy Durdin, 
writing in 1954, described domestic workers in a larger article about the relationship 
between the West and Asia. The dynamic o f worker/employer, according to Durdin, 
took on a new tone because o f the French War. Durdin said of the war and household 
servants:
The one element o f comfortable living in which the Far East surpasses the 
United States and equals Europe is availability o f household servants. Even 
here things ain't what they used to be. The pre-war white ‘sahib’ sat under a 
punkah pulled by tireless little Asians while another group o f silent, faithful 
domestics brought him a succession o f pink gins, curries and condiments. 
Today one is likely to be served by a sullen Vietnamese couple who, your 
French acquaintances tell you, may well be ruthless undercover Vietminh 
agents.48
Durdin leads us to believe that the presence of war in Vietnam brought new worries 
to the French home. French employers previously could simply enjoy the luxury o f 
being waited on. But during the war, the French in Vietnam were paranoid that
48 Peggy Durdin, “The Potent Lure o f Asia,” New York Times, November 7, 1954.
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domestic workers might be subverting their homes, and should be treated with 
suspicion.
Starting sometime after the United States presence started to grow, the United 
States Operations Mission to Vietnam supplemented the Post Report with “A Booklet 
o f Helpful Information for Americans in Vietnam.” Authored by the American 
W omen’s Association of Saigon, the booklet gave much o f the same information that 
a Saigon Post Report would, with the addition o f information like where to shop for 
various items in Saigon. The 1958 edition o f the “Booklet” included a section about 
servants that would apparently remain unchanged until at least 1962.49 The 
“Booklet” warned newcomers o f the disappointment that can often come with moving 
to Saigon and hiring a household staff. What initially seemed like a “delightful 
prospect” quickly gave way to “disillusionment.. .because o f the language barrier, 
difference in standards, and often American inexperience at handing large staffs o f 
specialized servants.”-50 Without saying much about the culture of having a 
household staff, the “Booklet” implied that Americans were not used to the idea of 
having servants. It addressed the possible fantasies o f Americans new to Saigon who 
saw the hiring o f servants as novel. The colonial, or at least class-based fantasy o f 
having servants, however, was also cultural. Americans often did not have the 
experience to run a household staff. By specifically equating a nationality with
49 This is the other year I was able to find in an archive.
50 The United States Operations Mission To Vietnam: A Booklet O f Helpful 
Information For Americans In Vietnam, May 1959, Folder 24, Box 17, Douglas Pike 
Collection: Unit 06 - Democratic Republic o f Vietnam, The Vietnam Center and 
Archive, Texas Tech University, 15-16.
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domestic managerial inexperience, the article implied that previous residents o f 
Saigon (such as the French or British) knew how to deal with the caste system shored 
up by colonialism. Thus, Americans had to learn to deal with colonialism within their 
own homes.
The “Booklet’s” suggestions for Americans looking to hire household staffs 
helped newcomers negotiate the legacy o f French colonialism in Saigon and use it to 
their advantage. The “Booklet” suggested that newly arrived Americans staff their 
households by finding servants through friends already in Saigon or reading the 
Embassy bulletin— departing Americans could place ads on behalf o f their staff. 51 
The continuity of domestic staff between transient American employers could also 
extend beyond the group o f Americans in Saigon. The “Booklet” said o f Chinese 
servants: “There are many Chinese servants who speak some English, and have 
worked for Americans, French or British for several years. Their caste system is rigid 
and they do not readily adapt to new household procedures.”' 2 Thanks to knowing 
what Americans might need to live a comfortable life, in addition to being familiar 
with English, servants who had perhaps worked under an older colonial regime were 
in higher demand. The “Booklet” still highlighted the division between Chinese and 
Vietnamese servants. It stated that Vietnamese domestic workers that they were 
“often less finished servants,” but were “ loyal and honest. Once they understand 
what is desired, they usually try to please.”-53 Even though the “Booklet,” like earlier
51
52
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Post Reports, recommended both Chinese and Vietnamese domestic workers, it 
warned against hiring both as there were “likely to be clashes between the two
„ „54groups.
By the time Else Baker arrived in Saigon, the American Post Report had 
updated its section on servants. These changes reflected small changes in the 
dynamic between American employers and domestic workers. The structure o f the 
American household seemed to be relatively unchanged. Like earlier reports, 1963 
Post Report explained that a “married couple or two single persons usually require 
two servants~a cook and a houseboy (boy) or maid (boyesse).”55 A family with 
small children might also add an “amah” to look after the children.56
However, the 1963 Post Report also mentioned cultural issues present in
57Saigon. For example, in giving advice on how to pay their domestic employees, the 
Post Report introduced a slice of Vietnamese culture. Specifically, it advised 
employers to give bonuses to their workers “at Tet, the Lunar New Year, which is the
54 Ibid.
55 Post Report - Saigon, 03 June 1963, Folder 02, Box 01, Tom Matthews Collection, 
The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University. Part IV-Page 4.
56 Ibid.
57 “Single servant to household” 1,700-2,500 piasters per month 
“Cook” 2,000-3,000 piasters per month
“Maid” 1,400-2,200 piasters per month
“Houseboy No. 1” 1600-2500 piasters per month
“Laundress” 1200-2000 piasters per month
“Amah” 1600-2500 piasters per month
“Gardener “ (daily) lOO-(monthly) 1000 piasters per month
“Chauffeur” 2,500 piasters per month
Post Report - Saigon, 03 June 1963, Folder 02, Box 01, Tom Matthews Collection, 
The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University. Part IV-Page 5.
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most important holiday in Viet-Nam.”58 Along with their bonus, employers were to 
give several days off to their workers to celebrate the holiday.59 The Post Report no 
longer gave recommendations based on the ethnicity of the workers, but rather 
pointed Americans to the Embassy Bulletin, which published a section o f available 
domestic workers. 60 It also suggested that new residents should ask for advice from 
other Americans in Saigon.61
Another cultural update the 1963 Post Report revealed came in the form of 
communication. According to the Report, French was still the language o f  choice for 
Americans wishing to communicate with Vietnamese people— Vietnamese people 
were beginning to learn English more, but the “ language was still not widespread.”62 
Not only was French “ indispensable for many o f the officers in the performance o f 
their official duties,”63 but “since most servants speak some French, a limited 
knowledge is highly desirable in managing a household.”64
The Post Report also gave Americans coming to Saigon a preview o f what to 
expect in terms of living arrangements. Employers were to house their domestic 
workers (often with the exception o f gardeners and chauffeurs) on site, usually in a
58 Post Report - Saigon, 03 June 1963, Folder 02, Box 01, Tom Matthews Collection, 
The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Part IV-Page 4-5.
59
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unit separate from the main house.65 It also told Americans that “servants buy their 
own food (most of them do not like western food).”66-
Mrs. Baker’s “Post of the Month Article” also addressed the employment o f 
domestic workers. Her account confirmed information from previous Post Reports 
while adding new information. According to Mrs. Baker, good cooks were in 
demand and more expensive than other workers; for their (often French-trained) 
talents, Americans could expect to pay $40 per month. In return, the cook had 
“complete charge of the kitchen—planning o f meals, purchase and preparation o f food. 
She'll keep a household account book which you must check periodically.”68 Rather 
than adopting the line o f the 1947 Post Report, Else Baker dismissed the “squeeze” 
by writing: “there are those who feel all cooks cheat a little. They may or may not. 
Even if they do, you'll find they can still buy more cheaply than you can.” 69
Mrs. Baker also offered advice on acquiring domestic staff. Specifically, she 
told Americans new to Saigon that were fortunate if  they were moving to a house that 
Americans had previously lived in, as the new residents could take on the existing 
staff. These continuing workers would “be accustomed to working for Americans 
and familiar with sanitary procedures necessary to keep you on your feet. They will
65 Ibid., 4.
66 Ibid.
67 Else Baker, “Post o f the Month: Saigon,” U.S. Lady, January 1965, 15-16.
68 Ibid.
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know a smattering of English. Having pleased one American family, they will most 
likely please you.”70
The Post Report and Else Baker’s “Post o f  the M onth” article provided a great 
deal o f information to current and prospective American residents o f Saigon.
However, if taken alone, each article in itself did not present a full picture o f  the 
relationships that some American women had with the Vietnamese people who 
worked in their home. Else Baker’s “Post o f the Month” article only hints at the lives 
of her domestic staff. For instance, she mentioned that her cook had “an amah to care 
for her six younger children. This is not uncommon,”71 but did not personalize her 
description too much. Luckily, in Else Baker’s zeal for writing, she documented a 
more complicated aspect o f  American life in Saigon, and how American homes could 
provide a place for some degree o f cultural exchange, even if only on a personal level. 
To help run the house, the Bakers hired two maids and a cook. Ly was the
72~number one maid, a position whose duties were often cleaning and laundry, “ Dieu, 
the number two maid, and Dieu’s mother, Lan, was the Baker’s cook.73 During her 
stay in Saigon, Else Baker developed close relationships with the three women who 
worked in her home. Through these relationships, Mrs. Baker not only was able to 
experience more o f what Saigon had to offer, but she was also able to describe Saigon 
more fully for her readers. In this way, the relationships formed within the American
70 Ibid., 15.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. 16.
73 Else Baker, “Death o f a Vietnamese Marine,” U.S. Lady, July-August 1964, 6.
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domestic space in Saigon create an understanding o f the city and the Vietnamese 
people.
One of the ways in which Else Baker, Ly, Dieu and Lan developed their 
relationship was through trips around the city (often in the Baker’s Volkswagen74).
For example, shortly after the Baker’s arrived in Saigon, Mrs. Baker attended Dieu’s 
wedding. 75 Writing her mother about the wedding, Mrs. Baker described the trip:
I had told Lan to plan not to come to work at all on Tuesday - to stay home 
and get her daughter married off. Ly was going to escort me to the ceremony 
so I would not have to worry about finding my w ay .. ..This is probably a rare 
opportunity we had to get to see the real ‘native’ section of town. They don’t 
live too far from us here. We parked the car on one o f the main streets then 
started on foot through a narrow alley which became more and more narrow 
as we went along— muddy, smelly and dirty of course - past hundreds o f little 
huts side by each on each side o f the winding alleyway.76 
In this case, the personal relationships forged inside the home resulted in network a 
expanding through the city. Attending D ieu’s wedding led Mrs. Baker outside the 
French/American downtown area and into the Vietnamese section o f the city. While 
the description was not overly detailed, it did record the process of exploring a city in 
a way that may have been unavailable to many American men. Often, American men
74 Correspondence from Lee Baker to Else, 11 June 1963, Folder 23, Box 01, Lee 
Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
75 Else Baker, “Death o f a Vietnamese Marine,” 6.
76 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 18 August 1963, Folder 02, Box 01, Lee 
Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
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had to work in an office, confined to the “American section” of town. In the case o f 
Mrs. Baker, she did not have to report to an office to fulfill her duty, as she saw it, to 
support Lee. As a result, she could do things like attend D ieu’s wedding and go 
around the city developing an understanding of the city not obtainable by those 
working behind a desk.
On another occasion, Mrs. Baker went to Cholon with Dieu, Ly, and Lan.
This time when she wrote her mother, she provided a little more of her own opinion 
about Saigon. Baker wrote how the market closer to downtown Saigon had many 
American patrons, and as a result, prices were higher. Going to Cholon, she found 
she could bargain with the shopkeepers. Baker also found out Dieu, Ly, and Lan had 
never been to Cholon:
The only thing I can think is the fact that the Vietnamese generally don’t like 
the Chinese much— plus the fact that anything different seems strange to them 
at first. But they decided they would like to go.77 
This passage revealed several things about Americans in Saigon. First, many 
Americans stayed in the downtown area and shopped at the Central M arket near 
where the Baker’s lived. Second, the city apparently was relatively segregated. The 
Chinese residents o f the city lived in Cholon, the Americans lived downtown, and the 
Vietnamese lived in a different section. This trip, one o f many that Dieu and Mrs. 
Baker took, not only moved them around town, but also provided an opportunity for 
Ly and Lan to see a new part o f the town.
77 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 06 January 1964, Folder 07, Box 01,
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
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Other elements about the layout of Saigon emerged in Mrs. Baker’s 
description o f Ly, Dieu and Lan. The Bakers kept a busy entertaining scheduling, 
hosting frequent parties at their house. Dieu often had Saturday nights off, but would 
come back to help Ly with such social occasions.'78 Even though Dieu, Ly and Lan 
had to work many of the parties that the Baker’s hosted, there was at least one that 
they were guests at. On Christmas day 1963, the Baker’s invited just Ly, Dieu and 
Lan, and their families over.79 This party, which Mrs. Baker wanted to throw to do 
something nice for her employee’s children, complicates the role o f  the Baker’s 
residence and hospitality. Not only did the Bakers throw parties for Americans, 
hoping to provide a sense of “home” for Americans in Saigon without their families, 
but the Mrs. Baker wanted to extend her hospitality to the families o f the women she 
employed. While they could have had a party during another part o f the year, they 
chose Christmas— a Christian/American holiday— to share with their Buddhist 
employees. This party was an attempt at cultural exchange focused in a domestic 
space and channeled through the rhetoric o f family and hospitality.
Mrs. Baker’s feelings towards the women who worked at her house came out 
in the first article she wrote for publication. In 1963, D ieu’s new husband, a
81Vietnamese marine, was killed in a military action near Saigon at Trung Lap. Else 
Baker wrote about the events that surrounded his death from her perspective; the
78 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 08 September 1963, Folder 03, Box 01, 
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
79 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 23 December 1963, Folder 06, Box 01, 
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
80 Ibid.
81 Else Baker, “Death of a Vietnamese Marine,” 6.
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story got picked up by the Associated Press in late-December 1963, and would be 
published by U.S. Lady and the Saigon Post, a local English-language newspaper.82
In a letter to her mother, Mrs. Baker reflected on the story. She described her 
motives for writing the story:
I wasn’t really trying to get a message about the hell o f war across because the 
blood and gore and devastation is just as great whether it is created by war, 
auto accident, plane crash or any other manmade or natural disaster. What I 
was trying to get across is the fact that war is not a statistical game— it’s a 
very human game and behind each statistic or fatality there’s another tale to 
tell just like his one.83 
Else Baker’s article about D ieu’s family coping with the loss of Long contained not 
only the travelogue elements, like the description o f Buddhist funeral practices, but 
also revealed, in part, the relationships that Else Baker had with Dieu, Ly and Lan. In 
trying to show the “human” side o f the American War in Vietnam, Mrs. Baker also 
demonstrated how the relationships between Americans in Saigon and the people who 
worked in their homes may have not been well-represented by the descriptions 
provided by Post Reports or other periodicals.
Mrs. Baker began the version of her article that appeared in U.S. Lady by 
briefly recalling Dieu and Long’s wedding, and the times when Long was stationed in 
Saigon. The description of Long’s tenure in Saigon reveals a little more about the
Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 29 December 1963, Folder 06, Box 01, 
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
83 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 17 November 1963, Folder 05, Box 01, 
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
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lives o f the women working in the Baker home. At one point, while Vietnamese 
Marines were stationed in the city, Dieu and Ly would take their bicycles to go see 
Long.84 And the Baker household seemed to very much include the friends and 
family o f the women who worked there as well. Another time, when the Marines 
were in Saigon for a parade, their house, noted Mrs. Baker, “was the noisiest, busiest
85and happiest place in Saigon as the central meeting point for off-duty M arines.” 
Shortly after Long died and Dieu and her family went to identify his body,
one of D ieu’s brothers came by the house. Mrs. Baker didn’t know what to do with
86him—he didn’t speak English— so she watered the plants with him. The events 
around Long’s death revealed a complicated relationship between the Mrs. Baker and 
the women who worked in her home. Their relationship was more than a simple 
employee-employer relationship: the Baker’s house was the gathering point during a 
time of crisis for Dieu’s family and Dieu invited Mrs. Baker to be with her and her
87family as they prepared Long’s body for the funeral, and to attend the funeral itself.
Long’s death revealed a larger network than just the one created between Mrs. 
Baker and the women who worked in her house. Mrs. Baker expanded the network to 
another woman who worked in Mr. Baker’s office. After Dieu’s brother visited the 
house, Mrs. Baker called Bichlien, Lee Baker’s secretary, for advice about the proper 
etiquette for Buddhist funerals. Besides obtaining advice about when the funeral 
should be held, sending flowers, and providing Dieu with some money to help pay for
84 Else Baker, “Death of a Vietnamese Marine,” 6.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 7.
87 Ibid. 7, 43.
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the funeral, 88 Mrs. Baker’s call to Bichlien demonstrated how women living in 
Saigon created networks that intertwined with the American men in Saigon— albeit 
they still existed separately.
The Politics of Parties and Entertaining in the Am erican Home in Saigon
The network Mr. And Mrs. Baker created in Saigon came partly from Lee’s 
acquaintances, but Mrs. Baker also expanded and developed that network by inviting 
people to their home and attending events across Saigon. The Bakers hosted 
gatherings, big and small. Some nights, they would just have one person over; on
89others, they may have had as many as sixty people, which necessitated hiring help, 
like a few bartenders from local hotels and police officers for security.90
Because o f Mr. Baker’s liaison role between the military and the press corps 
in Saigon, the Baker’s parties often mixed these groups. To keep her parties full o f 
interesting conversation, Mrs. Baker often invited “some o f the visiting 
correspondents mixed with a few couples— some from the military and some from 
USIS. W e’ve found this to be the best formula for a party because the people 
stationed here get pretty tired of seeing the same old faces at parties and they rarely 
get a chance to meet some o f the visiting correspondents.”91
88 Ibid.7.
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While welcoming a diverse group o f people at her parties, Mrs. Baker was 
particular about the type of women she would invite. Tending to want to talk more 
about political matters than “girl talk,” Mrs. Baker wrote her friend Mary, “if  they 
want to talk girl talk 1 don’t ask them because I’d rather listen to the men talk.”92 Mrs. 
Baker’s categorization of certain topics as “girl talk” or the things men would talk 
about marks an interesting split in the domestic space. She cast her home as a place 
where people could be casual and talk about serious things— the politics o f  the day 
and the like. She didn’t approve o f frivolous conversations in her domestic space. 
However, sometimes the party did divide itself into sections and the conversation 
split along gender lines. For instance, during one dinner party that included 
“practically all the Generals about town worth mentioning here,” after everyone ate, 
the “men had their little private talk here in the den.” 93
The Baker’s parties, while sometimes seemed to be about catching up with old 
friends coming through town, mostly seeming to present/embody some sort of 
purpose. Sometimes they would invite Information Officers and the enlisted 
personnel working for Lee.94 Other times, they had about “half newspaper people, 
half Information officers.”95 The Bakers also hosted parties to strategically introduce
92 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mary, 21 July 1964, Folder 13, Box 01, Lee 
Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
93 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 05 October 1963, Folder 04, Box 01,
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94 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 09 October 1963, Folder 04, Box 01,
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
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different groups of people. For example, when a friend o f theirs— a press information 
officer for an Admiral— visited Saigon, they held a party to catch up, but also to have 
him meet the press and other information officers.96 The Baker’s parties seemed to 
make Lee’s job in Saigon easier as well. Mrs. Baker recalled in a letter to her mother 
how they had invited the “Pacific head of the United Press— based in Tokyo” to a 
small dinner party. Because two UP reporters gave “Lee more trouble than almost 
anyone,” the couple wanted to “especially have him around to prove that we don’t 
really have two heads.” By the end o f evening, he seemed “sympathetic with Lee’s 
problems [and] several times made the statement that he wouldn’t have L ee’s job  for 
anything in the world. So perhaps he could pass on a little calming influence on his 
boys.”97 On another occasion, the Bakers wanted to host a party with both the press 
corps and Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Public Affairs. The 
Bakers felt that the Press would eventually “comer him anyhow and felt it best they 
do so in [their] house.”98
Mrs. Baker prided herself on being able to provide an atmosphere in which a 
wide variety o f people could relax but still do their job. Talking of one particularly 
successful party on New Years Day, she recalled to her mother that “the generals
96 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mary and All, 30 October 1963, Folder 04, 
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came— even General Harkins. But as usual, we’re convinced they come to our house 
because we don’t treat them like V IP’s— they can relax and enjoy themselves.”99 
In addition to providing better access to military officials for the press, and 
vice versa, the Bakers’ schedule allowed them better access with these groups. Mrs. 
Baker wrote her mother about one evening when Sylvester came by their house. Lee 
was able to talk to him about a few work-related issues that they had not been able to 
discuss previously,100 but Mrs. Baker also had a chance to talk to him. She told him 
what she thought o f the events in Vietnam “based upon talking to Blanche and 
Bichlien,” because she felt that he should be familiar with a Vietnamese 
perspective.101
By the end of 1964, the Bakers’ social calendar had become quite full, but 
their ability to mediate between the press and various military officials became 
limited. Mrs. Baker wrote, “at one time we made a very conscious effort to have all 
o f the correspondents who come to town to dinner during their stay. There are so 
many o f them coming nowadays that it is no longer possible for us to keep up with 
them.” '102
In addition to having people over to their house, the Baker’s often went 
around Saigon to take part in different social functions. Visiting a number of
99 Correspondence from Else Baker to Mom, 06 January 1964, Folder 07, Box 01,
Lee Baker Collection, The Vietnam Archive. Texas Tech University.
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different places, they often met up with colleagues at hotels around Saigon. Often on 
Sunday nights, they went out as a couple to a dining room at the Brink Hotel. 
Sometimes they met colleagues at the Rex Hotel, 103 the Brink’s hotel’s rooftop 
terrace/ 104 or at the Caravelle Hotel.105 In addition to informal meetings around 
town, the Bakers also attended more formal events. One New Year’s Eve they 
attended a “charity ball given at the British Embassy [to] benefit the war orphans.” 106 
Mrs. Baker commented after one busy week about the impressive company they kept: 
Socially w e’ve really come up in the world this past week. I want you to 
know that this week w e’ve had dinner with one o f the Vice Prime Ministers as 
well as the Prime Minister himself. 1 don’t know exactly why we were 
included either time, but perhaps Lee’s name is getting known around tow n.107 
Understaning the Novem ber 1963 Coup and Saigon’s Public Spaces Through  
American Dom estic Spaces
While documenting her combination of social/professional life mostly through 
private letters, Else Baker chose more public channels to share her experiences in 
Saigon’s public spaces. In the fall of 1963, Mrs. Baker transformed her relationship
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to writing by moving from letter-writer to journalist. The Denver Post aided in this 
transition when it published a letter Mrs. Baker wrote to a friend in Denver about the 
November 1963 coup in Saigon.108 Her articles appeared in Denver Post and Dayton 
Daily News— local papers where the Bakers had previously lived. She also sold 
articles that got distributed nationally, be that through the monthly periodical, U.S. 
Lady, or by selling stories to large agencies like the Associated Press. Her coup story 
also appeared in a local English-language newspaper circulated in Saigon— the 
Saigon P o st109
Mrs. Baker preserved her perspective on the coup that overthrew President 
Diem in 1963 (see Chapter Four for more information about the coup and the 
Buddhist Crisis) in at least two forms. First, her published account survived in the 
Denver Post article. Second, she donated a document containing her initial thoughts 
about the coup, perhaps a draft o f the letter she sent to her friend in Denver, 
apparently written the day the coup ended— this document contained sections 
identical to the Denver Post article, but it also contained a few more details. Together, 
Mrs. Baker’s writing about the coup recorded the events o f the coup, but grounded 
them in her house, her friends and family, and the streets o f  Saigon.
Mrs. Baker’s experience with the coup mostly had to do with the location o f 
the Baker’s home. Living at the comer o f  Cong Ly and Hong Thap Tu streets put
108 The reason Denver keeps appearing with the Bakers is that they lived in the city 
for a few years while Lee was “chief o f staff o f the Air Force Finance Center in 
Denver”, Else Baker, “Ex-Denverite Tells o f  Saigon Coup,” Denver Post, November 
13, 1963.
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them across the street from the Presidential Palace, which was damaged in a coup in
1962.'10 It also located them four blocks away from “the Gia Long Palace, temporary 
residence of President Diem and his family.” 111 Because their house was near the 
places where any physical power grab would necessarily happen, the Bakers would 
have had an interesting perspective on any such events. In fact, the two previous 
American residents o f their house witnessed coups from there, and the Bakers “knew 
when we accepted the house we'd have a ‘front row seat’ in the event o f a third try, 
and we did.” 112
Mrs. Baker retold the events o f the coup around the story o f Cue— Ly’s 
brother in the Vietnamese Marines. On the day before the coup began, he came by 
the Baker residence with a high fever. After sending him to bed and taking care o f 
him over night, the family decided to take him to a doctor. Lee made a phone call to 
get permission to take him to the Marine dispensary. That afternoon, Ly, Hue, Cue, 
and Mrs. Baker got in the Baker’s Volkswagen and went to the doctor as the coup—  
unbeknownst to them at the time— was going on.
After leaving the house, they noticed that there were barricades set up on the 
comer o f their street. But this didn’t worry Mrs. Baker, as it was a common 
occurrence when President Diem was traveling through. Mrs. Baker kept driving 
until she “saw a bus stopped in the middle o f the road ahead, with people milling 
about it. Ly, Hue and Cue spotted trouble simultaneously and they cried out, ‘Mam,
110 Else Baker, “Ex-Denverite Tells o f Saigon Coup,” Denver Post, November 13,
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that's no good—go home—go home.’” 113 At this point, Mrs. Baker recalled in her draft, 
“I dropped quickly into second gear and swung it around immediately.” 114 As she 
turned the car around, gunfire started and Mrs. Baker took the car to a nearby 
highway. Once there, they got stuck in traffic as “truck after truck of soldiers passed, 
pouring into Saigon.” 115 Thinking quickly, and knowing they still needed to care for 
Cue, the group decided to go to H ue’s house. After dropping Cue off, Hue and Ly 
and Mrs. Bakers went back to Cong Ly Street.
Upon arriving back at the Baker residence, they discovered that Dieu and Lan 
had locked up the house, “collected their most prize possessions and tied them in a 
bundle,” 116 and were waiting for the group to get back so that they could evacuate to 
the Tan Son Nhut airport as they had done when the Palace had been bombed 
previously (before the Bakers lived in Saigon) '.117' Lee called to inform everyone 
that the “his office had just passed to Armed Forces Radio Station a directive from 
the American ambassador that all Americans were to remain in their offices or
I 15?quarters until further notice. A coup d'etat was under way.” Because they had 
experience with coup attempts, the Vietnamese members o f the household wanted to
113 Ibid.
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1963.
196
leave. After some discussion, Lan left to be with her small children, and Hue left to 
take care o f Cue— Ly and Dieu stayed with Mrs. Baker.
As Ly, Dieu, and Mrs. Baker stayed inside the house, the shelling o f the 
Palace started. The sounds of gunfire “got louder and we realized that forces were 
moving up our street, raking the Palace grounds with machine gun fire.” 119 They 
heard “heavy equipment passing our house. The windows rattled and the house 
shook. We could hear sporadic machine gun bursts, rifle shots, airplanes overhead 
and then the dull thudding ‘phoom’ o f artillery and mortar fire.” 120 Being so close to 
the Palace the women expected to be caught in the return fire as “attacking units had 
set up posts close to our house.”' 121
Eventually, Lee returned to the house, and after everyone had gone to bed, 
Mrs. Baker and Lee noticed that the tone o f the gunfire changing around 3am. The 
couple “got up and stood in the shadows away from the window, watching the battle 
taking place in the moonlight.”122 Outside, they saw as many as five tanks outside 
their house gate, with others firing from the nearby Rue de Pasteur. That morning, at 
6:40am, the sound o f weapons stopped and “Gen. Duong Van Minh, chairman o f the 
Revolutionary Committee, came on the Vietnamese radio station to announce that 
President Diem had surrendered.” 123 After the coup, Mrs. Baker as “Air Force planes
119
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did victory rolls over the crowds [in the streets], dropping leaflets on their passes.” 
However, Americans were still advised to stay inside.1-4
Mrs. Baker’s experience with the 1963 coup demonstrates the permeable 
boundary between public and private spaces, as well as the role the pubic spaces 
played in the everyday life of Americans. After spending fifteen months in Saigon, 
Mrs. Baker still claimed that she did not see much “turmoil” in Saigon, though what 
there was “of it ha[d] taken place within a few blocks” o f the Baker’s house. 125 Mrs. 
Baker further described Saigon as part o f “two Vietnams— Saigon and the rest o f the 
country.” 126 She added that “aside from an occasional bad moment such as during 
the bombings against Americans— you’d never know from observing life in Saigon 
that this country is at war.” 127 Indeed, Mrs. Baker’s recollections revolved around 
everyday routines like parties, dinners, and miscellaneous errands. Through these 
everyday things, she told stories about the American relationship to Saigon. Her 
story about the 1963 coup revolved immediately around helping Cue, but ultimately 
that task became elevated from an “everyday” occurrence to “newsworthy” as she 
tried to get home.
One o f Mrs. Baker’s articles about Saigon, “O ff Beat Diary: Saigon Street 
Comer” appeared in The Aurora Beacon-News in late-September 1964. Like many o f
124 Else Baker, “Woman's Eye View of the Coup,” 1.
125 Else Baker, “To Answer A Question” (manuscript), no date, No Date, Folder 26, 
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her other articles, it described events taking place on the street in downtown Saigon.
In “O ff Beat Diary,” Mrs. Baker told o f how she watched a procession o f Buddhists 
going to the “cemetery to bury two young men who lost their lives in recent 
disturbances in this city.” 128 The marchers included monks, “pedicabs banked with 
flowers,” as well as “military representatives, boy scouts, student groups, women o f 
all ages, some men and boys—in a a steady, solemn, silent and orderly procession.” 129 
While watching the procession, a white man crossed the street and started talking to 
Mrs. Baker. Mrs. Baker described what followed:
A middle-aged Caucasian man crossed the street and stood near me, watching 
the procession. We were the only non-Orientals in sight and it seemed natural 
we should be drawn together....‘You're an American aren't you?’ he said. His 
accent was French and he told me he was a long-time resident o f Indochina.
He said he’d been watching trying to get the ‘feeling’ of the people. 130 
As they watched the procession, they noticed that some o f the marchers were carrying 
banners. The French man told Mrs. Baker that he was waiting to see if  any o f them 
displayed anti-French banners. When one finally approached, Mrs. Baker asked if he 
had seen any anti-American banners. He responded “no, not now. Perhaps your time 
will come later.” 131 Mrs. Baker and the French man “stood together on a street
128 Else Baker, “O ff Beat Diary: Saigon Street Comer,” The Aurora Beacon-News,
September 28, 1964.
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comer in Saigon—two westerners whose governments [had] opposing views on the 
solution to the political problems o f this weary country—sharing a common bond.” 132 
Mrs. Baker’s recollection o f the peaceful Buddhist procession placed herself 
and the French man in the same physical space, sharing little other than their W estern 
background. From this shared space, the Mrs. Baker and this French person 
compared how the Vietnamese people reacted to the policies of the French and 
United States. While France was disliked openly, Mrs. Baker and the French 
onlooker did not see any animosity toward the United States displayed in the crowd. 
The French m an’s prediction that the United States’ “time will come later” suggests a 
commonality between the French and Americans over foreign policy towards 
Vietnam. Even though the two countries had different agendas in Vietnam. In 1964, 
the United States was increasing its commitment to South Vietnam while France 
publically endorsed the withdrawal o f all foreign forces from Vietnam.
One o f the most notable continuities in much of Else Baker’s writing (public 
or private) was her description o f how the political events o f the day took place in 
public spaces. One of Else Baker’s articles that appeared in the Stars and Stripes and 
the Saigon Daily Mews, 133 “Meet Mr. Salute, He's a Life Saver in Saigon,” !34“ also 
highlighted the public nature o f politics in Saigon. In this article, Mrs. Baker wrote 
about one of the policemen stationed on her street— he saluted the Baker’s when he
132 Ibid.
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saw them, hence the nickname “Mr. Salute.” 135 Mrs. Baker first met him when he
helped her open the gate to her driveway during a downpour, and he was also was on
duty the day of the November 1963 coup. 136 In this article, Mrs. Baker wrote o f an
occasion when he was on duty as “angry demonstrators marched past our house on
their way to Gia Long Palace.” 137 Mrs. Baker described how Vietnamese policemen
blocked off the street as protesters swarmed the area. She went to the roof o f their
house to watch, only going inside once the crowd started throwing rocks. As the
crowd broke through the barricades on their street, the policemen lined up outside the
Baker’s residence to make sure that no harm came to it or its residents. As a response
1 ^8to that level o f protection, Mrs. Baker proclaimed, “Mr. Salute, I salute you.”
Mrs. Baker’s description o f this demonstration shows how contentious the 
public spaces o f Saigon could be, and yet at the same time, how personal 
relationships had the ability to influence the outcome of public events. In the case o f 
“Mr. Salute,” the police had a duty to protect the Palace grounds— the reason they 
were on the street in the first place. However, having frequently interacted with the 
Bakers on the street, albeit nearly anonymously, this single police officer and his 
colleagues yielded the street to the protestors, but did not allow any harm to come to 
the Americans on the street.
In an unpublished manuscript, Mrs. Baker wrote o f another incident in which 
she got stuck in a crowd o f Catholic demonstrators— clubs and machetes in hand.
These demonstrators had come into the city from a “Catholic relocation settlement 
on the outskirts o f town,” because they had heard that Buddhists were attacking 
Catholics. 139 In this instance, Mrs. Baker had dropped a friend off at her house and 
got a call from Lee while still there. “He told me that four people had been killed in a 
demonstration...[and] the American Ambassador [was] warning all Americans to get 
off the streets and to stay indoors.” 140" Lee said that it would most likely be safe for 
her to go home if  she avoided crowds. As Mrs. Baker made her way home, her car 
got stuck in a crowd o f demonstrators, and though she contemplated abandoning her 
car, she was able to move through.-141
In each o f the stories, Mrs. Baker’s description of the events reveals the ways 
in which Americans in Saigon imagined themselves in the city, and hints at the ways 
other people in the city regarded them. On one level, staying off the streets and 
avoiding protestors was obvious advice for the Embassy to give Americans in Saigon 
when it seemed like a situation could be dangerous. However, the end result o f this 
policy was the removal o f Americans from a public space where the politics o f 
Vietnam were being worked out. In the case o f Mrs. Baker getting stuck in her car 
among a crowd o f protestors and the policemen lining up outside their gate to prevent 
harm to them or their property, people in Saigon seemed disinterested in including 
Americans in the political process. Perhaps the police protected the B aker’s house 
not because the crowd would harm them, but rather because their blocking of the
139 Else Baker, “To Answer A Question” (manuscript), no date, 3.
140 Ibid., 2.
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American private space suggested that whatever the demonstrators wanted, it need 
not include Americans.
Both of these stories cast the streets o f Saigon as unpredictable spaces. One 
moment they could be mundane, while the next they could be threatening. Mrs.
Baker wrote o f the private American domestic space in terms of safety. She could 
retreat there and find adequate refuge from the chaos outdoors. However, her 
descriptions of the private American areas o f Saigon were often penetrated by 
violence from the outside. On Christmas Eve 1964, the Viet Minh bombed the Brink 
Hotel— the bachelor’s officer quarters where American service members stayed if 
they did not have families with them. O f course this bombing destroyed an American 
private space— rendering it absolutely unsafe. Perhaps more interesting than the 
event was Mrs. Baker’s brief initial description o f the bombing. Because the Brink 
was only a few blocks away from the Baker’s house, she heard the explosion as she 
was outside watering her poinsettias in last minute preparation for a Christmas Eve 
gathering.-142 “The blast shook the ground around us. My girls looked at me and 
L y .. .said ‘What's that, Mam! ’ It wasn't really a question. We all knew what it was.
A black cloud o f smoke could be seen over the garden wall.”"143 What was a 
domestic scene, full o f smells like cooking turkey for the coming party, broke down 
as violence entered the domestic space aurally, tactilely and visually.
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The intrusion of the war into American private spaces in Saigon seemed to 
increase as American involvement in Vietnam grew. For example, in a letter to her 
friend Mary, Mrs. Baker wrote how the sound o f  je t noise increased following the 
incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin:
I can’t help but to reflect on the changing ‘sounds’ o f Saigon as I hear the jets 
warm up and take off at the airport, or fly over the city. It’s a sound that we 
rarely hear here until the last couple of months but are hearing increasingly 
now. It’s a sound that never ceases to send a shiver o f excitement up my 
spine and yet, today is a sound that I listen to with a mental question mark 
after having just heard about the second attack against the 7th Fleet.144 
After the incident in the Gulf o f Tonkin, Saigon, according to Mrs. Baker, didn’t 
change how Americans acted. She did not see anyone panic, but all Americans were 
advised “to redouble precautions.”-145
In February 1965, Lyndon Johnson ordered American dependents to leave 
Saigon. However, the American press had been reporting that this would happen for 
months. Else Baker wrote her mother that she talked to Arthur Sylvester about it 
once when he visited Saigon in May 1964 and he had told her:
‘Else, I give you the same answer that 1 gave you last time I was here.’ Which 
was in effect that the policy is to let anyone go home who wants to, but
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essentially the U.S. government feels that having dependents here is a good 
thing146
Even though Sylvester reiterated that having dependents in Saigon was a good thing, 
eventually they had to leave— something Mrs. Baker was not happy about; “ I’m not 
happy with it— I don’t know anyone who is. I’m especially not happy with the way it 
is being handled....So far, we have not received firm instructions. I’m not sure 
exactly when I ’m going.” 147
Mrs. Baker’s experiences in Saigon, and her writing about them, documented 
the lives o f her and her network o f friends, family, and professional contacts in the 
city. Else Baker’s writing provides us a look into what types of events might lie 
underneath the opinions about American involvement in Vietnam and Saigon itself 
that appeared in American periodicals in the 1960s. The relationship between Else 
Baker’s private and public writing provided us with a theoretical framework to use 
when examining the American War in Vietnam. Writing allowed her the time and the 
forum to analyze her surroundings. She considered how her physical environment 
interacted with how she felt and with what, and whom, she knew. By examining, and 
unpacking, the writing o f Else Baker, we can see how moving through, and 
interpreting, space influenced the lives of Americans living in Saigon. Furthermore, 
we are able to see how different systems of power act upon people and how relations,
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such as gender systems, get embedded in how we interpret cultures different than
own.
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Sex, Policy, and Leisure: The American Impact on Saigon after Escalation
After the November 1963 Coup, Saigon become an increasingly American 
space as more individuals and organizations settled from across the Pacific. Through 
1965, as described in previous chapters, many American accounts o f  Saigon 
portrayed a city untouched by war. While there were terrorist attacks, press coverage 
o f violence served more as a reminder o f the sacrifice and commitment o f the United 
States to South Vietnam than an acknowledgement— by setting up operations in 
Saigon— that the United States had changed the city.
Once the United States committed more troops to the war in Vietnam in 1965, 
the United States’ footprint in Saigon grew. American money and troops funneled 
into the city worsening problems like traffic congestion and inflation. Consequently, 
representations o f the city changed as well. Representations o f Saigon transformed 
from those o f the early 1960s which portrayed Saigon as relatively safe, and even 
boring, to portraits o f a city stretched beyond its capacity by war. For the most part, 
the late 1960s Saigon represented in the press was a place o f leisure and danger, 
capable of harming everyone who entered city limits. In the mid-to-late 1960s, 
reporters and U.S. government officials used the changing conditions in Saigon to 
critique or defend the American War in Vietnam and American foreign policy. 
Specifically, authors and politicians used gendered and corporeal metaphors to cast 
the presence of the United States in Vietnam positive or negative for Vietnamese 
people. Ideologically laden representations o f Vietnamese and American women 
became a central way to discus the war.
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Despite the rhetoric about whether or not the United States had a positive or 
negative effect on Saigon, by the late 1960s, the United States had clearly changed 
the geography of Saigon. Fighting from the Tet Offensive decimated large parts o f 
the city and the efforts o f US officials to move troops out o f  the city were matched by 
new areas emerging to cater to Americans. The American presence in Saigon 
changed not only the physical aspects o f Saigon, but also created its own meanings 
around the city as reporters and government officials utilized the bodies o f Saigon 
residents (both American and Vietnamese) to discuss the American W ar in Vietnam. 
R eporting the Am erican Im pact on Saigon
In 1964 and 1965, before the American buildup in Vietnam hit full stride, the 
foreign press devoted much o f its energy on reporting the terrorist activities that 
targeted Americans. “American” physical spaces exploded with relative regularity; 
the U.S. Embassy, hotels housing Gls, bars, and recreational activities all became 
targets o f anti-American terror drives. Even though terrorists still targeted American 
spaces after 1965, the American presence in Saigon assumed a different tenor in 
1966. The foreign press started to comment on the condition of Saigon itself. Rather 
than report about the latest bombings around the city, they addressed how the city had 
changed.
In early 1966, reporters for American news outlets highlighted the growing 
problems in Saigon. A New York Times reporter pointed to one of the major 
differences in Saigon: population. According to his estimates, the city’s population 
had almost doubled from one million in 1954 to nearly two million in 1966. Because
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of the population increase, he wrote that Saigon was “slowly collapsing under the 
sheer weight o f people.”1
Although much o f the population increase owed to refugees, the American 
population in Saigon also grew. With more Americans came more American money, 
resulting in inflation o f the local currency— the piaster. Inflation and more American 
money in Saigon resulted in the pricing out many Vietnamese people from some 
activities in Saigon and ultimately led to tensions between American and Vietnamese 
residents. One reporter described the everyday impact o f GIs as “m onopolizing] 
taxis, the best night clubs and the most beautiful girls in Saigon.” Reporters also told 
o f racial tensions between Vietnamese and American residents.3
In March 1966, in a pattern similar to the protests o f  1963, Buddhist protesters 
started to march to protest against the Saigon government, then headed by Premier 
Nguyen Cao Ky. The protests, which critiqued both the Ky government and the 
United States, called for an elected civilian government and a true sovereignty.4 
Protesters also took an anti-American stance for its support o f the Ky regime. By the 
end of the month, the protests spread to downtown Saigon (outside the Central 
Market) and encompassed student gatherings and marches.5 These actions included 
speeches, police-installed barbed-wire barricades and bi-lingual banners aimed at
1 Anthony Carthew, “Vietnam Is Like An Oriental W estern,” New York Times,
January 23, 1966.
“ “The Underlying Reason for the Saigon Rioting,” Los Angeles Times', April 6, 1966.
3 Ibid.
4 Charles Mohr, “Buddhists Appear Split on Ky Regime,” New York Times, March 
28, 1966.
5 “Anti-Ky Rallies Erupt In Saigon,” New York Times, M arch 27, 1966.
Americans stating “Americans, We Want Friends Not Bosses,” and “Down With U.S. 
Obstructionism.”6
April o f 1966 saw the escalation o f the anti-Ky/anti-American protests. On 
one occasion, students marched to the radio station and demanded access to protest 
the government, and combat police dispatched them.7 In another incident, student 
protesters violating a city curfew flipped a U.S. jeep outside an American billet and 
set it on fire, while “shouting anti-junta and anti-U.S. slogans” and calling Americans 
“imperialists.”8
As in the Buddhist Crisis years earlier, some observers felt that Communist 
forces agitated the protests. The press reported that “United States intelligence 
agencies intercepted instructions to Vietcong agents” to blend with the protesters and 
incite more anti-American ideology.9 Some may debate the authenticity o f this 
information, but the war and American officials’ worries about the Viet Cong did mix 
with anti-Americanism in Saigon.
As negotiations between Buddhists stalled around the issue o f a timetable for 
National Assembly elections, more protesters marched through Saigon. One protest 
resulted in the ransacking o f a Vietnamese newspaper office and the burning o f
6 R. W. Apple, Jr., “Buddhists Assail Ky Regime And U.S. at Rally In Saigon,” New  
York Times, March 31, 1966.
7 Charles Mohr, “3,000 Troops Lead Vietnam Protest Against Regime,” N ew  York 
Times, April 3, 1966.
8 “A U.S. Jeep Is Burned by Anti-Government Demonstrators in Saigon” N ew York 
Times, April 5, 1966; R.W. Apple, Jr., “Tear Gas Subdues Youths In Saigon,” New  
York Times, April 5, 1966.
9 Seymour Topping, “Crisis In Saigon Snags U.S. Effort,” N ew York Times, April 5, 
1966.
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motorcycles. However, Buddhist leaders called for the protesters to calm down and 
they closed one of their pagodas that had served as a meeting place for the 
demonstrators.10
Demonstrations turned violent on April 8. In crowds led by Buddhist monks, 
and suspected by American intelligence to contain Vietcong agitators, twelve 
Americans “were beaten, manhandled or chased by the mob,” and another five 
servicemen were injured when someone threw a grenade at a “soft-drink stand” in a 
civilian location." Rioters also lobbed grenades at two police stations and in front of 
the Tan Son Nhut airport.12
Later in April, reporters increasingly investigated the causes o f  anti- 
Americanism in Saigon, something they had not yet really explored. Neil Sheehan 
published an article revealing Saigon to be more than just the place o f demonstrations 
and riots.13 Sheehan’s article exposed the conditions, both physical and social, in 
Saigon that might account for some o f the resentment towards Americans. Sheehan 
cited xenophobia, the strain on Saigon’s infrastructure o f the increased population, 
and the Vietnamese economy as reasons that might have caused the anti-U.S. banners 
and slogans to appear in protests.
10 “Buddhists Boycott Saigon Crisis Talks,” Washington Post, April 7, 1966.
11 Peter Arnett, “Anti-U.S. Rioting Mounts in Vietnam,” Washington Post, April 9, 
1966.
12 “Worst Viet Riot,” Los Angeles Times, April 9, 1966.
Ij Neil Sheehan, “Anti-Americanism Grows In Vietnam,” New York Times, April 
24, 1966.
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Sheehan also acknowledged that the Ky regime and the American support o f 
it was the “ immediate reason” for the anti-American protests.14 However, he added 
that while political discontent found a voice in street protests relatively easily, other 
issues that did not manifest themselves in that type o f action, found their expression 
through “widespread resentment” by the Saigonese.15 Sheehan understood the South 
Vietnamese resentment o f  the fact that U.S. buildup in Vietnam happened quickly and 
took its toll. He also reported that years o f influence by Westerners in general had 
contributed to the relationship between the Americans and Vietnamese specifically. 
One Vietnamese observer commented that “ legions of white men descend on a 
rudimentary Asian society. ..you are bound to have trouble.” 16
According to Sheehan, basic needs like electricity became scarce as 
Americans in Saigon further strained the city’s already overwhelmed infrastructure. 
Saigon residents blamed Americans for using too much o f the city’s electrical grid. 
The American build up also resulted in trash collecting in the street— not because the 
amount o f trash outstripped what the available garbage service could collect, but 
because the Vietnamese garbage collectors could leave their jobs to make more 
money working for the U.S. military or civilian construction outfits.
Sheehan highlighted the growing economic disparity between Americans and 
Vietnamese, which was exacerbated by the inequitable distribution o f resources. 
Americans seemingly had access to everything, while Vietnamese residents could
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 i u : j
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obtain very little. Because many Americans rented apartments, hotel rooms, and 
houses in Saigon, Vietnamese middle-class families could no longer find a place to 
live. Sheehan also reported that some landlords evicted Vietnamese tenants so they 
could charge more to ‘“ the dollar-laden adolescents,’ as the Vietnamese frequently 
call[ed] Americans.”17 Similarly, the Vietnamese in Saigon who wanted a taxi often 
found it hard to get one, as taxi drivers wanted American clients whom they could 
charge more.18
As the cost o f living for Vietnamese rose in Saigon, the disparity o f living 
conditions only grew and the injection o f American money into the economy caused 
an inflation. The disparity between Americans and Vietnamese residents manifested 
itself not only monetarily, but also in access to goods. Americans could purchase 
goods (like cigarettes and radios) at the Post Exchange. According to Sheehan, “such 
items, considered everyday necessities by Americans are luxury goods for 
Vietnamese.” 19 As a result, most o f  these goods were beyond the reach o f 
Vietnamese residents in the city.
The increasing lack of opportunities led to a financial strain for many 
Vietnamese residents in Saigon. Sheehan reported that leaders of the anti-American 
protest movement worried that “traditional Vietnamese society will not survive the 
American cultural and economic impact.”20 Sheehan and the Vietnamese people he
17
19
20
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
reported on, looked toward the “bar girl” as a representation of Saigon.21 Because 
inflation made it hard for many Vietnamese families to make enough money to live in 
Saigon, Sheehan reported that some Vietnamese women found it necessary to work at
9 9bars, providing company for GIs or as “mistresses.” He also related that Saigon 
newspapers often published stories such as the soldier “committing suicide, 
apparently out o f shame, because his wife has been working as a bar girl.”23 
According to Sheehan, “the sight o f thousands o f their young women going to work 
as bar girls and prostitutes or simply walking down the street on the arm o f some G.I. 
is galling to the Vietnamese.”24 Vietnamese newspapers published cartoons that 
addressed the impact o f Americans. One cartoon showed a “new social structure” 
evolving in Saigon. “At the top o f the social pyramid are the bar girls, below them 
come the prostitutes, then the pimps and bar owners and finally the taxi drivers.”25 
When reporting on Vietnamese sex workers, the foreign press did not 
monolithically victimize the Vietnamese. On the contrary, in the midst o f inflation 
and changing conditions in Saigon, some reporters cast the GIs as preyed upon by 
Vietnamese women and bar owners. In February 1966, several papers introduced 
their readers to “Saigon Tea.” Bar girls used the drink to negotiate their company
21 While this project does not include primary research on the lives o f Vietnamese sex 
workers, it is still influenced by the work o f Katherine M oon and her work on the 
relationships between American men and Korean sex workers (see Moon, Sex Among 
Allies, 1997). O f particular interest to this project is M oon’s assertion that the 
personal relationships are intertwined with foreign relations. The personal influences 
the national and vice-versa.
22 Sheehan, “Anti-Americanism Grows In Vietnam.”
23 Ibid.
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with GIs— a bar girl would sit with a GI if  he bought these non-alcoholic drinks.26 At
■y-j
the end of the night, these women split the profit o f these drinks with the bar owner." 
Consequently, Saigon Tea was never about the drink, but rather the mode o f payment 
for women working at bars. Saigon Tea only made the news because GIs started to 
object to the price, not the practice. In February 1966, a single glass cost “ 160 
piasters (about $2.70). For the same price, customers could buy two whiskies or five 
glasses o f beer.” This price had doubled since the previous month, which caused 
GIs to protest the high prices by refusing to buy Saigon Tea at the inflated cost.
The price o f drinks finally dropped in February 1966 when members o f the U.S. 
Military Police placed five bars in downtown Saigon “off limits” and removed 
American service members from those facilities.30 When the MPs noted that the ban 
would not be lifted until the bar posted prices and stopped bringing unordered drinks 
that would go on a patron’s tab.
In late April 1966, another article appeared in the Los Angeles Times claiming 
that the price for Saigon Tea had finally dropped to about half of what it was in 
February. The reporter said o f this change, “thank GI Joe for this reduction in the 
cost of living in Saigon.”31 While the tone o f these articles are light, they are 
remarkable in the way they engage with the changes undergoing in Saigon. While
26 “Price o f ‘Saigon Tea’ Angers U.S. Servicemen,” New York Times, February 15, 
1966.
27 “Gis Win War Over Saigon Tea Prices,” Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1966.
~y O
“Price o f ‘Saigon Tea’ Angers U.S. Servicemen,” New York Times, February 15, 
1966.
29 “Tea-Loving Gis Balk at Saigon Price,” Washington Post, February 15, 1966.
30 “MPs Place Saigon Bars O ff Limits,” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 1966.
31 “Gis Win War Over Saigon Tea Prices,” Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1966.
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some reporters and Vietnamese saw the American influx threatening Vietnamese 
ways o f life— especially when reporting about “Saigon Tea” and bar girls— other 
reporters saw the Vietnamese as the beneficiaries o f inflation at the expense of Gis. 
Saigon as a Reflection o f American Foreign Policy
Amid more anti-American demonstrations, notably a May Day march o f 5000 
people on the American Embassy,32 the relationship between Americans and other 
residents in Saigon came to a head in the off-duty lives o f Americans. When not at 
work, Americans— most often depicted in the press as Gis— occupied many spaces 
around Saigon. American government officials and the foreign press lent ideological 
meaning to American leisure in Saigon. Speaking to an audience in early May 1966 
at the School o f Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Senator 
J. William Fulbright delivered a speech titled “The Arrogance of Power.”33 In his 
speech, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asserted that the 
United States currently found itself in a precarious position. With its involvement in 
Vietnam, the United States risked losing sight of its capabilities—winning the 
American War in Vietnam might be beyond the reach of the United States.34 
Fulbright argued that part of the reason for “our difficulties in Southeast Asia [was] 
not a deficiency o f a power, but an excess o f the wrong kind o f power.”35 The
32 “5,000 in Saigon March on U.S. Offices,” New York Times, May 1, 1966.
33 E.W. Kenworthy, “Fulbright Issues A  W arning To U .S .,” New York Times,
May 6, 1966.
34 Ibid.
35 J. W. Fulbright, “Arrogance o f Power,” May 5, 1966, Lecture at School o f 
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland. 
William Fulbright Papers (MS F956 144) Series 72, Box 26, File 9, University of
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assertion o f American force abroad, to Fulbright, could not help Vietnamese society, 
and the task of bringing a democratic system of government to South Vietnam 
“probably [could] not be accomplished by any means available to outsiders.”36
Fulbright’s speech not only addressed the causes o f U.S. troubles abroad, but 
also alluded to the effects of American expansionism. Comparing the United States 
to other earlier empires, while acknowledging the “best o f intentions” held by 
Americans, Fulbright asserted that the United States had a similar ‘“ fatal impact’ on 
smaller nations that European explorers had on Tahitians and native Australians.”37 
He acknowledged that the United States has helped people in other parts o f the world 
and done so with the best o f motives. However, while delivering things like medical 
and industrial knowledge, Americans also “brought themselves and the 
condescending attitudes o f a people whose very success breeds disdain for other 
cultures.”38
Fulbright credited the negative impact o f Americans in other countries to 
“bringing power without understanding.”39 Without cultural sensitivity and local 
knowledge, American actions in other countries inadvertently “shattered traditional 
societies, disrupted fragile economies,” and by showing the power and ability to exert
Arkansas Libraries, http://scipio.uark.edu/u?/Fulbright,41. Accessed on May 31, 
2012,31-32.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 14-15.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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force and give advice, caused people o f other cultures to “ lose confidence in 
themselves.”40
Fulbright expressed his views on American foreign relations, in part, by 
utilizing gendered terms. When describing how the U.S. could use “ the wrong kind 
of power,” he mentioned that it could “result in a feeling o f impotence when it 
fail[ed] to achieve its desire[d] ends.”41 He then elaborated on this view, continuing 
with a gendered metaphor: “we are still acting like boy scouts dragging reluctant old 
ladies across streets they do not want to cross.”42 By using a metaphor o f an 
immature boy and presumably frail “old lady,” Fulbright at once attempted to critique 
American power— a male presence either immature or “impotent”— while casting the 
Vietnamese as women in need o f help, but set in their ways.
Fulbright condemned the American presence in Saigon, citing Sheehan’s New  
York Times article, when he claimed that “both literally and figuratively, Saigon 
ha[d]become an American brothel.”43 As he rehashed several of Sheehan’s 
observations, Fulbright seemed less worried about Vietnamese women than their 
male partners. Vietnamese husbands had to “put their wives or daughters to work” at 
bars or as “mistresses,” and Vietnamese soldiers killed themselves because o f their 
wives’ sex work.44 By referencing Sheehan’s article and calling Saigon an 
“American brothel,” Fulbright cast the United States, and its foreign policies, as a
40 Ibid., 15-16.
41 Ibid., 31.
42 Ibid., 31-32.
43 Ibid., 27.
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corrupting force. His speech argued that because of the United States, Vietnamese 
Women became sex workers out o f necessity and soldiers survived the war only to 
kill themselves.
Fulbright told the audience that the Vietnamese in Saigon did not passively 
accept the changes that Americans had brought about in the city. He specifically 
pointed to the demonstrations in Saigon that took place several weeks earlier where 
“demonstrators burned American jeeps, tried to assault American soldiers, and 
marched through the streets shouting ‘Down with the American imperialists.’”45 One 
Buddhist leader grouped the Americans with “the communists”: both threatened the 
independence o f South Vietnam.46 This rejection o f the American presence in 
Saigon, said Fulbright, left “most Americans shocked and angered.” The United 
States “sacrifice[d] American lives and money” and the Vietnamese are “shockingly 
ungrateful.”47
To better explain the angry feelings o f some Vietnamese towards Americans, 
Fulbright turned to the idea of “fatal impact.” For Fulbright, the Vietnamese 
protested because the power and wealth o f the United States “reproach[ed] their 
weakness” and “mock[ed] their poverty.” According to Fulbright, the Vietnamese 
worried “that traditional Vietnamese society [could not] survive the American 
economic and cultural impact.”49
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While critiquing the position o f the United States in Saigon, Fulbright also 
argued that the U.S. did not set out to create this problematic situation. Returning to a 
corporeal metaphor to help explain the current state of affairs, Fulbright argued that 
no matter the intent American culture was going to disrupt Vietnamese culture— “an 
effect which we can no more avoid than a man can help being bigger than a child.’00 
After Fulbright’s speech, the press and government officials seized on his 
comment about Saigon being an “American brothel.” While some members o f the 
press essentially outlined his speech, others sought out people to refute his claims.51 
For example, the New York Times interviewed Mrs. Oswald Lord, “a 6 1 year old 
woman who served in United Nations posts and . ..on Presidential committees on the 
status of women, foreign aid and the International Cooperation Year,” and who had 
returned from a State Department tour o f Asia. Lord refuted Fulbright’s claims about 
Saigon by pointing to the work American service members did while o ff duty. 
‘“ They’re not in town with the bar girls’ while o ff duty but are doing good, helping 
orphanages, rehabilitation centers and young Vietnam ese.... That’s the way they 
spend their days off.’”52
Robert McNamara, Secretary o f Defense, also disagreed with Fulbright’s 
characterization of Saigon during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting 
later that month. During that meeting, Fulbright spoke to McNamara about how 
people took offense at his use o f the word “brothel,” and how it was “not o f my
50 Ibid.
51 E.W. Kenworthy, “Fulbright Issues A W arning To U .S .,” New York Times,
May 6, 1966,2.
52 “Saigon No Brothel, Mrs. Lord Asserts,” New York Times, May 7, 1966, 1 1.
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origin,” although he did have it confirmed by members o f “our aid program.”53 He 
went on to mention the different problems in Saigon— such as lack o f garbage 
collection— and how he felt that problems like these were “inevitable when you inject 
such large numbers of foreign soldiers into [an] area” that is culturally different, and 
has people who have less money than Americans.54 To help solve these problems, he 
suggested moving Americans out o f the city, as their presence “negate[d] all the effort 
in civilian development and pacification, and ma[de] it impossible to achieve it.”55 
McNamara agreed that the US should move out o f  Saigon, and related that General 
Westmoreland agreed as well.
McNamara, however, did not agree with the characterization o f Saigon as a 
brothel. He responded to Fulbright by saying that he had not been to Saigon since 
November of the previous year, but “it was not a brothel then, and I do not believe it 
is today.”56 In his objection, McNamara, like Mrs. Lord, cited the humanitarian 
efforts of off duty service members.57 He qualified his remarks by saying that not 
“every American over there is a welfare worker,” but he believed that not every
co
American in Saigon was a “patrionizer o f a prostitute” either. The meeting 
lightened in tone as Fulbright replied, “I would suspect that the Secretary o f  Defense
53 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Assistance, 1966: 
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 89lh 
Cong., 2nd Sess., April-May 1966, (Senate Foreign Relations Committee), U.S. 
Government Printing Office: 1966, p. 697.
54 Ibid.
221
would not quite see the same side o f life in Saigon that a newspaper reporter would.” 
As the committee members laughed, McNamara said he would not “try to defend the 
newspaper reporters.” After more laughter, Senator Morse delivered the punch line—  
“how could you?”39 On the more serious side, this committee meeting reveals an 
important characteristic about Americans in Saigon. Fulbright’s joke to McNamara 
about seeing a different side of Saigon, in fact, was quite true. There were two 
competing American discourses on Saigon emerging. One articulated the Saigon o f 
“brothels” and social problems, and the other concentrated on humanistic aid and 
wholesome American values.
In the earlier years of United States involvement in Vietnam, the press and the 
State Department did not have much trouble constructing a wholesome version o f 
Americans in Saigon. While violence and protests often made the news, access to the 
wives and families of American Embassy officials and service members living in 
Saigon showed American involvement in Vietnam to be about aid and support. But 
by 1966, that version of Saigon was increasingly hard to see. Until early 1965, 
around 1800 American wives and children lived in Saigon. In February 1965, 
President Johnson ordered the evacuation o f all dependents in Vietnam after a steady 
escalation of violence, which included both failed and successful bombings o f 
American gathering places in Saigon such as family homes and movie theaters.60 In a 
statement about the evacuation, President Johnson said, “we have no choice now but
59 Ibid.
60 “ 1,800 U.S. Dependents Ordered to Come Home,” Los Angeles Times, February 8, 
1965.
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to clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued determination to back 
South Vietnam in its fight to maintain its independence.” 61 Johnson’s statement 
about the evacuation of American dependents carefully framed the evacuation o f 
dependents in a positive way. Removing dependents from Saigon could have been 
interpreted as abandoning the South Vietnamese cause— it was no longer safe enough 
for American women and children— or because the United States was not willing to 
send families there, they were not committed to the project in the long run. Instead, 
Johnson phrased it in terms of “clearing the decks,” a naval metaphor about getting 
ready for action, and framed the removal o f dependents as part of the United States’ 
effort to support South Vietnam.
A number o f reporters followed the story o f dependents leaving Saigon for 
their papers and magazines. The stories varied, but most o f  the women in these 
articles talked of their time in Saigon as a time o f  service— they were there to help the 
American and South Vietnamese cause. These articles also showed the ways in 
which the state and military establishment forwarded the same interpretation. For 
instance, when General William Westmoreland, commander o f the United States 
forces in South Vietnam, spoke to a reporter about his w ife’s departure, he said that 
“she and the children have been good soldiers over here. But now it’s time to 
leave.”62
61 John W. Henney, “U.S. Dependents to Quit Vietnam,” New York Times, February 
8, 1965.
62 “Mrs. Westmoreland Bids South Vietnam Good-by,” N ew  York Times, February 
15, 1965.
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Certainly, after dependents left Saigon, both reporters and State department 
officials wondered how the lack o f American families in Saigon would (re)cast the 
American commitment to the South Vietnamese cause. One reporter claimed that the 
State department had debated sending dependents home for over three years, but had 
not done so because they wanted to use American families to demonstrate the United 
States’ resolve to assist South Vietnam.-63 American women themselves backed up 
this interpretation o f American families in Vietnam. In published interviews and 
private letters, American women often cast their presence in Saigon in terms o f civic 
duty and supporting the American mission in Vietnam.
Reporters and government media looked to the remaining American women in 
Vietnam, mostly nurses, civilian employees o f the Embassy, and contractors, to craft 
a wholesome representation o f the United States presence in Vietnam. In 1966, the 
Army Pictorial Service released an episode o f Your Army Reports Today, part o f a 
series called The Big Picture about Saigon.64 To stress the welfare activities o f 
troops, Episode 700 of Your Army Reports Today covered the daily lives o f  hospital 
personnel— specifically female nurses. Showing them at work, the film depicted 
women caring for American service members. The episode also followed the female 
nurses while off duty, as the narrator explains, when “many o f the nurses [were]
63 John W. Henney, “U.S. Dependents to Quit Vietnam,” New York Times, February 
8, 1965.
64 Army Pictorial Service, The Big Picture, Episode 700: Your Army Reports, No. 8, 
in Big Picture 700 (Army Pictorial Service), 27:58 mins, American History in Video, 
Alexander Street Press, http://ahiv.alexanderstreet.com/view/774603, accessed 
November 21, 2012.
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engaged in providing medical care and civic action programs,” as in the case o f one 
nurse shown with appreciative Vietnamese children at an orphanage outside Saigon.
Episode 700 o f Your Army Reports created a visual representation o f 
McNamara and Mrs. Lord’s Saigon by providing viewers with a cinematic tour 
through a wholesome Saigon. The camera caught up with three female nurses in 
Saigon after work as they left the Third Field Hospital “after long and arduous on- 
duty. ..to see a little o f the town.” The camera meets them in downtown Saigon 
where the three women go window-shopping, which “is the same anywhere in the 
world.” The narrator informs us that “despite the war, Saigon displays its share of 
modes and fashions” for the women to browse. The women walk down the sidewalk 
and encounter a street vendor as “the sights and sounds of the colorful city provide a 
novel and interesting experience.” They eventually walk by Saigon’s City Hall where 
they find that “the architecture o f many o f the buildings reflects Vietnam’s long 
association with Western culture.” We are then transported to “the rooftop terrace o f 
the U.S. Army Officers Club,” where the women take pictures of the city.
While the trip to a clean, contained, and safe downtown was one way to spend 
the afternoon, Episode 700 suggests that there is another option—having fun on base. 
There, women might opt to spend their afternoons in the beauty parlor or in the 
hospital lounge. In the evening women can “catch up on the latest gossip,” talk on 
the phone, or write letters from the safety o f their beds. To wrap up the tour o f a 
nurse’s day in Saigon, Episode 700 directly addresses the idea of romance by 
showing a female nurse getting married to a male officer. “Even the U.S. Army goes 
along with romance as this army nurse is given timeout for wedding bells.”
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Episode 700’s version of Saigon— a wholesome place for Americans, and, 
arguably, by Americans— not only avoided obvious signs o f war, but was also devoid 
o f the aspects o f Saigon that Fulbright and Sheehan had outlined. In this narrative, 
off-duty Americans were not paying Vietnamese sex workers for their services, but 
rather were helping Vietnamese children, or shopping and behaving just as they were 
in some sort o f mythical version o f the United States.
The June 1966 issue o f Ebony Magazine gave a similar view o f Saigon, only 
this time from a civilian woman’s perspective. “Secretary on the Edge o f W ar” 
profiles Brenda Lee, the 26-year-old social secretary for Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. in an 
attempt to show the “small army o f dedicated U.S. civilians stationed on the fringe of 
war.”65 The photos in “Secretary on the Edge of War” tell a story o f Lee’s typical 
day, while leveraging the memory of terrorist attacks against American civilians to 
portray how the war entered Saigon. The result is a violent representation o f 
American sacrifice meant to show the strength o f the American cause through Lee’s 
commitment and enthusiasm for her job.
“Secretary on the Edge o f War” juxtaposes current images o f Brenda Lee with 
past images o f violence against Americans. The article starts by showing Brenda Lee 
walking to work behind barbed wire and follows it with separate archive images o f 
the 1965 Embassy bombing and a Vietnamese soldier with a gun across the street 
form the Embassy. This type o f grouping— violent with mundane— continues on the 
next page. For instance, in one shot Lee takes notes in Lodge’s office, while in the
65 “Secretary on the Edge o f  War,” Ebony, June 1966, 27.
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next, the photographer captures the interior of the Embassy after it had been 
bombed 66
The next image shows Lee and “fellow Foreign service staffers” arriving for 
another day at work “seemingly unaffected by grim reminders of [the] state o f the war 
in form of concrete barriers and MP guard,” as they embody the “picture o f carefree
fnbliss.” By describing the Embassy employees in this way, the author lent a sense o f
innocence to the four women and one man in the image. Despite seeing evidence o f
war, they are there to do their jobs and are not directly affected by the war in a great
way. The carefree attitude of the staffers going to work carries through the rest o f the
images in the article as the photographs place Brenda Lee in different locations
around town. She braves Saigon’s traffic on a “cyclo”— a bicycle-powered taxi—
browses on Nguyen Hue Street downtown and browses street vendor stalls while the
caption for the image describes a Vietnamese woman in an ao dai, and that Lee
“befriends” a Vietnamese child washing cars. One caption contrasts the level o f
safety in Saigon versus the U.S.: “Brenda admires Vietnamese people’s ability to be
happy despite poverty, [she] says in U.S. the same conditions would spawn 
68violence.” Another caption, paired with an image o f Brenda Lee crossing a street, 
mentions that the stares o f the Vietnamese at her obvious African-American heritage 
no longer bother her.
66 “Secretary on the Edge o f W ar,” Ebony, June 1966, 28.
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68 Ibid., 30.
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After saying that she “enjoys [the] city’s slow pace,” the pictorial essay 
demonstrates the comfort Saigon offered Americans. It show's her playing tennis at 
the Cercle Sportif—“an exclusive country club for the French during [the] Indochina 
War”— and having lunch with two other American female civilians.69 That evening, 
she goes out on a double date with two Army captains. The article informs us o f her 
dating habits as well: “she has no steady boyfriend, but dates regularly.”70 “Secretary 
on the Edge of War” also shows the comfort of Lee’s air-conditioned apartment as 
she “ is about to be served coffee by her Vietnamese ‘housegirl.’”71
“Secretary on the Edge o f War” serves as a foil to Fulbright’s brothel 
comment by highlighting private domestic American spaces, the American women in 
those spaces, and representing war through non-controversial and conventional 
images o f  war and American sacrifice. The images o f war (various barricades and an 
occasional uniform) and the descriptions o f the war, such as the “distant sounds o f
72artillery,” recall a version of Saigon from several years earlier, and written by 
civilians like Else Baker. By showing spaces like the Cercle Sportif, the images have 
a foundation in the French luxury that Americans living in Saigon earlier enjoyed as 
well.
Furthermore, when the comments o f Mrs. Lord, Secretary McNamara, and 
Episode 700 o f Your Army Reports Today are combined, a clear ideology emerges 
behind this version of Saigon. The war has not ruined the city or its people. To show
69 Ibid., 32.
70 Ibid., 30.
71 Ibid., 34.
72 Ibid., 27.
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this to be the case, this group o f statements and articles mobilizes a version o f Saigon 
constructed by Americans living in Saigon and the foreign press before the American 
buildup started, and American dependents were evacuated. The presence o f single 
American women who were free to move through the city serves as reminder that 
Saigon was still wholesome— their innocence, their “carefree bliss,” was not 
threatened. In addition, by expending images and copy on Brenda Lee’s dating life, 
“Secretary on the Edge of War” argued against the idea o f Saigon as a brothel. In 
Episode 700 and “Secretary on the Edge o f War,” Vietnamese women were not 
portrayed in a negative manner. Episode 700 contains a segment about Vietnamese 
women in the military; and “Secretary on the Edge of War,” while it focuses on the 
superficial, and comments on the ao dai and Vietnamese women as shop keepers and 
domestic workers, does not show the bar girls that other journalists like Sheehan 
described.
The wholesome American version o f Saigon put forward by McNamara and 
“Secretary at the Edge of War” did not monopolize the debate over what Saigon was 
like. In early 1966, the Los Angeles Times ran a story that preceded Fulbright’s 
brothel comment, about how Saigon had changed, but which also employed the 
metaphor of the female body to describe the city. Robert S. Elegant in “Once 
Tranquil Saigon Scarred by War’s Fury” reminisced about a Saigon he previously 
knew, while describing the city through a gendered metaphor. The sub-title o f his 
article sets the tone for his comparison— “Revisiting Former Queen o f Eastern Cities 
Shocks Writer Who Recalls Old Beauty.” Elegant opened his article by comparing a 
return to Saigon after a protracted absence to visiting a “woman loved 10 years ago”
in an “accident ward.”73 He went on to describe how seeing the battered and 
“misshapen body., .is almost unbearable against the memory of her form er grace and 
loveliness.”74
After giving an account o f the traffic and familiar buildings, Elegant noted 
how many things were not the same, such as the decline Saigon’s French culinary 
culture, or the tall, new American-funded buildings standing amidst the old 
buildings.75 But according to Elegant, one thing survived the influx o f Americans—  
sex. Even though the Diem regime shut down “opium divans and the more 
conspicuous brothels [it] could not whisk away the soft effulgence o f sex which 
floated over the white-faced buildings and the sidewalk cafes. But today, the city 
absolutely reeks o f sex— crude, commercial and instantaneous.”76 He portrayed the 
once “idyllic” Saigon River as a living being, as it differed from the one he 
remembered by the sounds of “the groaning of winches, the roar of tortured 
engines.”77 Elegant saw that the “ease and spaciousness” o f  Saigon had disappeared, 
and while he hoped these former attributes could return, he knew that they would not. 
He ended his article by suggesting that the city had died: “we shall always mourn the 
Saigon that once was.”78
73 Robert S. Elegant, “Once Tranquil Saigon Scarred by W ar’s Fury,” Los Angeles 
Times, January 23, 1966.
74 Ibid.
230
Other publications also engaged with the themes that Fulbright, Elegant, 
McNamara and Lord had inserted into the news. The Overseas Weekly, a sensational 
newspaper published in Germany and later in Saigon, briefly touched on Saigon. 
Overseas Weekly was known for critiquing the military establishment and was 
“adorned front and back by pinups, and crammed in between with lurid tales of 
scandal, crime and sin written in colorful GI jargon.”79 In June 1966, the paper ran a 
story about Fulbright’s comment and the conditions in Saigon. The article gives a
O A
military perspective on the debate between McNamara and Fulbright over Saigon.
It quoted a “top army chaplain” as saying that the GIs behaved morally. A “high- 
ranking Vietnamese” added that Fulbright didn’t know what he was talking about.
An Army Specialist, a non-commissioned officer with technical skillset, on leave in 
Saigon said the city seemed like a typical GI town. However, the G I’s comment 
implies a change. Saigon, to the GI passing through on leave, seemed to be the 
domain of Americans— it was a GI town.
Another article in Overseas Weekly, “Saigon Still a Brothel? Storm Still 
Rages,” does more than put Saigon into context o f  any town with a high number of 
GIs or defend the actions o f Americans and Vietnamese. While it provides a critique 
of Fulbright’s view of the city, the article begins with a few descriptive lines that
79 “The Overseas Weekly, Gadfly to the Army, Seeks Entry Into Asia,” Wall Street 
Journal, February 15, 1966.
SO Only part o f this article was archived in the Western Historical M anuscript 
Collection. There was more on page six o f the June 19 issue. “Saigon Still a 
Brothel? Storm Still Rages.” The Overseas Weekly (European Edition), June 19, 
1966.p 1. 6 Folder 549, Box 8, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University 
of Missouri.
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capture the reader’s attention. After quoting a proposition to a GI for sex, the 
article’s author maintained that it was hard to walk down Tu Do Street, “Saigon’s sin 
strip without getting an offer like this.”81 The article’s introduction, because o f its 
more sensational tone reveals the ways in which Americans mobilized the idea o f 
prostitution for their own devices. Here, even though the words that followed the 
quoted proposition showed readers a different take on prostitution, the introduction 
used sex to pique the interest o f readers. But, regardless o f what the author proffered 
as the reality o f the situation, the version o f Saigon this article creates is one similar 
to Fulbright’s account. When Fulbright talked about Saigon as a brothel, he also 
captured the attention of listeners/readers. He ultimately used the relationship 
between Americans and Vietnamese women, both real and mythic, to characterize the 
impact of the war on Vietnam.
While the two competing versions o f  Saigon permeated the American press, 
Vietnamese officials thought about other solutions to vice in Saigon. During a speech 
at the Saigon Lions Club,82 the South Vietnamese Welfare Minister Tran Ngoc Lien 
explained the circumstances o f sex work in Saigon. Lien said the war was to blame 
for the increase in prostitution in the cities. “Simple-mannered country girls who 
have been living in a village all their lives find themselves completely lost in the 
cities,” and because they have little job training, “ they become easy prey for madams
81 The Overseas Weekly (European Edition), June 19, I966.p 1. 6 Folder 549, Box 8, 
Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University o f Missouri.
s_ “Vice Crackdown Seen in Vietnam.” The Overseas Weekly (European Edition), 
September 4, 1966, 5. Folder 550, Box 8, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, 
University of Missouri.
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and pimps.” These figures, the “madams and pimps,” drew Lien’s focus. He felt 
they should face punishment as they attempted “ to push lots of virginal girls and
8 4chaste hearts in the path o f  sin.” The Overseas Weekly reported that Lien did not 
mention Americans by name in the speech, but that he blamed the reach o f  the vice 
generally on the “colossal amount o f money spent for it daily by the foreigners.”85 
As a solution, Lien suggested the South Vietnamese government move prostitutes 
from Saigon to a suburban “colony.”86 Once in the colony, the women would be 
monitored and kept under medical supervision while they went about their everyday
8 7routines, like shopping, working at bars, and going to the movies. The initial plan 
called for the women be allowed to leave the colony without seeking approval from 
an administrator.88 Moving the sex workers would be just the first step rehabilitating 
the young women.89
Over the course o f 1966, M cNamara’s version o f Saigon started to fade.
Lien’s speech made clear to both American and Vietnamese worries about the impact 
of the war on Saigon and its residents. While Lien did not explicitly blame 
Americans for corrupting Vietnamese women he still linked the U.S. presence to the 
problem, and Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. did not subsequently shy away from speaking 
about it. McNamara asked Lodge to answer a number questions about the
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
‘ 1 “Saigon Plans to Transfer Prostitutes to Enclosure,” New York Times, June 7,
1966; “Prostitutes’ Colony Set By Saigon,” Washington Post, June 7, 1966.
87 “Prostitutes’ Colony Set By Saigon,” Washington Post, June 7, 1966.
89 “Prostitutes; Colony Set By Saigon,” Washington Post, June 7, 1966.
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deteriorating conditions in South Vietnam, including anti-Americanism.90 Lodge 
summarized by telling him that “popular resentment against the American presence 
remains low” because many Vietnamese remember Americans are there to help them. 
However, he added “but the problem must be watched” as it could “flare up 
and .. .completely undercut our military success.”91 Even though there w asn’t much 
resentment against Americans, Lodge still was compelled to list the “principle 
irritants” such as
the effect o f the American presence on the economy—high rents, scarce taxis— 
and on the morality of the Vietnamese women, in other words high prices, 
bars, prostitution, and rowdyism. Some Vietnamese blame the United States 
for the prolongation and intensification o f  the war. Another theme is the 
destruction o f Vietnamese culture, i.e., we are Americanizing the young 
Vietnamese.92
To deal with these issues, Lodge and General Westmoreland worked to 
minimize the impact o f Americans in Saigon by reducing the number o f Americans 
(both military and civilian) in the city, imposing an eleven o ’clock curfew, and only 
allowing “one-third o f those stationed in the Saigon area on pass at any one time.”93 
The following day, the Los Angeles Times elaborated on Lodge’s comments. At the
90 Foreign Relations O f The United States, 1964-1968 Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, 
Document 254. Telegram From Secretary o f  Defense McNamara to the Embassy in 
Vietnam.
91 “Statement by H.C. Lodge, Monday, October 10, 1966, MACV Conference Room 
to Secretary o f Defense Robert S. McNamara and Party,” October 10, 1966, Henry 
Cabot Lodge papers II, Massachusetts Historical Society.
92 Ibid.
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time there were almost 18,000 American service members, spread across 82 different 
billets,94 and 3,000 civilians living in and around Saigon in addition to the 16,000 at 
Tan Son Nhut Air Base outside o f the city.95 The paper reported that “most o f the 
headquarters for various units” and the places GIs lived, were in already congested 
areas. The article, citing a “high officer concerned with the problem,” claimed that 
were three major issues with the American presence in Saigon.96 First, Americans 
got stuck in traffic that made military operations inefficient. Second, the inflation 
caused Vietnamese people in Saigon to suffer. Third, the influence o f Americans on 
the city strained the relationship between Americans and the Vietnamese people.97 
Specifically, the article argued that the nightly activities o f “drunk or abusive”
go
Americans on Tu Do Street hurt American relationships with the Vietnamese.
To relieve the strain on Saigon, the U.S. constructed new administrative 
buildings at Tan Son Nhut to replace those currently in the city.99 About 15 miles 
north o f the city, on a former rubber plantation, the U.S. military also set up an 
installation called Long Binh, which would provide additional headquarters and
94 Peter Braestrup, “U.S. Acts To Ease Saigon Crowding,” New York Times, October 
7, 1966.
95 William Tuohy, “U.S. Trying to Reduce GI Presence in Saigon,” Los Angeles 
Times, October 11, 1966.
96 Ibid.
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house 60,000 troops.100 To relieve the busy Saigon port, the U.S. began construction 
on a new port facility up river from Saigon.101
As the United States military and Embassy tried to move Americans out o f the 
city, the press continued to report on the worsening conditions in Saigon. The 
sensational, Gl-related stories from The Overseas Weekly cast the city as a dangerous 
place. Terrorist bombings of GI billets led one GI to tell The Overseas Weekly that he 
would feel safer in the new complex at Long Binh than in Saigon. The city was 
“noisy, smelly, crowded and dangerous.” 102 One story from October 1966 wrote o f 
GIs going to Saigon for recreation, where they visited “the Bars of Tu Do” and sought 
the company of Vietnamese women. The article split Vietnamese women into two 
groups: those who were outside establishments that catered to Americans, and those 
who were inside. The “girls” outside wore ao dais that made “them look like 
butterflies” and had “boyish” qualities— they were innocent. Inside “the GI joints,” 
however, women wore Western clothes because they could afford to— they earned 
more than other women.103
100 William Tuohy, “U.S. Trying to Reduce GI Presence in Saigon,” Los Angeles 
Times, October 11, 1966.; Peter Braestrup, “U.S. Acts To Ease Saigon Crowding,” 
New York Times, October 7, 1966.
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University o f Missouri.
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The dangerous world o f Saigon that The Overseas Weekly reported on and 
helped construct threatened Vietnamese women in addition to Americans. Because 
The Overseas Weekly covered crimes committed by GIs, it also detailed some o f the 
assaults against Vietnamese women. In an article titled “Booze, Sex, Money. . the 
paper told o f Truong Due, “an 18-year-old beauty with the delicate, porcelain features 
so many young Vietnamese girls have.” 104 Near the Melrose Bar, a bar close to “the 
Plaza, one of Saigon’s biggest BEQs [Bachelor’s Enlisted Quarters],” she became “a 
victim of her tawdry world of booze, sex and money.”105 The paper first tells the 
story as an act o f jealousy. Truong Due left the Melrose with one American, and her 
boyfriend Staff Sergeant William McQuaig found her “naked, in the hotel room with 
another American,” and allegedly killed her.106 The reporter did not follow up on 
McQuaig, but the article did include the reactions o f other women working at the 
Melrose Bar. They said that Truong Due was too young and “ loved money.” 107 The 
Overseas Weekly later followed M cQuaig’s court martial proceedings at Ton Son 
Nhut Air Base. According to the paper, McQuaig claimed that he and Truong Due 
were in his room together, but got in an argument and he accused her o f being part o f
104 “Booze, Sex and Money...” The Overseas Weekly (Pacific Edition), December 4, 
1966. Folder 499, Box 7, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University o f 
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the Viet Cong, at which point she used a handgun to commit suicide.'08 McQuaig 
was found guilty o f “negligent homicide, but let off lightly with only a one-stripe bust 
and a $300 f in e ” 109
Because of the tabloid nature o f The Overseas Weekly, it is hard to work out 
just what happened between William McQuaig and Truong Due. However, like 
many events in Saigon that only partially made their way into some sort o f archived 
record, the actual events are only part o f what created the city. The majority o f 
stories about the interactions between American men and Vietnamese women reflect 
how those stories used the relationships between the men and women to talk about the 
war. In the instance o f the reporting on McQuaig and Truong Due, the article 
described the latter as a young and delicate (thereby innocent) girl that had fallen 
“victim” to vice and the changes in Saigon brought about by the American presence. 
This was before she fell victim to the actual assault by the American service member: 
she was killed by “her tawdry world” before she was killed by a bullet.
However, not all articles about the city engaged so intently with sex and the 
relationships between Vietnamese and American residents o f Saigon. Articles in The 
Overseas Weekly often utilized a sense o f the unknown to describe the threats in
108 “Sgt Fined for G irl’s Death.” The Overseas Weekly (Pacific Edition), March 5, 
1967, p. 3. Folder 501, Box 7, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University 
o f Missouri.
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Saigon. This convention arose in the frequent articles about Military Police (MP) ride 
alongs in Saigon. These nightly patrols drove through “dark streets” threatened by 
unseen dangers— an “ambush by the Viet Cong— a shot from the darkness, a grenade 
tossed into the jeep.”110 There were also places where the patrols wouldn’t go— at 
one point, turning around “three miles from the heart o f Saigon,” because ahead was 
“VC territory.” The author explained that “machine gun companies” had to patrol 
these more dangerous areas, since the standard MPs were in charge o f protecting GIs, 
not engaging Viet Cong forces.111
A draft o f a later ride along article gave a more in-depth view of c ity’s threats. 
In this case, the threats also came from within the U.S military. This ride along 
revealed that the threat o f bureaucratic repercussions translated into physical threats 
in the city. Late in the ride along, the patrol got a call that a vehicle by the Capital 
BEQ had hit a Vietnamese man. The MPs responded to the call, but had “strict orders 
to leave their hand[s] off any incident involving Vietnamese.” The patrol was there 
for twenty minutes before the Vietnamese police arrived to help the man. One MP 
said, “w e’ve got strict orders.. .to do nothing at an accident scene except call the Canh 
Sats [Vietnamese police].... If  we lift one finger to help the victim and he should 
eventually die, we get the blame for it.” 112 This anecdote demonstrates a complex 
relationship between the authorities of two different police forces in Saigon. The MP
110 “MPs with a Difference Face Shots in the Dark.” The Overseas Weekly (Pacific 
Edition), December 11, 1966, p. 5-6. Folder 499, Box 7, Western Flistorical 
Manuscript Collection, University o f Missouri.
111 Ibid.
112 Stokes, Bob. “Stokes/mp Patrol” , August 5, 1967. Folder 36, Box 1. W estern 
Historical Manuscript Collection, University o f Missouri.
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patrol said they could help keep people away from the scene of the accident, but 
could not help those most who needed aid. The unseen danger here, in addition to the 
traffic that initially caused the accident, was the threat o f punishment from the 
American military system.
Changing the American Geography of Saigon
Stories that covered American life in Saigon after the American buildup 
started, like the MP ride along articles in The Overseas Weekly, exposed a changing 
geography in Saigon. Previously, articles about American leisure culture devoted 
most of their attention on the few blocks around the French-designed section o f 
downtown Saigon. As more Americans came into the city, Tu Do Street and the 
surrounding neighborhood no longer served as the main hub of leisure that it once did.
Reporting about the changing landscape o f  Saigon, and the places where 
Americans went when off-duty revealed that the United States brought with it one of 
its own social problems— segregation. While the United States military did not 
segregate its units, off-duty leisure in Saigon appeared to be more segregated than 
other aspects o f military life. Close living quarters in rural areas made off-duty 
segregation “ in country” less o f an issue, but the availability of different spaces in 
Vietnam’s cities allowed for the possibility of service members separating along 
racial lines— this was the case in Saigon.113
113 Charles C. Moskos, Jr., “The American Dilemma in Uniform: Race in the Armed 
Forces,” Annals o f  the American Academy o f  Political and Social Science, Vol. 406, 
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240
KJhanh Hoi, or “Soulsville” as GIs in a Wall Street Journal article called it, 
was a four, or so, block area in Saigon, home to a “sleazy row of 20 bars that line the 
west side of Trinh Minh The Street, across from the Khanh Hoi docks.” 114 The 
reporter described the area as “a rundown w harf.. .on the wrong side o f  the Ben Aghe 
River from the downtown area.” " 5 The bars in the area had names like The Playboy 
Club, Lido Bar, Three Sisters, Muy Juan, The Olympia, and Puerto R ico.116 Prices 
for drinks at these bars were cheaper than on Tu Do Street and the women working at 
the bars, according to patrons, pressured patrons less to buy drinks. Citing the U.S. 
Army’s Provost Marshal for Saigon, one author claimed the military was not overly 
concerned about Khanh Hoi. The Provost Marshal had called it ‘“potentially rough’ 
but ‘really not a bad area.’” 117 The only special measures they took in the area was to 
have patrols made up of both white and African American MPs.
Likewise, R.W. Apple wrote for the New York Times that while “Negro and 
white soldiers can be seen together in Saigon bars, a more common sight is a group of 
whites headed for Tu Do Street and a group o f Negros bound for the Khanh Hoi
Integration in the Armed Forces,” American Journal o f  Sociology, Vol. 72, No. 2 
(Sep., 1966), http://www.istor.org/stable/2775465, 44.
114 Selwyn Feinstein, “A Trip to ‘Soulsville,’ Where Negroes Gather in Saigon,”
Wall Street Journal, January 4, 1967.
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section on the waterfront.” 118 According to Apple, Khanh Hoi’s bars were “slightly 
down-at-the-heels...[and had] always catered to Negroes” even before Americans 
landed in Vietnam.119 Previously, black sailors frequented the area, and during the 
French Indochina War, black troops from Senegal had discovered the neighborhood. 
Apple found, however, that service members in Saigon “usually den[ied] that the 
more fashionable bars on Tu Do Street [were] segregated.” Talking to an 18-year-old 
African-American private, Apple found that the young man did not know why he 
chose bars in Khanh Hoi, but “he conceded that he hardly ever spent nights out 
w ith ...‘white guys from the unit.’” 120 Other opinions o f African Americans in Saigon 
varied, but mentioned that the women at the bars reminded them more of American 
women (Apple suggested that “some o f the bar girls appear[ed] to be o f at least partly 
Negro parentage”), and the music selection was more to their taste.121
The downtown area was not only physically separated from Khanh Hoi, but 
also seemed socially separated to at least some African American service members. 
One visitor to Khanh Hoi said, “you can’t help but get the feeling.. .that you’re not 
wanted at those downtown bars.” 122 Another compared Saigon to Mississippi:
“Saigon is just like M ississippi.... It’s segregated. The hammers (girls) over there on
1 i8R.W. Apple Jr., “Negro and White Fight Side by Side,” New York Times, January 
3, 1966.
1,9 Ibid.
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Tudo don’t want you around.” 123 A GI interviewed for an article in The Nation stated 
that the conflict also extended to white GIs. He didn’t notice racism during combat, 
“but when you have to go your own way for a beer or to find a girl, you realize that 
Chuck [slang for white soldiers] isn’t your buddy after all.” 124
An article from the Baltimore Afro-American  put a slightly different spin on 
the racial politics o f Saigon. In detailing discrimination, it questioned the impact 
racism might have had on the goals o f the United States in Vietnam. The author 
argued that “American-produced racism[had] been instilled in the hearts o f  the 
Vietnamese people,” and manifested itself in Saigon when eateries owned by 
Vietnamese and French restaurateurs would not serve African-American service 
members.12'^  One of the restaurants that would not serve African Americans, Le 
Guillaume Tell, according to other sources, was in Khanh H oi.126 However, the 
article mentioned other establishments in the district, those with “lovely dark-skinned 
Cambodian hostesses” where “genuine soul music [could] be found,” and that treated 
African-American service members “like brothers instead o f  the plague.” 127 The 
article quoted an Army Specialist, whose thoughts “echoed the sentiments o f most o f 
the colored G I’s in Vietnam” and in previous wars, by saying that “when
123 Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., ‘“ O ff Duty W e’re in a Different B ag,’ Patrons o f Soulsville 
Philosophize,” Washington Post, April 4, 1967.
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discrimination comes from the Vietnamese and French who we’re supposed to be 
defending, you wonder where w e’re at.”
While reporters wrote about Saigon’s downtown and Khanh Hoi as centers o f 
American leisure, American officials still hoped to remove the majority o f Americans 
from Saigon to help alleviate some o f the problems their presence had caused. In 
April 1966, almost 36,000 U.S. service members lived in the Saigon area. To help 
stem the problems, General Westmoreland, as directed by President Johnson and the 
Joint Chiefs, stopped sending new units to Saigon until the ones currently stationed
I - )Q
there could be moved.
Operation MOOSE, short for Move Out o f  Saigon Expeditiously, attempted to 
get Americans out o f the city, or at least past the technical city limits,130 but it did not 
proceed quickly. The United States had to construct new facilities, move offices and 
people, and return seventy properties back to their Vietnamese owners.131 Depending 
on the source o f the estimate, the United States government had to spend between $40 
million dollars and $117 million dollars and two years to remove all but 7,900 
Americans from Saigon and Cholon.132 Tan Son Nhut Air Base continued to house
;2: ibid.
129 Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years o f  Escalation, 1962- 
1967, (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2006), 272.
130 Jordan, Phil. “Moose Art 24-31 Dec 67, Jorda, 17 June 68,” June 17, 1968. Folder 
73, Box 1. Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri.
131 Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years o f  Escalation, 1962- 
1967, (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2006), 272-273.
132 “Overs Politik, Dec 9.”, December 9, 1967. Folder 49, Box 1. Western Historical 
Manuscript Collection, University o f Missouri; Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The 
Joint Command in the Years o f  Escalation, 1962-1967, Center for Military History 
(Washington, DC), 2006, 273.
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almost 20,000 service members. Despite this investment in time and money, the 
military still kept control o f fifteen hotels in Saigon and nine in Cholon. One o f these, 
the Brink BOQ (Bachelor Officers’ Quarters), the U.S. bought in 1956 for $1.5 
million dollars and the other, the Ambassador, the South Vietnamese government 
gave to the U .S .'33 The U.S. military, acting on the behest o f President Nixon to 
make Saigon less inhabited by Americans to demonstrate how Vietnamization was 
working, undertook MOOSE II in the early 1970s.134 The second round o f moves 
closed down more housing in the city, and changed traffic routes to remove military 
traffic from the city itself.135
Moving troops out of Saigon aimed, in part, to reduce the chance o f anti- 
American sentiment in South Vietnam. It also worked alongside measures to try to 
“clean up” Saigon. Nguyen Van Thieu’s South Vietnamese government decided to 
close down “ 160 cabarets and 47 dance halls” in late 1967 in order to, in the words o f 
government officials, “diminish the debauched aspect o f the city.”136 One Time 
magazine reporter saw this as a good thing, lamenting the difference between the 
Saigon o f late-1967 to a previous version of the city. The reporter wrote that bars and 
nightlife had made “tawdry neon jungles of once elegant neighborhoods as the Rue 
Catinat o f Graham Greene’s The Quiet American.” 137
133 Overs Politik, Dec 9.”, December 9, 1967. Folder 49, Box 1. Western Historical 
Manuscript Collection, University o f Missouri.
134 Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years o f  Withdrawal, 
1968-1973, (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2006), 199.
135 Ibid.
136 “Cleaning Up Saigon,” Time (December 1, 1967), 27.
137 Ibid.
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While moving Americans out o f downtown Saigon and shutting down some 
of the nightlife in the city held the possibility of changing the environment o f the city, 
the consequent build-up o f the American presence outside the city only shifted the 
concentration o f Americans from downtown to areas closer to Tan Son Nhut Air Base. 
In an MP ride along article that appeared in the Los Angeles Times, a reporter detailed 
the area near Tan Son Nhut Air Base. During the ridealong with the MP “Machine 
Gun Patrol,” the most heavily armed patrol reserved for dangerous areas, the reporter 
explored “an exceedingly dangerous road at an exceedingly dangerous hour.” 138 The 
patrol drove down Plantation Road that night. It bordered the “western edge o f 
Saigon, connecting Tan Son Nhut air base w ith.. .Cholon.”139 The author described 
the road itself as a previously normal path that was transformed after the Tet 
Offensive into “the most sinister strip o f pavement in all Vietnam.” 140 An article in 
The Overseas Weekly elaborated that the “the entire Plantation district, between Tan 
Son Nhut and the Phu Tho race track in Cholon, is less than three years old.” The Tet 
Offensive had demolished large parts o f this area and Communist forces worked from 
the area because “it was so lightly policed, which today is why it has become such a 
rough and tasteless girlie bar strip.” 141
138 John Randolph, “MPs Test Courage on Night Jeep Patrol,” Los Angeles Times, 
May 23, 1968.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 “On the Plantation Road It’s Still Jungle Law.” The Overseas Weekly (Pacific 
Edition), January 30, 1971, p. 2.Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University 
o f Missouri.
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Plantation Road, according to the reporters, served as a “natural front line 
between the city’s defenders and Communists attacking from nearby paddies.” 142 
Just a year later, however, Plantation Road’s representation seemed to have changed 
in the press. Instead of a deserted street— a front line— it now became a dangerous 
place because of the bars located there, which catered to the large concentration o f 
service members living at Tan Son Nhut. The Overseas Weekly reported in 1971 that 
these bars were the direct outcome of the U.S. move to Tan Son Nhut. The additional 
billets near the air base were in an area where inflation had not raised rent, so it was 
cheaper for the military to house troops there, but also for bars to open.143
The streets and bars of Plantation Road were constructed in the pages o f The 
Overseas Weekly as a dangerous place. One story told o f an incident where ARVN 
troops shot at the Military Police at the Star Hill Hotel.144 Another article mentioned 
that at one time the only place formally declared “off limits” by the Military Police 
was the Sing-Sing restaurant on Plantation Road because o f a shooting that had 
happened there.145 A year later, an article reported that “off limits” signs were posted 
in a particularly unsafe area off Plantation Road after an “angry mob” and hidden
142 John Randolph, “MPs Test Courage on Night Jeep Patrol,” Los Angeles Times, 
May 23, 1968.
143 “On the Plantation Road It’s Still Jungle Law.” The Overseas Weekly (Pacific 
Edition), January 30, 1971, p. 2.Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University 
o f Missouri.
144 “ARVNs Draw on U.S. Hardhats.” The Overseas Weekly (Pacific Edition), August 
23, 1969, p. 3, Folder 505, Box 7, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, 
University of Missouri.
145 “A Day in the Life of an MP,” The Overseas Weekly (Pacific Edition), 1970 
October 24, p. 10. Folder 511, Box 7, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, 
University of Missouri.
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shooters targeted Military Policy. The Overseas Weekly also related incidents in 
private residences on Plantation Road. For example, a Sergeant Major shot and killed 
a Vietnamese woman in her apartment on Plantation Road.146 Another article 
claimed it wasn’t unusual to find several fights breaking out at the same time on the 
same block o f the street.147
The emergence o f Plantation Road as a new host location for the leisure o f 
off-duty service members, in some ways, reveals the ways in which Americans 
influenced Saigon’s geography. Plantation Road, as reported in the late-1960s, did 
not exist before the Americans arrived in Saigon. After causing major changes in the 
city, American journalists and politicians questioned what was going on in Saigon 
and eventually decided to move Americans out o f the city. One of the results was 
Plantation Road— a dangerous place where Americans and Vietnamese still interacted, 
but not against the backdrop o f  a city that public memory might remember as 
peaceful or aesthetically pleasing. The same problems existed on Plantation Road 
that existed previously in downtown Saigon, but now the shared understanding of that 
area was not framed by the layers o f meaning embedded in the older buildings o f the 
downtown area. In other words, the American presence in Saigon eventually created 
its own meanings for the city.
146 “Sgt Maj Cleared in Girl’s Death.” The Overseas Weekly (Pacific Edition), August 
22, 1970, p. 15, Folder 510, Box 7, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, 
University of Missouri.
147 “Overseas-pacific, Gia Dinh-police, Cathy Domke, Feb. 6”, February 6, 1970. 
Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University o f Missouri.
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The changes Saigon underwent in the second half o f the 1960s and early 
1970s reveals how gender permeates American foreign policy. Different factions o f 
reporters and government officials used representations o f American and Vietnamese 
women to question the effectiveness o f American foreign policy and to defend the 
morality of the American presence in Vietnam. Ultimately, the figure o f the “bar 
girl” shows how private and physical relationships between Vietnamese women and 
American men in Saigon got translated into textual forms, which in turn could be 
used by the politicians of the highest level to shape opinions about American foreign 
policy.
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Epilogue: Binaries, Myths and American Foreign Policy 
“Dear Dean,” wrote Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. in late 1965, “I hate to add to 
your worries, but here is som ething.. .we're not doing.. .and I don't know what to do 
about it.” 1 At the time, Lodge was the American Ambassador to South Vietnam and 
he was writing to then Secretary o f State Dean Rusk. Lodge’s letter came in the 
middle of a series o f correspondences between Saigon and Washington about the role 
of American women in Vietnam. In these letters to the Secretary of State and the 
President, Lodge expressed his concern about his ability to gain influence with 
Vietnamese women and the diplomatic roles o f American women in Vietnam. While 
Lodge’s correspondence reinforced the importance of American women abroad, his 
letters reveal much more about the diplomatic relationship between the United States 
and South Vietnam— they urge us to reconsider the ways in which American 
diplomatic relations relied on certain cultural understandings of gender.
Well after dependents left Saigon, Lodge found out that he had a problem. 
After several conversations with the wife o f the South Vietnamese Prime Minister, 
Lodge concluded that she was not pleased by her husband’s position. More 
specifically, Lodge said that “like so many Vietnamese, she has not got a Western 
style, twentieth century patriotism, and she would like to have her husband at home in 
the evening.” 2 Lodge felt that she could be very influential to her husband and if the
1 Henry Cabot Lodge to Dean Rusk, Secretary o f State, December 14, 1965, Henry 
Cabot Lodge papers II, Massachusetts Historical Society.
2 Ibid.
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Prime Minister “[got] into a tight spot, [she] might make the difference as to whether 
he stayed in office or not.” 3
Looking at his letter to Rusk, Lodge’s problem was not with Prime Minister 
Ky or his wife, but with the lack o f American dependents in Saigon who could 
influence women like Mrs. Ky. “When I am asked whether we are doing everything 
we could do in Viet-Nam,” wrote Lodge, “I am obliged to say that we are not because 
there is no intelligent official American woman in touch with Mrs. Ky.” Lodge went 
on to explain that there was no diplomatic contact between American women and 
many wives of South Vietnamese leaders1-, before offering a solution. 4 Lodge 
wanted to bring the wives of five U.S. officials back to Saigon to make contact with 
female Vietnamese leaders and gain their support for the economic and militaristic 
goals of the United States Mission to Vietnam.5
After complaining to Rusk about the lack o f contact and influence Americans 
had with Vietnamese women in powerful positions, Lodge wrote President Lyndon 
Johnson. In his letter to the President, Lodge essentially outlined the same case—  
Vietnamese women were incredibly influential in Vietnamese society, and the United 
States needed its own set o f  influential American women to interact with them. 
Lodge’s letter to the President made explicit what his previous letter only implied. 
Lodge felt that he could not have the influence he needed with Vietnamese women.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
3 Henry Cabot Lodge to Dean Rusk, Secretary o f State, December 14, 1965, Henry 
Cabot Lodge papers II, Massachusetts Historical Society; Henry Cabot Lodge, 
“Officers Without Fixed Tours o f Duty at Saigon,” November 29, 1965, Henry Cabot 
Lodge papers II, Massachusetts Historical Society.
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Or as he put it, “obviously, there is a limit to what I can do where the ladies are 
involved.” 6 Lodge argued that this was “a job for the Ambassador's wife. Nothing 
lower ranking will do.”-7
Lodge’s letters concerning the importance o f the wives of high-ranking 
American officials in Saigon highlight two aspects o f the American presence in 
Vietnam. First, they reveal the diplomatic role American women played in the 
relationship between the Government o f Vietnam and the United States Mission in 
Vietnam. Rather than just seeing the presence o f dependents in Vietnam as a 
rhetorical device for showing support for the South Vietnamese government, Lodge’s 
“problem” revealed that American women potentially forwarded American 
diplomatic goals in Vietnam through their contact with Vietnamese women. Second, 
these letters express a need for us, as scholars, to consider the ways in which 
understandings o f gender influenced United States diplomacy.
Lodge’s inability, or perhaps disinterest, in connecting with the female 
Vietnamese leaders leaves us with many questions. For example, was there a 
gendered division o f labor when it comes to diplomacy? Or, how did American 
gender systems influence American understandings o f Vietnamese culture? We can 
start to answer some of these questions by looking at the results of Lodge’s letters to 
Washington. Because of Henry Cabot Lodge’s letters, the wives o f high-ranking 
officials, including Lodge’s wife Emily Sears Lodge, visited Saigon for short visits. 
While in Saigon, Emily Sears Lodge would do things like host dozens o f female
6 Henry Cabot Lodge, to The President, December 29, 1965, Henry Cabot Lodge 
papers II, Massachusetts Historical Society.
7 Ibid.
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Q
Vietnamese leaders for tea. When South Vietnam was preparing for an election in 
1966, Embassy officials met with her and a group o f other women to discuss how to 
build support for the election among Vietnamese women. 9
Emily Sears Lodge’s activities in Saigon suggest that American women, at 
least those in powerful positions, had their own role to play in American diplomacy. 
This more informal role, seemingly only accessible by women, may have been in 
response to American officials attempting to understand how Vietnamese culture was 
structured. In his letter to the President, Henry Cabot Lodge called Vietnamese 
culture “matriarchal.” His need for wives o f high-ranking officials was, in part, a 
strategy to adjust to his understanding o f how gender and power functioned in 
Vietnamese culture.
Henry Cabot Lodge’s letters and Emily Sears Lodge’s return to Saigon open 
possibilities for not only understanding the relationship o f Americans to Saigon, but 
also for the analysis o f American foreign relations with Vietnam. The archive left by 
the Lodge’s concerning their time in Saigon makes clear that American diplomacy in 
Vietnam was rooted in the confluence o f understandings about gender and culture—  
both American and Vietnamese. However, the sources presented throughout the 
preceding chapters, reveal the complex and varied ways Americans understood the 
people o f Vietnam and the city o f Saigon.
8 Dorothy McCardle, “Hers Is Part-Time Job in Saigon,” Washington Post, May 17, 
1966.
9 Edward G. Lansdale to Emily Sears Lodge, August 12, 1966, Reel 25, Henry Cabot 
Lodge papers II, Massachusetts Historical Society.
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Even though Americans held numerous views o f what Saigon “was,” their 
understandings of the United States’ relationship to the city was often one­
dimensional and simplistic. One o f these simplified versions of the U.S./Saigon 
relationship came from U.S. government officials. When people like Henry Cabot 
Lodge, Jr. and President Lyndon Johnson, discussed the meaning o f the United States 
presence in Saigon, they often presented a straight-forward understanding of 
American-Vietnamese relations based in the city. On different occasions, United 
States government officials, as shown in previous chapters, expressed how the 
American presence in Saigon was to support the South Vietnamese. For example, by 
building the new Embassy, the United States demonstrated resolve and commitment 
to the South Vietnamese cause.
The government and personal archives o f people like Henry Cabot Lodge do 
not provide us with complete answers as to the true understanding these officials had 
o f Saigon and its people. However, they do provide enough evidence to suggest that 
United States policy makers understood American-Vietnamese relations through 
national boundaries and constructed divisions between what they saw as the East and 
West. Ideas o f what was “Eastern” versus what was “Western” in Saigon appear 
throughout the chapters o f  this project and show a surprising resilience as they travel 
across media and time. From the earliest writings on Saigon, Americans engaged 
with an East-West binary when dealing with the city, often imbuing that relationship 
with Orientalist conceptions o f Asian cultures. The East-West/Orientalist binary 
played out not only through representations o f Saigon and the people living there, but 
also geographically. As Edward Said and others have noted, Orientalism is a term
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that describes the way in which the “West” (Europe and America) has viewed the 
“East” (Asian countries), how these “W estern” perspectives gets expressed through 
cultural products, and the institutions that have produced these views and products.
In other words, “Orientalism” does not play out simply in the imagination, but also in 
the material reality o f the viewers and the viewed. Orientalist thought creates and 
utilizes categories, such as “East,” or “Oriental” and “West,” that condense diverse 
cultures into homogenous labels. These labels allow people to easily create 
hierarchical differences between different cultures— for instance, the “W est” is 
different from, and superior to, the “East.” 10 Orientalist thought often falls into a 
pattern; “ it present[s] the West as rational, progressive, adult, and masculine and the 
East, as irrational, backward-looking, childish, and feminine.” 11 By convincing 
Westerners of the superiority o f Western countries, Orientalism has been used to 
legitimate imperialism and the domination o f peoples;12 it has also been used to view 
the Asian cultures as responding to “W estern” cultures rather than producing/being 
responsible for advancing their own cultures.13
Not all representations o f Saigon and its residents engaged with Orientalist 
tropes, but many did. Early representations of the city portrayed the Indochinese 
residents of the city as animals (see Chapter 1). Later representations like Graham 
Greene’s The Quiet American and Josepch Mankiewicz’s filmic adaptation (see 
Chapter 2) used less overt means o f constructing a hierarchical relationship between
10 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945- 
1961 (University o f California Press, 2003), 10.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 11.
13 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), 109.
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East and West. Greene and Mankiewicz also built upon conventions established by 
journalists (see Chapter 1) who cast the area outside o f the French-designed 
downtown as dangerous and uncivilized. The novel and the film both also portrayed 
Vietnamese women as available for the pleasure o f Western men. When the 
American buildup escalated in the mid-1960s, the Orientalist tropes concerning 
Vietnamese women gained momentum in the figure o f the “bar girl,” who came to 
represent not only danger to Western men, but also the failing of the American war 
effort in Vietnam (see Chapter 5).
Rather than engage with the East-West binary, a more productive way to 
analyze these relationships would be to treat the space o f Saigon with more flexibility. 
In the space of this more flexible version o f the city, people know each other and 
create different networks not bound by nation, religion, or other categories. O f course, 
these types o f categories could still influence the relationships people had with, and to, 
the city; but not fixating on these categories might provide a more in-depth 
understanding of how people understood one another and the places in which they 
lived. Like it or not, Americans moved to Saigon and became part o f  Saigon culture, 
even if they were there for only a few years. People like Else Baker show how 
meaningful relationships evolved between Americans and Vietnamese living in the 
city, even in the face o f a employer/employee dynamic that could have simply 
reinscribed a Colonial view of the relationship between American and Vietnamese 
cultures.
While the East-West binary runs through many o f the sources in this project, 
another binary surfaces at times as well. In different instances, we see a barrier
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emerge in the debates about Saigon between lived experiences and representations o f 
the city. That is to say, policy makers seemed unable to cope with the symbiotic 
relationship between the representations o f Saigon and Vietnam and the conditions on 
the ground. Take, for example, the debate between Senator Fulbright and Secretary 
McNamara about whether or not Saigon could be accurately described as an 
American “brothel” (see Chapter 5). This debate depended on the separation o f what 
Americans experienced while visiting Saigon and what the press reported. On the 
one hand, McNamara, who traveled to Saigon and argued that Saigon had a sex work 
industry, but most Americans there were not patrons, used an argument grounded in 
the assumption that the lived experience in Saigon trumped all else. He had been 
there, so he knew the truth. On the other hand, Fulbright had read a newspaper article 
about the conditions in Saigon that led him to call the city a “brothel.” The question 
should not have been what was “right,” or which characterization represented the 
“real” Saigon, but that both lived experience and representation had equally circulated 
to construct the city o f Saigon.
A more complex understanding o f the interplay between American and 
Vietnamese cultures and how the meanings of a city are constructed might have led to 
different outcomes in the American trajectory in Vietnam. Is this to say that cultural 
understanding and a more fluid approach to how cultures interact would have 
changed the outcome of the American W ar in Vietnam? Not necessarily. However, 
if policy makers better understood the cultural clashes happening in Saigon, such as 
the struggle between Diem and Buddhists, they could have made better decisions as 
to help the people o f Vietnam.
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While policy makers should consider the impact o f the cultural issues on 
foreign relations, they should also strive to better understand complex ideas about 
spatial relationships in order create better policies. Edward Soja’s idea o f 
“Thirdspace” is one possible starting point. Thirdspace is a term meant to encompass 
the way of looking at human existence through the combination of the lived and 
imagined experiences of a place. Soja argues that this is how people understand the 
world around them, and his term provides a framework for analyzing both social 
relationships and places. Had policymakers like Fulbright and McNamara considered 
the interaction between the representations o f the Saigon and the experiences o f the 
people living there, they might have not only resolved their disagreement, but 
foreseen some of the issues Saigon experienced later in the 1960s (see Chapter 5).
Examining the American presence in Saigon reveals the applicability o f Soja’s 
Thirdspace and shows how some people, to some extent, already understood the 
interaction between the representation and lived experience. During the 1963 
Buddhist Crisis, Henry Cabot Lodge and Vietnamese Buddhist Monks used the public 
spaces and the press to assert their agendas in Saigon (see Chapter 3). As Malcolm 
Browne noted, the American press, on multiple occasions, also became part o f the 
events they were hired to report on. However, the players in these situations seemed 
to view the lived/imagined relationship in these cases as causal—doing something in 
the public space resulted in its representation in media. A more post-modern view of 
Saigon (Thirdspace) would allow decision makers in the American Embassy to 
understand that the relationship between imagined and lived experience extended 
beyond this causality to bridge time and include other meanings. For example, while
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one meaning of Henry Cabot Lodge’s walk was that he was connecting with the 
people of Saigon, another was that the images o f him walking through the city placed 
him in the shadow of French Colonialism. The previous meanings o f  oppression 
placed on the downtown section o f the city; still existed in imagery o f the city and in 
his asserting control over the space, he also inherited some o f these meanings for the 
American presence in Vietnam.
This project has attempted to explain some of the ways in which Americans 
understood the city o f Saigon. However, it is not, nor could it ever be, considered 
exhaustive. In his book Postmetropolis, Edward Soja compared the attempt to 
understand “lived space” as similar to writing a biography. There is no way that one 
could ever capture all the events, or their importance, in a single life because “there is 
too much that lies beneath the surface, unknown and perhaps unknowable, for a 
complete story to be told.” Because one cannot tell a complete story, Soja urges us to 
“selectively explore” spaces “in the most insightful ways we can find.” 14
Thus, while there are necessarily some limitations to this project, one o f the 
greatest limitations lurks in the analysis of Henry Cabot Lodge’s correspondence 
about bringing American women back to Saigon in order to establish diplomatic 
relationships with the wives o f high-ranking Vietnamese officials. To fully 
understand Lodge’s desire to influence Vietnamese women, a future step o f this 
project would be to take into consideration how constructions of gender are culturally 
specific and to utilize Vietnamese sources. The current scope of this project does not 
allow for the analysis o f these types of sources, but future versions o f  this project
14 Edward Soja, Postmetropolis (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 11-12.
would need to address not only the ways in which the United States understood 
Saigon, but also the ways in which the residents o f Saigon understood the United 
States.
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